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STUCK IN NEUTRAL:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHIFTING
THE HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY AGENDA
INTO HIGH GEAR
A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE MAJOR
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY ISSUES FACING AMERICA
September 16, 1999
ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO
SAFETY
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) is an alliance of
consumer, health and safety groups and insurance companies and agents
working together to make America's roads safer. Advocates encourages the
adoption of federal and state laws, policies and programs that save lives
and reduce injuries. By joining its resources with others, Advocates helps
build coalitions to increase participation of a wide array of groups in
public policy initiatives which advance highway and auto safety.
Advocates was founded in 1989 by the heads of a number of major
property and casualty insurance companies and several prominent consumer
and safety leaders. These two communities share virtually identical goals
on highway and auto safety issues.
This Report is being distributed on the 10th anniversary of the
establishment of Advocates. Throughout the ten years during
which Advocates has worked on safety issues affecting the vehicle, the
driver, and the highway, important safety concerns have been addressed
related to occupant protection, vehicle crashworthiness and crash
avoidance, impaired driving, red light running, speeding, highway safety
issues including intersection safety and highway design, as well as issues
affecting consumer protection and information. On these and numerous other
issues, Advocates has played a dynamic role in developing legislative and
regulatory policies at both the state and federal levels of government,
expanding public understanding of auto and highway safety issues, and
encouraging coalition efforts to further reduce the devastating human and
economic costs of death and injury on the nation's roadways.
ABOUT THE REPORT
This Report is the work product of Advocates. The Report presents the
views and recommendations of Advocates on many but not all of the major
safety issues that are facing the nation today or that will confront
society in the near future. More detailed discussions of a number of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards are attached as an appendix to the
Report. For more information about any particular safety issue contact
Advocates.
The Report generally relies on data contained in the Fatal
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and as reported in Traffic
Safety Facts 1997 NHTSA (Nov. 1998), and on public information and
studies published by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) as well as other
organizations. Except as otherwise noted, final statistics for calendar
year 1997 are relied on because the 1998 FARS data was released too late
to be included in the Report. Specific references and citations are
available from Advocates.
This report was prepared by the staff of Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety. Advocates wishes to express sincere
gratitude to Amy Buckler, Kimberly Peterson and Brendan Gill for their
contributions to the Report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report, Stuck In Neutral: Recommendations for Shifting The Highway
And Auto Safety Agenda Into High Gear, is an assessment of both current
and future safety needs at the crossroads of two centuries. The premise of
this Report is that with over 40,000 deaths a year, and more than
3,000,000 cumulative recorded traffic fatalities, as well as millions of
serious injuries every year, there is a pressing need to renew and
revitalize efforts and actions to address this most severe public health
epidemic.
The Report provides analyses and discussion of 35 of the most prominent
safety issues organized in sections according to the fundamental
principles of motor vehicle fatality and injury causation propounded by
Dr. William Haddon, who served as the first administrator of the federal
highway safety agency. In keeping with the categories of the "Haddon
Matrix," safety countermeasures, including legislative and regulatory
reforms, that address pre-crash (crash avoidance), crash
(crashworthiness), and post-crash safety are divided into those issues
that involve vehicle design and equipment, driver behavior or, more
generally, human factors, and the highway environment.
In the Introduction, the Report begins with a discussion of the safety
successes of the last decade. The approaches used to improve traffic
safety include a mix of state and federal actions. The combination of the
enactment of a state or federal safety law, in conjunction with a public
education campaign and serious enforcement efforts has repeatedly proven
to be a successful safety strategy. Youth advocacy efforts can be included
as an emerging method for developing strong safety activists and improving
safety policies.
Safety improvements have been achieved on a wide variety of issues, but
they have not met with success in all areas of concern. While new laws
addressing driver and occupant behavior have been enacted, variation among
laws, gaps in coverage, and lack of uniform enforcement have blunted the
overall safety impact of such laws. In addition, many people believe that
federal regulation of passenger and commercial vehicles is no longer
essential. The Report emphasizes that not only does federal regulation of
passenger and commercial vehicles remain a critical area in which safety
performance must be upgraded and new standards established, but that the
American public overwhelmingly wants such action by its government. A set
of discussion papers on necessary upgrades to the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards , included as Appendix B, stresses the
need to revise vehicle safety performance standards to provide
state-of-the-art crashworthiness and crash avoidance protection.
The Report's Introduction also discusses the demographic facts of life
that population changes will increase the numbers and percentage of both
teenage and older
drivers. Since both of these age groups present special auto and
traffic safety issues and needs, the Report attempts to point out where
and how safety policies can and should address those needs. The Report
provides recommendations based on current law and knowledge that will
better prepare the nation to address these crucial safety issues.
The Report also makes the case that the public continues to espouse
high levels of support for actions that advance vehicle and highway
safety. Three polls conducted by Louis Harris on highway safety-related
issues, including one
released in conjunction with the Report , indicate that the American
public wants and expects vehicles and highways to be as safe as reasonably
possible. The overwhelming public support is especially true for the
important role that federal performance standards play in assuring the
public that high levels of safety are standard in every passenger vehicle
sold in America.
The body of the Report discusses the major safety issues facing the
nation, but by no means attempts to address every important existing and
prospective safety concern. The Report provides an agenda for the critical
safety issues that must be faced in the immediate future.
Areas of particular concern that require concerted action include
increased safety belt use, drunk driving, teenage driving, intersection
safety, truck-related fatalities, rollover crashes and excessive speed.
The over 80 recommendations in the Report lay out a detailed blueprint
for specific ways to improve auto and highway safety. Issue by issue, the
Report makes the case that to meet safety expectations and to provide a
reasonable level of safety protection, much more can and must be done by
policymakers in this nation. Not only must legislators and regulators
respond to current safety issues, but pressing concerns based on
demographic realities, emerging trends and new technologies must be met if
motor vehicle travel in the next 20 years is to be at least as safe, if
not safer, than the past 20 years.
SUMMARY OF REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFER MOTOR VEHICLES AND HIGHWAYS
THE VEHICLE
FEDERAL
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS)
NHTSA must revise and upgrade existing motor vehicle safety
standards to establish a new generation of safety standards that will meet
the needs of modern vehicles.
ADVANCED AIR BAGS
NHTSA must issue a final rule on advanced air bag systems that
includes performance requirements that protect:
children and other out-of-position occupants in low speed
crashes;
unbelted occupants in high speed crashes;
all occupants against neck, head and chest injuries;
NHTSA should require that safety belt systems include pre-tensioners
and load limiters as standard equipment;
NHTSA should require improved protection against intrusion that
causes leg, foot and ankle injuries;
NHTSA should provide more funding for research and development
of improved crash and occupant sensors;
NHTSA should increase the speed required for frontal crash
tests and consider adding an offset frontal crash test.
PASSENGER VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY
NHTSA should develop safety countermeasures to improve front
end and side impact energy management in smaller vehicles;
NHTSA should develop approaches to modulate the height, weight,
and general aggressive character of large vans, pickups, and SUVs;
NHTSA should require improved active and passive occupant
restraint systems in cars.
ROLLOVER PROTECTION
NHTSA should establish a new stability performance standard for
vehicles under real-world operating conditions;
NHTSA should require improved padding on vehicle interiors;
NHTSA should upgrade the current standard for door latch/hinge
performance;
NHTSA should require innovative anti-ejection glazing;
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard;
NHTSA should develop and provide consumers with comparative
information on vehicle rollover.
ROOF CRUSH
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard to include
performance requirements that control general roof failure and localized
roof intrusion;
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard to require a
dynamic crash test that reflects real-world crash experience.
SIDE IMPACT PROTECTION
NHTSA should upgrade side impact protection performance
requirements;
NHTSA should upgrade side impact test requirements for light
trucks and vans;
NHTSA should develop approaches to modulate the height, weight,
and general aggressive character of large vans, pickups, and SUVs;
FHWA should require placement of protective barriers and crash
cushions where appropriate on federal-aid highways;
FHWA should require retrofit for breakaway poles, light
supports and other highway appurtenances on federal-aid highways.
HEAD RESTRAINTS
NHTSA should upgrade standard to include state-of-the-art
performance requirements;
NHTSA should include performance requirements to increase
restraint height and to reduce distance between back of occupant's head
and the head restraint.
CHILD RESTRAINTS
NHTSA should expand the scope of the child restraint system
standard to children who weigh 80 pounds;
NHTSA should establish minimum safety requirements for child
booster seats and belt-adjusting devices;
NHTSA should develop a child test dummy representative of a
10-year-old child;
NHTSA should require that child restraints be dynamically
tested.
ON-BOARD CRASH RECORDERS
NHTSA should require on-board crash recorders in all passenger
vehicles and establish minimum requirements for data collection;
NHTSA should require appropriate data on crash mode and
severity be linked to automatic crash notification systems;
FHWA should require on-board commercial vehicle technologies
which help to accurately verify commercial driver hours of service
compliance.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND AUTOMATIC CRASH NOTIFICATION (ACN)
NHTSA and FHWA should make ACN a transportation safety
priority;
NHTSA and FHWA should dedicate greater resources and more
funding for ACN development and testing;
ACN technology should be required standard equipment on all
passenger vehicles.
PEDESTRIAN CRASH PROTECTION
NHTSA should establish a vehicle safety standard to improve
protection for pedestrians struck by vehicles;
NHTSA should include performance requirements that provide for
less rigid parts on passenger vehicle fronts ends and that require safer
distances between the vehicle hood and engine parts.
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE ROLLOVER
NHTSA should require performance standards which could
significantly reduce the propensity for rollover including requirements
for lower center of gravity, improved suspension systems, wider wheelbases
and revised design principles for cargo units, including tank trailers;
NHTSA should develop performance requirements that improve the
ability of trailers to respond to curves and quick steering movements
without becoming unstable;
FHWA should require reasonable operational restrictions for
multi-unit combinations that restrict tractor-trailers from operating on
facilities not designed to accommodate vehicles of that size.
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE BRAKES
NHTSA should require performance standards in commercial motor
vehicles to reduce the time needed to actuate the brake drums in order to
induce the installation of brake-by-wire braking systems.
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE DESIGN COMPATIBILITY
NHTSA, which has jurisdiction over newly manufactured trucks
and buses, should upgrade performance requirements for truck and bus
lighting systems;
NHTSA should require improved conspicuity treatment for
single-unit trucks;
NHTSA should require improved mirror and electronic vehicle
detection systems for trucks and buses;
NHTSA should improve requirements for rear impact guards to
make them lower and more energy-absorbing and extend these requirements to
single-unit trucks;
NHTSA should require side impact guards to prevent side
underride of large trucks and trailers by passenger vehicles;
NHTSA should adopt performance requirements that reduce front
end "aggressivity" of bus and truck cab designs;
FHWA, which has jurisdiction over the on-road operation of
trucks and buses, should require the retrofit of improved truck rear
impact guards to make them lower and more energy-absorbing;
FHWA should require the retrofit of side impact guards to
prevent side underride of large trucks and trailers by passenger vehicles.
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SIZE AND WEIGHT
Congress should extend the current federal weight limit of
80,000 pounds, and the length limit of 53 feet, on the Interstate Highway
System to the National Highway System;
Congress should continue the freeze on longer combination
vehicles (LCVs);
Congress should not enact special interest exemptions that
permit trucks to exceed current federal gross and axle weight limits;
States should not permit increased weight limits on state and
local roads and streets.
THE DRIVER: HUMAN FACTORS
STANDARD ENFORCEMENT OF STATE SAFETY BELT USE LAWS
Congress should require uniform adoption in every state of
standard enforcement of safety belt use laws or face the loss of
federal-aid highway funds;
States should enact and vigorously enforce standard enforcement
of safety belt use laws.
CLOSING GAPS IN STATE CHILD RESTRAINT LAWS
States should immediately act to close the gaps in child
restraint laws;
States should extend mandatory safety belt use laws to all
occupants, regardless of age, to all seating positions, and in all
circumstances.
MOTORCYCLE HELMETS
Congress should require that states enact all-rider motorcycle
helmet laws or face the loss of federal-aid highway funds;
States that do not have an all-rider motorcycle helmet law
should enact such a law;
States that do have all-rider motorcycle helmet law should
oppose any efforts to repeal or weaken those laws.
BICYCLE SAFETY
States should enact or upgrade bicycle safety laws to require
all-rider helmet use;
States should conduct education programs for bicyclists and
those that share the road with bicycles;
States should plan for roadway infrastructure and trail
improvements to better accommodate bicycles.
RIDING IN PICKUP TRUCK CARGO AREAS
States should enact laws to prohibit passenger use of the rear
cargo bed of pickup trucks under all circumstances.
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION: .08% BAC
Congress should require that states enact .08% BAC as the legal
limit for imposing criminal sanctions for drunk driving offenses or face
the loss of federal aid highway funds;
States that have a legal limit of .10% BAC should adopt .08%
BAC as their legal limit for drunk driving offenses.
REPEAT OFFENDERS
States should expeditiously enact repeat offender laws that
comply with or exceed the requirements of federal law.
OPEN CONTAINER LAWS
States should enact laws that comply with or exceed the federal
minimum requirements for laws to prohibit the transportation of open
containers of alcoholic beverages.
ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION
States should adopt ALR laws that provide for immediate license
revocation.
NEW PENALTIES FOR IMPAIRED DRIVING
States need to adopt measures that will keep repeat offenders
off the road, including
vehicle immobilization, forfeiture and use of interlock devices
as additional penalties for impaired driving.
DRIVER ALERTNESS AND FATIGUE
FHWA should revise current hours of service regulations to
increase truck and bus driver off-duty rest time, to protect that off-duty
time against interruption and to prohibit any increase in driving time
beyond 10 hours;
FHWA should require the use of automated vehicle tracking and
recordation of commercial driver duty time;
NHTSA should develop a sustained public education effort to
advise the public of the dangers of fatigued driving;
States should enact state graduated licensing laws that limit
the ability of teenage drivers to drive during late night hours.
RED LIGHT RUNNING
States should enact enabling laws that permit the use of
photo-enforcement systems, authorize enforcement agencies to cite red
light violators by mail, and place responsibility for the violation on the
vehicle owner.
SPEEDING AND EXCESSIVE SPEED
States should reduce speed limits on roads and highways that
demonstrate an increase in crashes, fatalities or injuries;
States should effectively enforce all posted speed limits on
all roadways;
States should improve the driving safety, highway design,
traffic control devices and remove roadside obstacles on highways posted
at 65 mph or higher in order to provide greater safety for vehicles that
run off the road at high speeds;
Congress should require states to submit appropriate data on
vehicle speed and speed-related crashes to NHTSA.
GRADUATED LICENSING
States should adopt three-tier graduated licensing systems for
teenage drivers.
LICENSE RENEWAL
States should explore reasonable graduated licensing systems
for older drivers that
incorporate individual evaluations of driver performance based
on consideration of driving skills rather than chronological age alone.
DRIVER DISTRACTIONS
NHTSA should develop human factors criteria and determine needs
for driver attention;
NHTSA should regulate the proliferation of in-vehicle displays;
NHTSA should regulate the proliferation of other in-vehicle
technology that can divert driver attention.
THE DRIVER AND HIGHWAY DESIGN
FHWA should develop a uniform set of human factors criteria
which specify "design drivers" governing highway geometric
design and traffic engineering standards.
THE HIGHWAY
INTERSECTION SAFETY
States should enact legislation that enables localities to
install photo radar;
FHWA and the states should revise the existing practices for
traffic control devices to permit longer phasing for pedestrian signals to
enable safer pedestrian crossing on high volume roadways;
FHWA should emphasize the need for state and local governments
to provide safer intersections for vehicles and pedestrians through better
design, improved traffic control measures and, where warranted,
rehabilitation or reconstruction of intersections.
HIGHWAY WORK ZONE SAFETY
FHWA should evaluate and revise the standards for temporary
traffic control in highway work zones, especially for driver decision
sight distance, temporary alignment, and cross-section design features
contained in the Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) , to provide a safer
operating environment for vehicles on roads undergoing reconstruction and
maintenance;
FHWA should also revise the MUTCD sections on pedestrian and
worker safety given the unnecessary pedestrian deaths and injuries that
occur in highway and street work zones, and the very high fatality rate
for construction workers;
FHWA also needs to require the states to report work zone
injury and fatal crash data with appropriate measures of exposure in order
to determine whether specific traffic control practices and other safety
countermeasures have measurable benefits.
HIGHWAY ALIGNMENT AND WIDTH (CROSS-SECTION)
FHWA should require the use of state-of-the-art engineering
standards on the National Highway System and Federal-aid Highways;
FHWA should issue standards, not just guidelines, to regulate
geometric design on highways constructed with federal funding.
ROADSIDE ENVIRONMENT
FHWA needs to establish specific standards for barriers and
impact attenuators that can reduce the severity of heavy vehicle roadside
crashes and to require the use of these improved safety designs as a
condition of receiving federal assistance for highway reconstruction and
rehabilitation.
TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES
FHWA should establish standards with minimum levels of
brightness for traffic signs;
FHWA should amend current standards to require one inch of
letter height on signs for every 40 feet of viewing distance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
ES 1
FORWARD -- THE "HADDON MATRIX" i
INTRODUCTION iii
Where We Are Now: Safety Accomplishments of The Past Ten Years iii
Where We Are Going: Future Trends in Safety v
1. An Aging Driving Population vi
2. Expansion of the Teenage Driving Population vii
3. "New" Safety Issues viii
How We Will Get There: Public Support for Effective Safety Approaches
ix
THE VEHICLE 1
A. PASSENGER VEHICLE SAFETY - INTRODUCTION 1
ISSUE: FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 2
ISSUE: ADVANCED AIR BAGS 3
ISSUE: PASSENGER VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY 5
ISSUE: ROLLOVER PROTECTION 7
ISSUE: ROOF CRUSH 8
ISSUE: SIDE IMPACT PROTECTION 9
ISSUE: HEAD RESTRAINTS 11
ISSUE: CHILD RESTRAINTS 12
ISSUE: ON-BOARD CRASH RECORDERS 14
ISSUE: EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND AUTOMATIC CRASH NOTIFICATION 15
ISSUE: PEDESTRIAN CRASH PROTECTION 16
B. COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY - INTRODUCTION 17
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE ROLLOVER 18
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE BRAKES 19
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE DESIGN COMPATIBILITY 21
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SIZE AND WEIGHT 23
THE DRIVER: HUMAN FACTORS 25
A. OCCUPANT PROTECTION LAWS -- INTRODUCTION 25
ISSUE: STANDARD ENFORCEMENT OF STATE SAFETY BELT USE LAWS 27
ISSUE: CLOSING GAPS IN STATE CHILD RESTRAINT LAWS 29
ISSUE: MOTORCYCLE HELMETS 31
ISSUE: BICYCLE SAFETY 33
ISSUE: RIDING IN PICKUP TRUCK CARGO AREAS 34
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE DRIVER: HUMAN FACTORS (Cont'd)
B. IMPAIRED DRIVING - INTRODUCTION 35
ISSUE: BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION: 08% BAC 36
ISSUE: REPEAT OFFENDERS 38
ISSUE: OPEN CONTAINER LAWS 39
ISSUE: ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION 40
ISSUE: NEW PENALTIES FOR IMPAIRED DRIVING 41
ISSUE: DRIVER ALERTNESS AND FATIGUE 43
C. OTHER CRITICAL BEHAVIORAL ISSUES 45
ISSUE: RED LIGHT RUNNING 45
ISSUE: SPEEDING AND EXCESSIVE SPEED 47
ISSUE: GRADUATED LICENSING 49
ISSUE: LICENSE RENEWAL 51
ISSUE: DRIVER DISTRACTIONS 53
ISSUE: THE DRIVER AND HIGHWAY DESIGN 54
THE HIGHWAY 55
THE HIGHWAY ENVIRONMENT - INTRODUCTION 55
ISSUE: INTERSECTION SAFETY 56
ISSUE: HIGHWAY WORK ZONE SAFETY 59
ISSUE: HIGHWAY ALIGNMENT AND WIDTH 61
ISSUE: ROADSIDE ENVIRONMENT 63
ISSUE: TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES 65
APPENDIX 67
APPENDIX A: Listing of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)
67
APPENDIX B: "Discussion Papers" On Major FMVSS 72
APPENDIX C: State Law Chart 95
FORWARD
THE "HADDON MATRIX"
This Report on the current status and future of highway and auto safety
issues relies to a great extent on fundamental principles established by
Dr. William Haddon. A full appreciation of both the methodological
approach and the particular safety countermeasures addressed in this
Report requires some understanding of the epidemiological context in which
safety researchers and advocates work. This forward attempts to briefly
explain that context and provide some basic insight into the systematic
approach used by the safety community.
Dr. William Haddon, Jr., the first administrator of NHTSA,
revolutionized highway safety when he discarded the fragmented attempts at
regulating highway safety and replaced them with a coherent framework
within which safety efforts could be organized. Dr. Haddon recognized that
the focus on driver behaviors alone was not sufficient to prevent or
reduce injuries, and that other factors had to be considered.
The achievement of the Haddon Matrix was the demonstration of the
dynamic intersection of the three major sub-systems comprising vehicle
operation and crash production - the driver, the vehicle, and the highway
- with the time line of crash causation composed of pre-event conditions,
the crash event itself, and the injury consequences of the crash once it
had occurred (post-event). The Haddon Matrix is usually depicted as
follows:
| THE HADDON MATRIX |
| |
VEHICLE |
DRIVER |
HIGHWAY |
| PRE-CRASH |
|
|
|
| CRASH |
|
|
|
| POST-CRASH |
|
|
|
Within each cell of the matrix it was possible to identify factors that
contributed to a crash or could have prevented a crash to determine the
causation of injuries and fatalities. Doctor Haddon used the premise that
most motor vehicle injuries and fatalities are preventable events.
However, when prevention fails in some cases, the next order of
business is to reduce crash severity and the incidence of injuries and
fatalities in crashes that occur. Finally, the post-crash cell addresses
actions and interventions that reduce post-crash safety problems such as
vehicle fires, and the response of emergency medical services which is
crucial to the amelioration of both the acute and long-term consequences
of the injuries sustained in the crashes.
The Haddon Matrix also pointed the way for use of "systems
engineering" as the controlling philosophy for reducing crashes and
preventing or lessening injuries even when crashes take place. By
approaching traffic safety problems through system engineering, designers
and regulators can take into account the interactions of human behavior,
the design of the vehicle both for crash avoidance as well as for occupant
protection, and the need to design highways to be "forgiving"
operating environments where driver errors should not result in deaths and
serious injuries.
This Report revisits the Haddon Matrix and reexamines the highway and
auto safety issues within the familiar categories of the vehicle, human
factors (drivers, occupants, and pedestrians), and the highway (roadside
environment). Vehicle crash avoidance and crashworthiness, although much
improved since the early 1970s, still have serious deficiencies. As to
human factors, it is clear that driver errors still occur for a wide
variety of reasons, the result of inadequate attention to both vehicle and
highway design. Lastly, highway design failures continue to plague traffic
safety. Both inadequate geometric designs and traffic engineering measures
still create dangerous opportunities for driver mistakes and serious
injuries and deaths are the tragic result.
INTRODUCTION
Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety (Advocates ) was founded
ten years ago to actively press for policy solutions that reduce motor
vehicle crashes and the resultant deaths and injuries that occur on our
nation's highways. The need for this effort is self evident. Since the
introduction of the automobile in the United States, motor vehicle crashes
have claimed over 3 million lives on U.S. roadways with uncounted hundreds
of millions of serious and minor injuries. The accumulated death toll on
our roads far surpasses the loss of American lives in all the wars and
battles this nation has ever fought. Moreover, traffic and highway crashes
continually take a toll of over 40,000 lives, incurs hundreds of thousands
serious physical injuries and head trauma, and costs society more than
$150 billion in medical and related costs each and every year.
As an organization, Advocates has a decade of experience in highway and
auto safety and brings to those issues a wealth of information and
institutional knowledge. This Report reflects this knowledge and is
presented as a means of focusing attention on the existing and emerging
safety issues that will lead America into the 21st century. Not
all of the safety problems that faced the nation 30 years ago have been
solved and new threats to public safety have developed. It is time to take
stock, reevaluate the safety challenges and take action.
This Report will document the safety problems that confront the nation
and discuss the areas that still have not been properly addressed by
safety standards and other countermeasures. The report recommends
solutions based on what Advocates and other safety experts know will work.
Experience has shown that one effective strategy that brings about
behavioral changes that improve safety is to motivate people to alter
their individual actions by enacting strong laws backed by public
education and committed enforcement. Equally important is the resolve and
determined political will of regulators, policy makers and elected leaders
who have the responsibility of setting and enforcing highway and auto
safety standards. Implementing the recommendations in this Report will
lead to even greater advances in public safety on American highways at a
time when fatality and injury rates have plateaued.
As Advocates celebrates the accomplishments achieved over the last ten
years, we also look forward to the next century and recognize the
challenges that an increasingly mobile society will encounter. This Report
will elaborate on the safety challenges, old, new, and emerging and
provides a blueprint for the future safety agenda of America. The agenda
includes new and improved performance standards for vehicles, better
protection of occupants and pedestrians and safety countermeasures in the
highway environment.
Where We Are Now: Safety
Accomplishments of The Past Ten Years
When Advocates was founded in 1989, 45,582 people died and
approximately 3,284,000 were injured in motor vehicle crashes on American
highways that year. The preliminary data from the Fatal Analysis Reporting
System (FARS) for 1998 reveals that in the past decade there has been an
overall nine percent reduction in annual fatalities since 1989 (41,480)
and a more modest one percent reduction in injuries since 1989
(3,251,000). During this period, annual fatalities reached a record low in
1992 (39,250), falling below 40,000 for the first time since 1962
(38,980), but have been on the increase in the last six years. The
fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) has dropped
from 2.2 in 1989 to 1.6 in 1997 and 1998. The decrease in the fatality
rate is part of an historic trend and the result of many factors. The
fatality rate, however, has leveled off in recent years after having
reached 1.7 in 1992. Despite the fact that VMT has increased from 2,096
billion to 2,618 billion in the past decade, and a number of safety
setbacks have taken place, there has been some progress in certain areas
of highway safety.
Achievements in safety policy have been accomplished over many years
because of the combined efforts of numerous individuals and organizations.
In the last decade, advances in a number of areas of highway and auto
safety were pursued at both federal and state government levels.
At the federal level, enactment of major safety legislation has
improved the quality of people's lives by providing a greater degree of
safety. For example, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991 (ISTEA) required the installation of dual front air bags in all
new passenger vehicles. To date, air bags have been estimated to have
saved more than 4,000 lives. The
National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 (NHS ) required all
states to enact "zero tolerance" blood alcohol concentration
laws for underage drivers. However, that legislation also repealed the
National Maximum Speed Limit law enacted in 1974. Enactment of the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998
encompassed a number of key safety provisions including a schedule for the
introduction of advanced air bag systems and requirements that states
enact minimum penalties for repeat offenders and prohibit possession of
open alcoholic beverage containers.
Among the states, success can be measured in the adoption of important
safety legislation. A summary of certain highway safety laws adopted by
states is included in Appendix C. As of August of 1999:
50 states and the District of Columbia have zero tolerance laws,
prohibiting any impairment while driving by persons under the age of 21;
49 states (all except New Hampshire) and the District of Columbia have
mandatory seat belt use laws for adults, although only 16 states and the
District of Columbia provide for standard enforcement of their seat belt
law;
40 states and the District of Columbia have administrative license
revocation (ALR) laws;
24 states and the District of Columbia have laws mandating that all
children under the age of 16, in all seating positions and under all
circumstances, be restrained by either a safety belt or child restraint;
23 states have a full graduated driver licensing system in place for
teenage drivers, and ten additional states have partial systems which
contain either a mandatory holding period for a learner's permit or night
driving restrictions once licensed;
21 states and the District of Columbia have all-rider motorcycle helmet
laws of which nineteen have defended their laws against significant
attempts at repeal;
17 states and the District of Columbia have a maximum blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.08% BAC;
16 states and the District of Columbia have standard safety belt
enforcement, and use rates in standard enforcement states are 17
percentage points higher than in states with secondary enforcement;
12 states and the District of Columbia have laws, demonstration
projects or pilot programs that use red light running photo enforcement to
reduce intersection violations.
At the regulatory level some progress has also been achieved. The
initial Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) were issued in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In large measure, these safety standards are responsible
for the general level of vehicle and occupant safety. The current FMVSS
and related regulations administered by NHTSA are listed in Appendix A of
this Report. A number of these standards have been revised and the core
safety requirements have been extended to light trucks and vans. However,
the existing FMVSS do not cover all aspects of safety performance and
occupant protection and a number of new vehicle safety standards need to
be established, especially given the changes in the vehicle fleet in
recent years. Furthermore, many of the safety standards have not been
significantly updated since they were first adopted and are in dire need
of upgrading and revision to reflect state-of-the-art engineering and
safety practices. A series of discussion papers on the need to establish
new standards and to revise and upgrade existing standards is presented in
Appendix B of this Report.
On another regulatory front, there has been little progress on
improving the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) , which govern commercial
truck and bus operations. These regulations, many of which were originally
developed by the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission in the 1930s
and 1940s, are the responsibility of the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA). Safety advances in this area have been quite limited, and the
existing safety regulations have not been effectively administered or
enforced. As a result, progress on advancing greater truck and bus safety
has been slow and difficult to achieve in the past decade.
Recent recognition by auto manufacturers that "safety sells,"
and that consumers are willing to pay for greater personal safety, has
also contributed to advancing safety. If consumers are provided with
accurate and reliable safety information, they can and will make choices
based on safety concerns.
Where We Are Going: Future Trends in
Safety
While there have been substantial advances in the field of highway and
auto safety, there is still much work to be done and new challenges to
confront. Upgraded and expanded motor vehicle and motor carrier safety
standards remain an important concern. In addition, traffic safety will
have to meet challenges posed by changes in technology (in-vehicle
applications), business practices (just-in-time delivery), lifestyles
(night-time and shift work), and population demographics. Since 1975, the
number of licensed female drivers has increased and has nearly reached
parity with the number of licensed male drivers. In the future, it is also
expected that greater access to mobility will also spur an increase in the
percentage of disabled drivers. The two most important areas which require
particular attention are the population trends that inevitably and
dramatically will increase the numbers of older
and
younger (teenage) drivers on American highways, two groups that are
overrepresented in motor vehicle fatality statistics.
1. An Aging Driving Population (Click HERE for
Graphic Chart)
In general, a larger percentage of the American population is living
longer than ever before. At the beginning of the 20th century,
when motor vehicles were getting a foothold in society, life expectancy
was only 46 years. Now, at the close of the century, life expectancy has
reached 76 years. Demographers refer to this as the "squaring"
of the aging pyramid and it has major implications for our country's
social policies, including how the U.S. responds to important topics of
public health and safety.
Currently, there are about 25 million people in the U.S. who are 70
years of age and older, representing almost 10 percent of the population.
Even more startling, U.S. census data show that this age group grew at
more than double the rate of the rest of our population over the last
decade. This trend will continue as the "Baby Boom" generation
begins to reach retirement age in 2010. By the year 2020, the U.S. will
have over 40 million people who are 70 years of age or older, and about 50
million who are 65 or older.
These figures must be considered in light of the fatality statistics
involving older people. Drivers age 75 years and older have fatality rates
above the national average. The fatality rate for drivers 85 years and
over is nine times higher than for drivers 25 through 69 years old, based
on estimated annual travel. In fact, while people age 70 and older
comprised 9 percent of the nation's population in 1997, they were involved
traffic in 14 percent of traffic fatalities, 13 percent of occupant
fatalities, and 17 percent of pedestrian fatalities. This indicates that
older populations, above age 70, in general are overrepresented in traffic
fatalities.
Personal mobility in passenger vehicles has produced an all-time high
in the number of licensed drivers over 70 years of age - currently about
18 million - and many more older citizens regularly or occasionally rely
on personal transportation as passengers in cars or light trucks. As this
segment of the population increases it will be necessary to address and,
where possible, accommodate the inevitable changes which occur in health
and functioning associated with ageing. As people enter their 70s, 80s,
and, nowadays, even their 90s, age or illness can compromise physical
abilities and lead to reductions in functional capacity, which can
adversely impact motor skills, cognition, attentiveness or alertness, and
dexterity. Everyone experiences certain decreased capabilities as they get
older, such as longer perception-reaction time, decreased peripheral
vision, increased sensitivity to glare, and more limited torso flexibility
and range of limb and neck motion. While persons of all ages are subject
to such concerns, the process of aging itself often compromises one or
more functions that are necessary to the driving task. Functional changes
occur at different times and to different degrees for every individual,
but are increasingly likely with advancing age.
It also should be stressed that most of these physical decrements also
lead to increased vulnerability of older persons to serious injuries when
involved in a crash as a driver, passenger or pedestrian. In addition,
riding in or driving a passenger vehicle produces specific risks for older
people which need to be addressed by highway and street designers, traffic
engineers, motor vehicle manufacturers, and government regulators.
As a result, whether as driver or occupant, older people have specific
needs which, unfortunately, are largely not being met with today's
roadways and cars. Numerous highway design features and traffic control
devices are not only inadequate for the general driving population, but
critically fail to respond to the specific capabilities of older drivers.
Similarly, passenger vehicles are designed, tested, and marketed primarily
to meet the driving and occupant protection needs of far younger drivers
and passengers.
2. Expansion of the Teenage Driving Population (Click HERE
for Graphic Chart)
Even as America experiences dramatic growth in the older driving
population, it will also see steady increases in the number of teenage
drivers on our roads. As the children of the Baby Boom generation, or the
"Baby Boom Echo" as they are often called, reach driving age
more teenagers than ever before will be behind the wheel. The teenage
driving population, on an upswing since 1993, will continue to grow so
that by 2010 there will be 23 percent more 15 to 20 year-old drivers than
there were in 1995. This increase in population is expected to be matched
by a similar increase in teenage traffic fatalities. Data show that
teenaged drivers are overrepresented in motor vehicle crashes, far
exceeding their percentage among licensed drivers. Even though teenagers
as a group tend to drive fewer miles per year than other age groups, they
are involved in 3 times as many fatal crashes as are all drivers. Not
surprisingly, motor vehicle deaths are the leading cause of fatalities for
young people 15 to 20 years of age.
There are a number of factors that contribute to this situation. While
younger drivers tend to have good eye sight, reflexes and hand-eye
coordination, they frequently lack experience and good judgment,
especially behind the wheel of a motor vehicle. In addition, they have a
greater propensity to engage in risky behavior compared to other age
groups. Teenage drivers are less likely than adults to perceive danger and
more likely to commit driving errors that lead to a crash. Teenage drivers
are also more likely to be involved in a single vehicle crash due to
speeding, driving recklessly, or over-compensating during sudden
maneuvers. Finally, teenagers are statistically less likely to be wearing
their safety belts either as drivers or occupants of motor vehicles. These
factors all contribute to teenage drivers having the highest crash rate of
all age groups of drivers.
3. "New" Safety Issues
In addition to population trends which will require new approaches and
safety countermeasures, other trends are developing that deserve
attention. These new safety issues include the phenomenon of aggressive
driving, the production of smaller and lighter low-speed vehicles (such as
golf cars and neighborhood electrical vehicles), and the development of
intelligent vehicle technology.
Aggressive driving usually refers to traffic infractions such as
speeding, tailgating, following too closely, unsignaled lane changes and
similar offenses often committed in combination with each other. While the
term "aggressive driving" has been applied in recent years as a
unique phenomenon, it is essentially a modern twist on well known poor
driving practices. States already have laws and regulations that deal with
the underlying traffic violations. To the extent that aggressive driving
as a new safety issue is based on the malicious intent of drivers, some
law enforcement agencies have begun special monitoring programs to
identify aggressive driving behavior. Enforcement efforts are frequently
combined with driver education and public information efforts, including
courteous driving campaigns, in an attempt to reduce the incidence of
aggressive driving.
The use of smaller, lighter non-traditional vehicles for local
transportation on public highways is a safety issue that is only beginning
to take shape. Recent actions by several states and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) now permit the use of
low-speed vehicles such as golf cars on public highways along with
passenger cars, light trucks, vans, and commercial motor vehicles. At
present, the number of vehicles in this class are small, and the on-road
use is limited. In the future, as the older driving population increases
and a new generation of small, light vehicles, including neighborhood
electric vehicles, are developed and marketed, these vehicles may present
a new safety issue regarding the compatibility of the vehicle fleet on
American highways.
Finally, the development of intelligent vehicles, which is supposed to
provide greater safety through crash prevention, or crash avoidance,
remains on the safety horizon. It is unlikely that intelligent vehicle
technology will ever bring about large reductions in crashes and
fatalities. Most of the ideas referred to as intelligent vehicle systems
either have no safety component or rely on sophisticated technology that
has not been proven practical for safety applications in mass production
vehicles. The Report does address a few good ideas that involve
technological solutions and in-vehicle communications, such as more
advanced crash and occupant sensors, safety technology for commercial
motor vehicles, and automated crash notification. These ideas rely on
existing technology and have practical applications that are likely to
have safety benefits. In addition, the Report discusses the disadvantage
of increasing technology, the potential for driver distraction from an
overload of in-vehicle technology.
How We Will Get There: Public
Support for Effective Safety Approaches
The experience of the past decade makes it clear that different safety
issues require varying approaches. In general, however, the combination of
safety laws, explained through public education and information campaigns,
which are coupled to committed enforcement efforts provides the best
possible atmosphere for public acceptance and observance of safety
measures. As part of this mix, Advocates is spearheading attempts to
develop a burgeoning youth advocacy movement in which young citizens speak
out on safety issues on their own behalf, while learning how government
works.
In any event, it is evident that there must be a mixture of efforts at
both the state and federal levels of government. A number of safety
problems can only be tackled through state intervention and through state
and local law enforcement. However, traffic safety is also a national
concern that affects public health across the nation. Frequently, however,
safety countermeasures are not dependent on local conditions but need to
be addressed in a uniform manner regardless of political boundaries,
especially in regard to issues of public health and safety.
The public has long supported the need to adopt national solutions to
deal with national problems The American people have continually supported
state and federal legislation and regulation aimed at improving highway
and auto safety in order to achieve a greater degree of personal safety
for themselves and their loved ones.
On three separate occasions, Advocates has commissioned the national
pollster, Louis Harris, to conduct surveys of the American public's
opinions on a range of highway and auto safety topics. The results were
released in May 1996
, April 1998
, and September,
1999 , contemporaneous with the issuance of this Report. The polls
reveal that the public has a continuing and growing interest in the safety
of highways and vehicles, as well as a strong resolve that there be a
heightened government presence to ensure safe cars and roads.
The 1999 Louis Harris poll reflects the largest support yet for a
strong federal presence in safety matters including highway and auto
safety. A record 93 percent of respondents said that it is
"important" for the federal government to be concerned about
uniform safety standards. This continues the trend of increasing support
for federal activity to ensure uniform safety standards. In the 1998 poll
89 percent of respondents thought this was an "important"
federal responsibility, and in the 1996 poll 85 percent of respondents
called the federal presence "important." While more people think
that federal safety standards are important today compared to three years
ago, a constant percentage believe that such a federal role is "very
important." There was no erosion in support among the 61 percent of
the population, or six out of ten respondents, who deemed federal safety
regulations to be "very important" between the 1999 and 1996
polls. In response to a question in the 1998 poll, public supported more
federal funding for auto safety by a margin of 77 to 21 percent. .
The 1999 poll also inquired about the need to revise or renew the
safety standards that regulate motor vehicles. More than two-thirds of the
respondents, 69 percent, agreed that it is time to set new auto safety
standards. Only 25 percent thought that the existing motor vehicle safety
standards were sufficient. In light of the changes in fleet mix, vehicle
design, technology and equipment it is understandable that the public
would express a desire for the issuance of up-to-date vehicle safety
standards. Toward this goal, Advocates has provided in depth discussion
papers, in Appendix B of this Report, regarding the need to establish
several new motor vehicle safety standards and the improvements required
to upgrade the level of safety provided by a number of the existing safety
standards.
In the 1999 poll, the public also expressed overwhelming concern about
other key auto and highway safety issues. For example, 85 percent of those
polled want more attention paid to intersection safety problems, including
making intersections safer for pedestrians, with over half of all
respondents (57 percent) saying that much more attention should be given
to this safety issue. In a related question, over two-thirds of those
responding said that "somewhat more" (39 percent) or "much
more" (31 percent) attention is needed for intersection safety
improvements. In addition, three-quarters of Americans, 74 percent,
identified red light running as a safety problem and favored the use of
red light cameras, automated photographic technology, to reduce the
incidence of red light running by drivers.
On other safety concerns included in the poll, more than four of five
persons asked (81 percent) supported the mandatory installation of
technology to improve truck safety including the use of so-called
"black box" data recorders and technology to provide warnings to
truck drivers when they are getting tired. Widespread support was also
found for more frequent license testing of younger and older drivers.
Among those polled, 72 percent supported more frequent license tests for
younger drivers, and 83 percent for older drivers. Significantly, 69
percent of respondents ages 18 to 29 supported more frequent license tests
for younger drivers, and 80 percent of respondents aged 65 and over
supported more frequent license tests for older drivers.
In a number of surveys, and in the two earlier polls conducted by Louis
Harris for Advocates, the public expressed strong opinions about federal
regulation of underage drinking and impaired driving. Seventy-eight
percent of adults surveyed opposed any effort to roll back the legal
drinking age from 21 years of age. A decisive majority of 91 percent
favored uniform laws mandating that teenage drivers who test positive for
any alcohol are subject to immediate revocation of their driver's license
and are subject to strong penalties for driving under the influence. As of
spring 1998, this desire of the public became a reality. All states
currently have zero tolerance laws under which any driver under the age of
21 may not have greater than a 0.02 percent BAC. Similar action must be
taken in other highway safety areas in which there is such sweeping public
support and need for a policy response.
Another such area with overwhelming public support is the realm of
child restraint laws. An impressive 90 percent of adult respondents
believed that "all people driving children, whether they are related
to the children or not, should be made responsible for ensuring that the
children are properly belted in." Americans responded that they
favored stronger enforcement of child safety laws that require all
children to be buckled up. Eighty-four percent of adult respondents favor
making it mandatory for states to require that all children traveling in
vehicles operated by anyone, not just their parents, no matter where the
children are riding must be buckled in child safety seats.
These results emphasize that the American public wants and expects the
federal government to continue to assure high levels of safety in the
vehicles we drive and the roads we travel. It is clear that where
necessary, the public assumes that strong safety measures have be taken
and that adequate safety standards exist. These and other public opinion
surveys, as well as the desire of American consumers to purchase vehicles
built with greater levels of safety, is a call for action that simply
cannot be ignored. The public would like to see strong federal regulation
of car safety standards, large truck safety, safe highways, laws mandating
safety belt use and availability of consumer information. On other issues,
the public desires an active state presence to protect child passengers,
ensure the use of seat belts by older children and adults, and in setting
reasonable speed limits and controlling excessive speed on highways.
The determination of which measures are effective and should be pursued
must be the result of a systematic analysis of the interactions between
vehicles, occupants, and the roadside environment. In the forward to this
Report, we briefly set out the basic philosophy of prevention in highway
and vehicle design and mentioned how an integrated policy approach called
"systems engineering" is needed to form an interconnected set of
design and performance characteristics for both roads and vehicles that
directly responds to the needs of promoting safer driving and increasing
occupant protection when crashes occur.
Broad public concern for highway safety, rapidly changing driver
demographics, unacceptably high fatalities and injuries each year and, at
times, government inertia in pressing for substantial progress, require a
review of the unfinished highway safety agenda and a road map for
advancing safety in the 21st century. The following Report is
Advocates' assessment of the highway and auto safety issues that need
attention and action in our effort to reduce traffic deaths and injuries.
The most valuable lens through which to view the entire driving
environment is the Haddon Matrix which integrates the need for prevention
in transportation decision-making with the concept of systems engineering.
For this reason, Advocates' relies on the Haddon Matrix as the basic
outline for our analysis. By using a systems engineering approach, the
Report reviews and recommends safety strategies dealing with the vehicle,
the occupant, and the roadway environment.
HADDON MATRIX PART ONE:
THE VEHICLE
A. PASSENGER VEHICLE SAFETY -
INTRODUCTION
Passenger vehicle safety is separated into three major areas in
accordance with the Haddon Matrix: pre-crash safety performance, often
called crash avoidance, protection of vehicle occupants when crashes
occur, usually referred to as crashworthiness, and post-crash integrity of
the vehicle and emergency response in the event of a crash.
Crash avoidance standards and designs address a number of vehicle
operating systems, some of which are often taken for granted as direct
contributors to the safe operation of a car or light truck. For example,
windshields and side windows near the driver must be able to transmit
sufficient light day and night to ensure adequate visibility, and driver
controls and displays need to be easy to locate and use, and provide a
clear and uniform message that assist drivers and ensure consistently safe
vehicle operation.
A number of important vehicle crash avoidance standards are overdue for
revision. Advances in technological capabilities or new information
showing the inadequacies of certain designs and their performance have not
been accommodated quickly enough. As a result, many benefits of safe
operation through crash prevention have been denied to the motoring
public. Some of these standards will be reviewed in the sections that
follow.
Similarly, passenger vehicle crashworthiness standards have also lagged
in many respects even though research and crash data over the past several
years clearly have shown the need to revise and upgrade major standards
for the prevention of serious injuries and deaths to car and light truck
occupants. This Report will address important crash safety performance
issues that are overdue for attention. Many of the FMVSS have not been
significantly revised since first adopted thirty years ago. In the case of
both crash avoidance and crashworthiness, a more detailed treatment of the
major policy and safety issues pertaining to the federal motor vehicle
safety standards are provided as an appendix to this Report.
Post-crash issues include vehicle integrity as well as the response of
emergency medical services and hospital care. The latter has long been
left to the domain of individual, local emergency response units. Recent
technological and other developments are improving the role that
post-crash intervention can play in saving lives and reducing injuries.
The addition of automatic crash notification would improve emergency
response time that would greatly benefit the medical outcomes for crash
victims.
ISSUE: FEDERAL
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS )
Performance requirements for crash avoidance and crashworthiness
features of motor vehicles are contained in the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) , which govern most major
safety systems in cars, pickups, and vans. The FMVSS are issued by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and each standard is
categorized based on the Haddon Matrix and whether the standard provides
pre-crash, crash, or post-crash protection. While the FMVSS
are the backbone of American passenger vehicle safety, they do not
cover all aspects of vehicle safety. Moreover, many of the standards in
the FMVSS
were issued early in the history of NHTSA
and while some have been updated over the ensuing 30 years, others remain
in need of major revision.
Many of the original standards were issued by the agency based upon
prevailing motor vehicle manufacturer industry voluntary standards in
order to quickly achieve regulation of new vehicle safety design and
performance. The initial FMVSS reflected engineering and safety practices
prevalent in the 1960s. Unfortunately, some standards have languished for
many years without appropriate revisions and others been either proposed
for adoption or amendment without success. In a number of other instances,
significant areas of vehicle safety design and performance are
unregulated, leaving the quality of either crash avoidance or
crashworthiness to the discretion of motor vehicle manufacturers.
In the following sections, this report will briefly review major motor
vehicle safety standards which need to be improved or newly established.
More detailed analyses of the issues related to each of the major FMVSS
standards which require upgrading are contained in the appendix to this
Report.
RECOMMENDATION:
NHTSA must revise and upgrade existing motor vehicle safety
standards to establish a new generation of safety standards that will meet
the needs of modern vehicles.
ISSUE: ADVANCED AIR BAGS
Air bags have proven to be a key occupant safety device which can
minimize or eliminate head, face, and chest injuries in high speed motor
vehicle crashes. Air bags are 31 percent effective in reducing fatalities
in frontal crashes and they are estimated to have saved more than 4,000
people to date, mostly unbelted occupants. Teenage and young male drivers
who do not buckle up are primary beneficiaries of air bags. About a third
or more of all occupants still do not wear safety belts and for them air
bags are the main method of occupant protection.
However, air bags also provide safety protection for belted occupants.
In combination with lap/shoulder safety belts, air bags are 75 percent
effective in preventing serious head injury and 66 percent effective in
preventing serious chest injury. This safety record could be improved if
safety belts were equipped with pre-tensioners and load limiters as
standard equipment. These devices would improve safety belt performance
when interacting with air bags. This would be particularly beneficial to
older people who suffer broken bones more readily than other occupants.
Air bags are now required for front seat occupants in all new passenger
vehicles sold in the U.S. because of their great safety potential-- it is
estimated that 3,000 lives could be saved each year when all passenger
vehicles are air bag equipped.
Nevertheless, air bags have been responsible for more than 140 deaths,
mostly to children and shorter adults. These losses have occurred
primarily in low speed crashes where an air bag deployment was not
required to save lives. Many of the children killed were not sitting back
against the seat and were considered to be "out-of-position."
Many of the adult drivers were sitting too close to the steering column
and the air bag. All but a few of the people killed by air bags were
either unbelted or improperly belted.
Interim action has been taken to reduce the power of air bag
deployments. Safety considerations for children and out-of-position
occupants necessitate that air bags do not deploy, or do not harm
occupants if they are deployed, in low speed crashes, while still
deploying fast enough to ensure occupant protection in high speed crashes.
NHTSA is presently considering a proposed rule to set performance
standards for advanced air bags and is trying to determine what tests are
needed to ensure that air bags perform as intended. The air bag
requirements need to be upgraded to include various crash test dummy
sizes, both belted and unbelted, that are tested in a variety of positions
and at various speeds in crashes into a fixed barrier. Performance
requirements are also needed to ensure that air bag technology protects
all size occupants in real world crash conditions.
Vehicle sensors must also be capable of properly determining that a
crash is severe enough to deploy the air bags, and that determination must
be made early enough in the crash to allow for a safe deployment. In the
future, sensors will be required that determine the characteristics of the
occupant and the crash and which can instantly fine tune the air bag
deployment based on both these factors.
Because air bags and safety belt are saving lives and reducing the
probability of serious head and chest injuries, more people survive
crashes with other injuries, especially broken legs and ankles. These type
of injuries are generally less severe for most of the population but
present serious injuries for older occupants. In order to reduce or
prevent these injuries, greater protection from intrusion must be provided
to the vehicle occupant compartment. This can be done by testing vehicle
designs against intrusion and at higher impact speeds. A higher speed
frontal crash test and a high speed offset frontal crash test should be
considered and eventually adopted to ensure greater occupant protection in
high speed crashes.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA must issue a final rule on advanced air bag systems that
includes performance requirements that protect:
children and other out-of-position occupants in low speed
crashes;
unbelted occupants in high speed crashes;
all occupants against neck, head and chest injuries;
NHTSA should require that safety belt systems include
pre-tensioners and load limiters as standard equipment;
NHTSA should require improved protection against intrusion that
causes leg, foot and ankle injuries;
NHTSA should provide more funding for research and development
of improved crash and occupant sensors;
NHTSA should increase the speed required for frontal crash
tests and consider adding an offset frontal crash test.
ISSUE: PASSENGER VEHICLE
COMPATIBILITY
An important aspect of both crash avoidance and crashworthiness designs
and performance is the controlled, predictable interaction of vehicles
prior to and during collisions. Each passenger vehicle shares the road
with other vehicles, and compatible operation is crucial to securing high
levels of resulting traffic safety and crash protection.
For crash avoidance operations, for example, headlamp designs are
critically important not only for providing sufficient illumination to
drivers to see the road and traffic control devices such as signs and
pavement markings, but also to supply necessary light without generating
disabling glare for other drivers. Similarly, strategic placement of
marker and tail lamps are needed so that other drivers can easily detect
other vehicles in the vicinity. Other systems that govern crash avoidance
maneuvering, such as brakes which must perform repeatedly in a reliable
manner to guarantee safe deceleration and stops, especially near other
vehicles sharing the road. In the crashworthiness arena, the challenge
facing regulators and safety engineers is to provide good occupant
protection despite a wide variety of possible types of crashes, including
those between vehicles of different sizes, weights and designs.
While some disparity in vehicle size has always existed, especially
between passenger vehicles and medium and heavy trucks, there is growing
disparity among passenger vehicles.
The growth of the light truck and van market in recent years --
especially in sport utility vehicles (SUVs) - has aggravated this serious
problem of crash incompatibility. Large SUVs, pickups, and vans inflict
far more damage and cause greater vehicle intrusion when they collide with
smaller passenger vehicles, especially cars. Not only are these vehicles
often considerably heavier than most cars, but they also are higher and
stiffer so that much more crash energy is transferred to the smaller
vehicle in a crash than would be produced by another car.
This means that crash management for protecting occupants in the
smaller vehicle is shouldered primarily by the smaller vehicle's safety
design and performance. Statistics show that most smaller vehicles don't
do a very good job in preventing dangerous, life-threatening crash forces
from reaching occupants when their vehicles are struck by larger vehicles.
This is especially true in side impact crashes where the larger, heavier,
taller, stiffer vehicle is particularly dangerous when its front end
collides with the sides of small vehicles, as often occurs in intersection
crashes. In these side impacts, there is little structure intervening
between occupants and the crash forces. As an example, the chances of
death for small car occupants when their vehicles are struck in the side
by a large pickup truck or a SUV are more than 20 times greater than when
the collision is with another small car.
Whether front or side crashes, it has become rapidly apparent that
improving the safety of small vehicles in crashes with larger vehicles
requires a systems engineering approach of both further improving the
crash management capabilities of smaller vehicles as well as softening the
severity of impacts by larger vehicles. Many of the possible
countermeasures are just now being implemented or are being studied, but,
in the main, they center on better front and, especially, side impact
energy management in smaller vehicles, and improved active and passive
restraint systems in cars, paralleled by efforts to modulate the height,
weight, and general aggressive character of large vans, pickup trucks, and
SUVs. Given the 50 percent new vehicle market share now enjoyed by the
general class of light trucks and vans, offsetting the excessive crash
losses currently suffered by occupants of smaller passenger vehicles when
struck by larger vehicles is clearly an urgent topic for safety
researchers, government decision makers, and motor vehicle manufacturers.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should develop safety countermeasures to improve front
end and side impact energy management in smaller vehicles;
NHTSA should develop approaches to modulate the height, weight,
and general aggressive character of large vans, pickups, and SUVs;
NHTSA should require improved active and passive occupant
restraint systems in cars.
ISSUE: ROLLOVER PROTECTION
Rollovers of passenger vehicles are particularly severe crashes with
very high rates of fatalities and severe injuries which usually are the
result of massive trauma, especially to the head and neck. Also, a
substantial portion of rollover fatalities is due to occupant ejection.
Thus, both crash avoidance and crashworthiness countermeasures are needed
to address the enormous annual losses from rollovers. Over 7,000 fatal
rollover crashes have occurred each year for the past few years and more
than 9,000 deaths in rollover crashes may have occurred in 1998.
Vehicles with narrower wheelbases and a relatively high center of
gravity are particularly susceptible to rollover. While rollover occurs in
cars, especially smaller, lighter models, the highest rollover rates occur
among SUVs and pickup trucks. One of the main difficulties with current
SUVs and pickup trucks is their relatively high centers of gravity
compared with most passenger cars. Combined with narrow and often very
short wheelbases, these design features inherently increase the rollover
tendencies of these multipurpose passenger vehicles. SUVs and pickup
trucks are involved in half of all fatal rollover crashes and together
suffer fatal rollover crashes at twice the rate of all light vehicles
(under 10,000 pounds) taken together.
The primary task facing government decision makers and safety engineers
is to prevent most rollover crashes from occurring by changing some of the
safety performance deficiencies, to enhance vehicle stability, especially
in the light truck and van class of passenger vehicles. In cases where
rollovers nevertheless occur, multiple countermeasures to prevent ejection
are needed including improved performance standards for door locks,
latches and hinges, and window materials that prevent occupant ejection.
In addition, given the lower rate of seat belt use by occupants of light
trucks and vans, increased occupant restraint use must be a priority.
Improvements are also needed in vehicle crashworthiness to prevent or
mitigate serious injuries resulting from occupant impact with interior
surfaces and components of passenger vehicles in rollovers. These
countermeasures include padding, advanced air bags, and revised standards
for roof crush and localized intrusion.
In 1994 NHTSA terminated rulemaking on a rollover standard. The agency
held meetings on providing consumers vehicle stickers or other rollover
information. While such information is no substitute for a performance
standard, the agency has not proposed a consumer regulation to provide
comparative information on vehicle rollover.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should establish a new stability performance standard for
vehicles under real-world operating conditions;
NHTSA should require improved padding on vehicle interiors;
NHTSA should upgrade the current standard for door latch/hinge
performance;
NHTSA should require innovative anti-ejection glazing;
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard;
NHTSA should develop and provide consumers with comparative
information on vehicle rollover.
ISSUE: ROOF CRUSH
The roof crush standard governs passenger vehicle roof crash strength,
but this safety requirement is inadequate in real-world crashes and has
not undergone major revision since 1971. The present standard only
requires that a force equal to one and one-half times the weight of the
vehicle be applied to the reinforced sides of the roof structure at the
roof rails. Moreover, this is merely a static test, the force is applied
while the vehicle is standing still, that does not apply to the central
portion of the roof structure that is not supported by the roof rails. As
a result, roof crush and localized intrusion into the passenger
compartment are common events in on-roof rollover crashes and crashes in
which the roof rails strike narrow cross-section objects at the roadside
such as trees and poles. The standard, therefore, is a poor measure of
roof crush performance under actual crash conditions and provides
inadequate occupant protection.
The standard needs to be upgraded to include performance requirements
that provide for occupant protection in full, on-roof rollover crashes.
The standard should require a dynamic crash test that meets the real-world
demands placed on car and light truck roofs in order to preserve occupant
compartment crush space. In particular, a new standard must ensure that
vehicle roofs are resistant in full rollover crashes both to general
failure of support structures as well as to localized intrusion.
In 1994, when NHTSA terminated rulemaking on a performance standard for
vehicle rollover, one of the actions it promised to take was improvement
of the roof crush standard. While the agency has continued to research the
issue, no regulatory action has been proposed.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard to include
performance requirements that control general roof failure and localized
roof intrusion;
NHTSA should upgrade the roof crush standard to require a
dynamic crash test that reflects real-world crash experience.
ISSUE: SIDE IMPACT PROTECTION
Side impacts have increasingly become a leading source of motor vehicle
deaths and severe injuries. More than one-third of serious to severe
injuries sustained each year by occupants in passenger vehicles are the
result of side impacts. A major aspect of the problem is the fact that
there is so little protective structure in passenger vehicles between
occupants and collision forces. While the front ends of vehicles often
have several feet of structure which can manage some or most of the crash
forces, this is not true of the sides and doors of most passenger
vehicles.
This safety problem has grown more acute over the last several years in
large part because of the expansion of the light truck and van market,
including SUVs, which has surpassed sales of new cars. As a result, the
side impact problem has taken center stage because of the disproportionate
losses suffered by car occupants when their vehicle is struck in the side
by larger, heavier light trucks and vans.
Two standards govern side impact protection: one standard addresses
lower vehicle interior protection of the lower torso; the other requires
at least some additional padding to offset upper interior head injuries. A
key shortcoming of these standards is the lack of a systems engineering
approach to side impact occupant protection. The standards were separately
developed and issued without specific coordination so that an overall,
uniform set of countermeasures are usually not implemented by
manufacturers complying with their minimum requirements. At the present
time, manufacturers are responding to both standards with widely varying
levels of protection for motorists, some supplying side impact air bags of
varying effectiveness while others rely only on extra padding. Some
vehicles successfully complying with the minimum requirements of both
standards nevertheless are clearly not equal to the task of preventing
death and serious injury in collisions with both fixed objects and with
other vehicles.
Almost a third of all fatal crashes are single vehicle events and a
large portion of these involve roadway departures into highly dangerous
roadside environments. One of the most lethal kinds of side impacts is a
car or light truck that skids out of control and slides sideways into a
tree, telephone pole, light or signal support, or other object which
results in deep, localized intrusion into the passenger compartment. As
part of a systems engineering approach, roadside protective barriers and
crash cushions would be used routinely, and solid roadside objects such as
poles and light supports should be replaced with supports that breakaway
or deform safely when struck.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should upgrade side impact protection performance
requirements;
NHTSA should upgrade side impact test requirements for light
trucks and vans;
NHTSA should develop approaches to modulate the height, weight,
and general aggressive character of large vans, pickups, and SUVs;
FHWA should require placement of protective barriers and crash
cushions where appropriate on federal-aid highways;
FHWA should require retrofit for breakaway poles, light
supports and other highway appurtenances on federal-aid highways.
ISSUE: HEAD RESTRAINTS
Head restraint design and performance is an excellent example of
occupant crash protection. Although relatively few lives are lost from
low-speed rear impacts by other vehicles, neck injuries cause enormous
pain, many lost work days, and economic losses for the hundreds of
thousands of people who unnecessarily suffer these injuries each year. In
fact, the federal government estimates that nearly one million people a
year suffer neck injuries from rear impacts due almost entirely to
inadequate head restraint design and performance.
The current head restraint standard has been on the books since 1969,
but no changes have been made to its original requirements which have been
shown in many studies over the years to be highly inadequate. One of the
important shortcomings of the FMVSS regulation of head restraints is that
it permits restraints which are too low and do not prevent the head and
neck from snapping back over the top of the restraint. The current
standard also permits restraints to be retracted so that they are often
useless in preventing injury. But restraint height is not the only safety
issue. Another problem with the standard is that it allows too much space
between the back of the head and the front of the head restraint so that a
good deal of dangerous head movement to the rear can occur before the head
restraint begins to work.
Better head restraint designs have been researched, tested, and placed
in some models of cars for several years. Some of these designs,
unfortunately, perform well only if occupants properly adjust them. But
newer designs are even self-adjusting prior to a rear impact so that
maximum protection of the neck and head occurs at impact. Other designs
are energy-absorbing to increase protection to the head and neck during a
crash. State-of-the-art designs far exceed the minimal FMVSS compliance
standard which is long past due for revision.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should upgrade standard to include state-of-the-art
performance requirements;
NHTSA should include performance requirements to increase
restraint height and to reduce distance between back of occupant's head
and the head restraint.
ISSUE: CHILD RESTRAINTS
State laws require the use of child restraint systems when transporting
children, but it is the Federal safety standard for child restraint
systems that regulates the minimum requirements for the child restraint.
FMVSS No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, establishes the minimum
requirements for manufacturing, testing, installing, and registering
safety restraint systems. Great strides have been taken to improve the
safety standard in recent years, including testing of child restraints
with a range of child-sized test dummies of different weights, and the
adoption of a new uniform system for securing child restraints without
using vehicle safety belts that will be available in a few years. The
standard should also be updated by a requirement for integrated child
restraints that are built in to the seat backs of passenger vehicles.
Because they are an integral part of the vehicle structure, integrated
child restraints provide better stability than existing add-on restraint
designs.
While these improvements address the safety of young children in child
restraints, up to approximately age four, children from five years to nine
or ten years old remain at risk. Children in this age group often do not
use child restraints intended for younger children and are too small to
fit properly or comfortably in lap/shoulder safety belt systems designed
for adults. Moreover, the child restraint standard does not apply to
children over 50 pounds.
Since the safety environment in passenger vehicles does not address the
needs of children between 5 and 10 years of age, it should come as no
surprise that proper restraint use decreases as children get older. While
restraint use for infants is 85 percent, use of restraints by children
ages 5 through 15 is only 64 percent. As a result, many of these children
ride unsecured and unbelted. In 1997, 457 children aged 5 to 9 were killed
in passenger vehicles and another 91,000 were injured.
The passenger vehicle environment does not adequately meet the safety
needs of older children in a crash. Existing child restraint regulations
do not provide protection to older children who would benefit from other
child restraint devices such as booster seats. This gap in protection for
older children is not acceptable. The child restraint standard must be
expanded to cover children who weigh more than 50 pounds, up to as much as
80 pounds, and to establish minimum safety requirements for booster seats
and belt-positioning devices. In addition, booster seats and other devices
should be tested with crash test dummies representative of children in
this age group. The current 6-year-old, 48 pound, child test dummy is
inappropriate for testing up to 80, pounds so development of a larger,
heavier test dummy approximating a 10-year-old child needs to be
conducted.
Another measure to improve safety is testing child restraint systems in
real-world crash conditions. Although child restraints are currently
subjected to a dynamic performance test, that test does not involve a
real-world crash. Child restraints are only required to be tested in a
sled test that simulates a barrier crash but does not recreate the dynamic
forces that occur in a real-world crash. Child restraints should be tested
in current crash test programs conducted by vehicle manufacturers and the
government.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should expand the scope of the child restraint system
standard to children who weigh 80 pounds;
NHTSA should establish minimum safety requirements for child
booster seats and belt-adjusting devices;
NHTSA should develop a child test dummy representative of a
10-year-old child;
NHTSA should require that child restraints be dynamically
tested.
ISSUE: ON-BOARD CRASH RECORDERS
Electronic monitoring of vehicle operating systems is a burgeoning area
of research and application to the entire range of motor vehicles, both
large and small. An important area of safety technology which could save
many lives and reduce the serious consequences of injuries to survivors in
motor vehicle crashes is on-board crash recorders. These systems not only
have promise in helping to reconstruct the actual circumstances of
crashes, but also can be used to transmit information to emergency medical
services personnel and police so that responses to severe crashes,
especially in less populated parts of the country, can be accelerated.
Some manufacturers are already equipping certain models of passenger
vehicles with different types of on-board recorders. The information
recorded varies but should include the date and time, the vehicle speed at
the time of impact and the change in velocity of the vehicle, the type of
crash type (i.e., side or frontal impact), whether safety belts were
buckled and other pertinent data. Information relayed to medical
facilities on impact severity can be transmitted directly to emergency
response units and used for triage in order to assure the appropriate
medical response is dispatched as quickly as possible. Rapid response to
crash injuries frequently not only results in saving lives that otherwise
would be lost from delay, but also has substantial effects on the severity
level of injuries which are not life threatening. The Haddon Matrix
emphasizes the need to continue protection after the crash event itself so
that appropriate care of the injured occupants or pedestrians occurs as
quickly as possible.
On-board crash recorders are part of the development in technologies
that can provide monitoring of commercial vehicle operating systems as
well as human performance behind the wheel. Reliable technologies are now
available which can accurately verify important safety aspects of
commercial vehicle driver performance, especially adherence to regulated
maximum limits for driving time. Technologies such as on-board recorders
and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems can provide both real-time
and stored data on commercial vehicle operator continuous driving time and
vehicle location on the road. On-board recorders, in combination with
vehicle GPS, can deter falsification of commercial driver paper logbooks
and reduce the dependence of enforcement personnel on paper documentation
for vehicle routing and driver duty status. These means of overseeing
commercial driver hours of service compliance could substantially reduce
the dangers of large trucks and buses being operated by fatigued drivers
whose alertness and safety performance has been reduced by sleep
deprivation.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should require on-board crash recorders in all passenger
vehicles and establish minimum requirements for data collection;
NHTSA should require appropriate data on crash mode and
severity be linked to automatic crash notification systems.
FHWA should require on-board commercial vehicle technologies
which help to accurately verify commercial driver hours of service
compliance.
ISSUE: EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND
AUTOMATIC CRASH NOTIFICATION
In the post-crash area of the Haddon Matrix, countermeasures have
usually involved advances in the quality of hospital-based medical care.
The problem has always been confirming that a crash has occurred and
locating the site in time for medical intervention to make a difference.
It is estimated that nearly half of all highway fatalities, about 20,000,
take place prior to any hospital care. Timely medical intervention has
been shown to increase the chances of surviving a crash and for reducing
the extent of long-term care for those with severe physical injuries. This
is particularly important in rural areas where hospital care may not be
close by.
In the last decade, strides have also been made in improving the
response time of emergency services in some crashes, especially through
the use of cellular telephone communications and the availability of
helicopters. However, emergency response time is still a major factor in
the medical outcome for crash victims. While, crash notification averages
5 minutes in urban areas and 10 minutes in rural areas, appropriate
emergency medical response can take much longer, particularly in more
isolated rural areas. A major breakthrough in post-crash emergency
response time for all crashes is possible through the use of automatic
crash notification systems (ACN) located in the vehicle.
In the event of a crash, the ACN system would immediately notify the
nearest emergency dispatch office which contacts the appropriate
responders. This would generally be done through cellular telephones in
the vehicle. For example, in a crash at or above a predetermined severity
the ACN system would automatically dial 9-1-1, transmit location
information and open a phone line for direct communication with the
vehicle occupants. The most sophisticated system would also transmit crash
data from the vehicle's on-board recorder including the type of crash
(frontal, side, rollover), the impact speed or change in velocity, whether
safety belts were buckled and air bags deployed, and other relevant crash
data. Specific information about the type and severity of the crash can
indicate to medical personnel the kinds of injuries that are likely to be
involved and ensure that the emergency responders are properly equipped.
ACN systems are one area in which existing technologies can be applied
with great effect. Although a number of different systems are currently
being tested, significant government and private resources and
organizational activities are required in order to make ACN systems a
reality and to ensure that they become standard equipment in all motor
vehicles.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA and FHWA should make ACN a transportation safety
priority;
NHTSA and FHWA should dedicate greater resources and more
funding for ACN development and testing;
ACN technology should be required standard equipment on all
passenger vehicles.
ISSUE: PEDESTRIAN CRASH PROTECTION
The pedestrian is often the forgotten victim in annual crash
statistics. More than 5,000 pedestrians are killed each year when struck
by motor vehicles and nearly 100,000 are injured, with older people and
young children suffering disproportionate deaths and injuries. A large
part of the problem with pedestrian crash safety is that many serious
injuries and deaths occur at relatively low vehicle impact speeds. Despite
the low speed such a crash can often result in death because people are
killed from head trauma when the upper torso and head strike stiff,
unyielding portions of the vehicle front end, including fender tops and
windshield cowls which inflict terrible injuries. Making basic changes to
the aggressive quality of passenger vehicle front ends could save scores
of lives and prevent hundreds of serious injuries.
The front surfaces of cars and light trucks could be made less rigid
and less dangerous to pedestrians. One manufacturer has already redesigned
the front end of its 1999 model to increase the space between the hood and
engine compartment components that can cause severe head trauma, and also
to soften the tops of fenders so that impact forces are reduced. These
countermeasures are easily achievable in the designs of new vehicles.
NHTSA's research has
shown that these new designs were both feasible and cost-effective and
could dramatically reduce pedestrian injuries by changing the front end
designs of cars, pickup trucks, and vans. Nevertheless, NHTSA has not
moved forward with any requirement that motor vehicles be designed to be
more forgiving in pedestrian crashes.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should establish a vehicle safety standard to improve
protection for pedestrians struck by vehicles;
NHTSA should include performance requirements that provide for
less rigid parts on passenger vehicle fronts ends and that require safer
distances between the vehicle hood and engine parts.
B. COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY -
INTRODUCTION
Commercial motor vehicles, large trucks and buses, are a major link in
our national transportation system. Trucks especially play an essential
role in the economy by facilitating the distribution of a large portion of
the products sold in America. Despite this important contribution, they
impose a heavy cost in terms of traffic crashes, injuries, and fatalities.
In 1997, approximately 444,000 large trucks were involved in traffic
crashes in the U.S. Of this total, 4,871 were fatal crashes in which 5,398
people died, while another 133,000 persons were injured in truck-involved
crashes. In that year, one in eight traffic fatalities, or 13 percent,
resulted from a collision involving a large truck. Even as the rate of
fatalities in truck crashes has fallen, the total number of persons killed
or injured in truck-involved crashes has been on the rise over the past
decade. Moreover, a disproportionate number of fatalities and serious
injuries occur when large trucks collide with smaller, passenger vehicles.
When large trucks have crashes with passenger vehicles, 98 percent of the
deaths are suffered by the occupants of the cars and light trucks.
The impact of economic trends on the trucking industry, including a
growing economy, low gas prices, and "just in time" delivery,
coupled with the deregulation of the trucking industry itself, assure that
there will be continued expansion of the trucking industry in years to
come. Because trucks are disproportionately involved in crashes and
fatalities, the safety of truck design and operations must be closely
scrutinized and regulated.
Large trucks and buses have a number of unique safety problems. They
also share certain of the crash avoidance and crashworthiness problems of
smaller passenger vehicles, especially pickup trucks, vans, and SUVs, but
on a grander scale. Many of the inherent safety deficiencies of trucks and
buses are further magnified in their highway operations because they do
not "fit" the highway environment as well as smaller vehicles.
This is a particularly severe problem for the heaviest classes of trucks
which have poor crash avoidance capabilities, and because the margins of
error for heavy vehicle drivers are also reduced by highway design
features which often do not meet the needs of big truck and bus
operations.
These challenges usually cannot be completely met through a single
countermeasure, but instead require an application of systems engineering
responses to safety issues. Properly addressing commercial vehicle safety
problems involves many factors: the dynamic characteristics of large
vehicles both in normal operations and in crashes; how these
characteristics are accommodated by road and traffic engineering design;
and how well or badly the human operator at the controls can manage the
negotiation of an often very heavy, very unwieldy vehicle under all
operating circumstances.
The following sections will review the most basic safety problems of
commercial vehicle design and performance, and what needs to be done to
improve on-the-road safety. Other aspects of commercial vehicle safety
involving the driver and the road will be discussed later in this Report.
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE ROLLOVER
More than 50 percent of all deaths to truck drivers each year are the
result of their rigs rolling over. Medium and heavy single-unit trucks and
buses are considerably more unstable than passenger cars, and combination
units such as tractor-trailers are especially prone to rollover. Their
high centers of gravity and relatively narrow wheelbases are inherent
design factors which make their stability even more troublesome when the
tractor is hitched to a cargo trailer. Because tractor-trailers pivot at
the attachment point between the tractor and the trailer, different forces
can affect each part of the truck in widely varying ways.
The problems of tractor-trailer stability and rollover tendency are
magnified when the combination truck is composed of the tractor and two or
even three trailers. In these instances, additional stability problems
come into play because of high-speed offtracking and trailer sway.
High-speed offtracking of a multiple-trailer combination truck means that
in going around a curve to the left at highway speeds, for example, the
trailers swing out to the right or to the outside of the lane. Trailer
sway is due primarily to the increased tendency of trailers hooked
together in a series simply to wander back and forth from side to side.
Driver mistakes, especially those involving quick steering reversals
which would often have little destabilizing effect in passenger cars,
cause even worse offtracking and a "crack-the-whip" effect in
which the rearmost trailer suddenly begins to swing and rock violently
from side to side. This violent action is carried forward through the
preceding units of the rig until the combination is so unstable that
rollover takes place.
A number of fundamental countermeasures can be applied simultaneously
to improve the crash avoidance response of tractor-trailers, particularly
for reducing rollover tendencies.
These include different "fifth-wheel" designs, reconfigured
and lower suspension systems, wider wheelbases, and revised design
principles for cargo units, including tank trailers, which could
significantly lower the center of gravity. For trailers, reasonable
operational restrictions on multi-unit combinations can be matched with
design changes to the attachment of one trailer to another so they respond
to curves and quick steering movements without easily becoming unstable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should require performance standards which could
significantly reduce the propensity for rollover including requirements
for lower center of gravity, improved suspension systems, wider wheelbases
and revised design principles for cargo units, including tank trailers;
NHTSA should develop performance requirements that improve the
ability of trailers to respond to curves and quick steering movements
without becoming unstable;
FHWA should require reasonable operational restrictions for
multi-unit combinations that restrict tractor-trailers from operating on
facilities not designed to accommodate vehicles of that size.
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE BRAKES
Brakes for large trucks and buses currently have a number of drawbacks.
But designing better, more reliable and effective braking systems,
especially for large trucks, is a challenge due to the substantial
difference between braking a large truck when empty, for example, and when
it is fully loaded. The considerable range of weight differences in the
same truck-trailer combination are not equally accommodated by current
braking design or performance. Instead, brakes are optimized to work best
when the truck is near its maximum weight. Consequently, an unloaded
tractor-trailer tends to brake unreliably and, in trucks without antilock
brakes, braking distances can be longer than with a fully loaded truck.
Another danger is locking the brakes, especially those on the rear drive
axle of the tractor, leading to tractor spinout and a jackknife of the
trailer.
At the other extreme, an overweight truck demands braking capacity
which cannot be provided by the brakes, especially in rolling terrain
where braking on downgrades is repeatedly required. In these instances,
truck brakes are especially prone to heat up and result in very long
braking distances. In worst case conditions, brakes can even fail causing
a fully-loaded or over-loaded truck to be unstoppable. In an age of
sophisticated technology, the prevalence of runaway truck ramps is an
indication of the poor state of truck brakes.
Antilock brakes are important safety features of both tractors and
trailers because they permit drivers to apply maximum pedal force without
the danger of locking the brakes of either the tractor or trailer. While
they have improved performance in important respects, antilock brakes are
not a cure-all for braking deficiencies in the current generation of heavy
trucks and buses.
One of the central problems with larger commercial vehicles is that
they rely on air brakes rather than hydraulic brakes. Air brakes require
time for air pressure to build up in order to actuate the brake drums on
each wheel. Even when all brakes are properly adjusted, it is not unusual,
especially with multi-trailer combinations such as Triples (a tractor
pulling three short trailers), to have several seconds delay until braking
occurs at the last trailer.
The delays experienced in air brakes before actual braking occurs can
be reduced through the actuation of each brake by electronic signal. Such
brakes are called "brake-by-wire" systems. Because braking
distances particularly of air-braked tractor trailers can be several times
longer than comparable car braking under the same conditions,
brake-by-wire systems could substantially reduce both the number of
crashes as well as their severity because braking distances for heavy
vehicles would be considerably reduced. Also, brake-by-wire controls brake
wear so that braking systems are in better service condition between
routine and preventive maintenance intervals.
Although brake-by-wire systems are available on every tractor in Europe
and supplied as standard equipment by some manufacturers there, it is only
offered as a option by one U.S. manufacturer.
RECOMMENDATION:
NHTSA should require performance standards in commercial motor
vehicles to reduce the time needed to actuate the brake drums in order to
induce the installation of brake-by-wire braking systems.
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE DESIGN
COMPATIBILITY
The large differences in size, especially height, width, and length,
between large commercial vehicles and small passenger vehicles causes a
host of operational problems which often lead to collisions between
trucks, buses, and smaller passenger vehicles. In these crashes, the small
vehicle is badly overmatched because of the vastly greater weight or mass
of the large truck or bus. The enormous difference in weight means that
the chances of small vehicle occupant survival are tremendously reduced
because the crash management capabilities of a car or light truck are
unable to protect occupants against the force of the large truck,
especially at higher impact speeds. This outcome places great importance
on preventing the collision.
Changes in vehicle performance requirements can help prevent crashes
from occurring in the first instance and make those crashes that do occur
more survivable. Crash prevention is a challenge because of the very
different operating characteristics of large commercial vehicles. Big
trucks and buses perform basic highway maneuvers more slowly than
passenger vehicles. Lane changes, acceleration from entry lanes and ramps
to make mergers, and braking, among other actions, take more time and more
space than a car or light truck. Part of the additional time and space
necessary reflects the inherent operating characteristics and limitations
of trucks and buses, but another factor is the need to maintain control of
the vehicle.
This means that passenger vehicles must be able to see commercial
vehicles and to be seen by their drivers. Large trucks, however, are often
poorly lit at night and at certain angles of view are nearly invisible to
passenger vehicle drivers. The basic lighting standards for large
commercial vehicles are virtually unchanged since the middle of this
century.
Night-time conspicuity of some heavy vehicles has been marginally
improved in recent years by a new regulation requiring strategically
placed reflectors on the sides and rear of most trailers and truck
tractors. However, although improved conspicuity could also reduce
passenger vehicle rear and side impact collisions with single-unit trucks,
the Department of Transportation has not been extended this rule to medium
and heavy commercial vehicles.
As for seeing other vehicles in their vicinity, commercial drivers are
usually at a distinct disadvantage because of large blind spots in front
of, alongside, and behind their trucks and buses. Although FHWA and others
have called for passenger cars to stay far away from big commercial
vehicles because of this problem, it is obvious that under many operating
conditions this is simply not feasible. Instead, truck and bus driver
fields of vision need to be augmented by both improved mirror designs,
which increase the capacity of the commercial driver to view the areas
alongside the truck or bus, as well as electronic systems which supplement
mirrors. Vehicle detection systems are rapidly being developed which rely
on Doppler radar, for example, and which provide commercial drivers the
ability to "see" other vehicles around their rigs so that lane
changes are not made with catastrophic consequences. While some of these
sophisticated electronic detection systems are still in development,
others have already been tested and are in limited use. But neither
improved mirror systems nor electronic vehicle detection systems have been
required by NHTSA or FHWA. As a result, it is not surprising that
truck-passenger vehicle crashes are regular events.
A major source of crash deaths and serious injuries occur when small
motor vehicles strike large ones in rear and side underride collisions.
Because the sides and rear of a trailer are
high - sometimes almost at roof height of a small car - passenger
vehicles can run under the trailer resulting in massive intrusion of the
trailer into the passenger occupant compartment.
One means of reducing impact forces in underride crashes is to place
metal guards on the rear and sides of trucks to block passenger vehicles
from going under the truck trailer. For rear underride crashes, NHTSA has
issued a regulation calling for a rear impact guard on most trailers
which, however, is not optimized for maximum crash management and in some
cases may still permit underride. Requiring rear underride guards for
single-unit trucks, which are involved in one-quarter of annual rear
impact crash deaths to passenger vehicle occupants, has not been proposed.
Moreover, no side underride guards are currently required on trucks or
trailers although this is a major source of underride crash losses.
Another means of ameliorating the crash between a large truck and a
smaller passenger vehicle is to reduce the aggressive character of large
trucks and buses. Because the crash management of a small motor vehicle
cannot cope with the transmission of impact forces from a large vehicle, a
basic safety design approach is to attenuate the crash, or lengthen the
time of the impact. This means that collisions are spread out over a
longer space and amount of time so that changes in velocity are less
sudden and lethal. Commercial vehicle frontal collisions with passenger
vehicles result in several thousand severe injuries and deaths each year.
These can be ameliorated by reducing the aggressive character of large
truck and bus front ends. There are a number of approaches to dealing with
this problem, some of them centered on applying the lessons learned in
highway barrier and crash cushion design to vehicle design.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA, which has jurisdiction over newly manufactured trucks
and buses, should upgrade performance requirements for truck and bus
lighting systems;
NHTSA should require improved conspicuity treatment for
single-unit trucks;
NHTSA should require improved mirror and electronic vehicle
detection systems for trucks and buses;
NHTSA should improve requirements for rear impact guards to
make them lower and more energy-absorbing and extend these requirements to
single-unit trucks;
NHTSA should require side impact guards to prevent side
underride of large trucks and trailers by passenger vehicles;
NHTSA should adopt performance requirements that reduce front
end "aggressivity" of bus and truck cab designs;
FHWA, which has jurisdiction over the on-road operation of
trucks and buses, should require the retrofit of improved truck rear
impact guards to make them lower and more energy-absorbing;
FHWA should require the retrofit of side impact guards to
prevent side underride of large trucks and trailers by passenger vehicles.
ISSUE: COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SIZE AND
WEIGHT
There are firm indications that both the sizes and weights of large
commercial vehicles have reached and even exceeded the operating safety
and structural limits of our highways. Truck sizes and weights, governed
by a confusing patchwork of federal and state limits and legal exemptions,
have grown over the past quarter-century to the point where our nation's
infrastructure is unable to accommodate today's big trucks. Safety margins
in areas such as rollover resistance, encroachment of outside travel
lanes, and heavy vehicle braking have been reduced or eliminated so that,
along with a tremendous and often disproportionate growth in truck traffic
on many highways, both truck drivers and the rest of the traveling public
are placed at increased risk of death and injury.
Although there are pressures to raise truck weights even further,
numerous studies have consistently shown that increasing the gross, that
is, the total or overall weight of large trucks rapidly increases their
chances of suffering a rollover crash. In fact, standard
"18-wheeler" trucks weighing 100,000 pounds instead of the
maximum federal limit of 80,000 pounds have 50 percent more rollover
crashes than the lighter rigs. Similarly, extra-heavy, overweight trucks
have significantly poorer braking which results in longer stopping
distances than lighter trucks. Given the already substantially longer
stopping distances for large trucks as compared with small passenger
vehicles, further increases in stopping distances by overweight trucks
often makes the difference between stopping safely in time or having a
crash. Recent background studies and white papers produced for the Federal
Highway Administration have even explicitly recommended against allowing
the present generation of standard tractor/semi-trailer combination trucks
to carry more than 80,000 pounds because of predictable increases in crash
risk for these extra-heavy trucks.
Unfortunately, the problems with overweight trucks are matched by the
substantial degradation of operating safety when combination trucks become
extra-long. Studies, such as those performed by the American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) the late 1980s,
showed that even trailers 48 feet long could not negotiate a large
percentage of the nation's freeway ramps because of offtracking.
Offtracking consists of the different paths taken by the front steering
tires and the wider path taken by the rear cargo tires of a large vehicle.
This is especially pronounced in combination tractor/semi-trailers when
turning or following a highway curve. Extra-long trailers - a few states
now permit up to 59 and 60 feet in length - are dangerous when rounding
severe curves and turning corners at lower speeds because they will
frequently cross over the centerlines of two-lane roads or swing out into
both adjacent and oncoming lanes to accomplish turns at right-angled
intersections.
It also should be pointed out that some extra-long combinations are
even more dangerous because they are composed of two or even three
trailing cargo units instead of just one. In a Triple-Trailer rig, for
example, there are three attachment points where the trailers pivot in
negotiating curves and turns, a design feature which makes these big rigs
even more unstable and prone to rollover, and, in some cases, also
resulting in even worse offtracking. Also, electrical design problems in
some of these longest combinations result in insufficient power reaching
the last trailer in the series so that its brakes are not engaged. This
can result in even longer stopping distances.
Extra-long, excessively-heavy trucks also diminish safety from our
nation's highways in yet another way. Overweight axles and excessive gross
weights also radically increase both the severity and rate of damage to
road pavement and to bridges. Many states are allowed extra-heavy gross or
axle weights on commercial vehicles under complicated legal rights
provided by federal law when construction began on the Interstate Highway
in the late 1950s. This increased damage to the Interstate System is
compounded by the extra-heavy weights allowed by many states on roads off
the Interstate System. These are roads which, in most instances, are
damaged even faster than Interstate highways because they are often built
to substantially lower design standards, including poorer pavement
quality. In all cases, however, overweight trucks cause much more damage
than trucks obeying weight limits and this increased damage must be
repaired by diverting dollars needed to enhance basic highway safety
design and instead devoting these scarce funds to structural
rehabilitation of roads and bridges.
This brief overview of truck size and weight safety underscores the
need to ensure that no further increases in truck sizes and weights are
allowed, especially at the federal level for the Interstate System. In
fact, with the advent of the National Highway System in 1995, there is a
pressing need for federal legislation limiting the sizes and weights of
big trucks on this more extensive federally-funded network of major
highways. Without such legislative control, truck sizes and weights will
both continue to increase in response to the repeated arguments for
industry economies of scale and improved commercial productivity. Amending
federal laws in the past to accommodate these arguments have unfortunately
resulted in both increased crash risks for large trucks and accelerated,
more costly damage to our country's streets, highways, and bridges.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Congress should extend the current federal weight limit of
80,000 pounds, and the length limit of 53 feet, on the Interstate Highway
System to the National Highway System;
Congress should continue the freeze on longer combination
vehicles (LCVs);
Congress should not enact special interest exemptions that
permit trucks to exceed current federal gross and axle weight limits;
States should not permit increased weight limits on state and
local roads and streets.
HADDON MATRIX PART TWO:
THE DRIVER: HUMAN FACTORS
The Haddon Matrix, as originally conceived, referred to the driver as
the active human element in traffic safety. The actions of the driver
remain a key component of the matrix, particularly when it comes to
attentiveness to the driving task. However, there is a realization that
many human factors contribute to safety including the actions of occupants
and the role that social attitudes, laws, and government regulation play
in shaping human behavior. The issues that predominate in this area are
those that can achieve major improvements in safety outcomes in the
future. They are largely issues of driver and occupant behavior aimed
either at discouraging risk taking and risky behavior or which are
intended to encourage safer practices. For this reason, rather than
referring just to the driver, the Report uses the term "Human
Factors."
A. OCCUPANT PROTECTION -- INTRODUCTION
Occupant protection is a shared responsibility of vehicle and equipment
designers and passenger car occupants. While safety belts, child
restraints and helmets must be made available to the public, drivers and
other occupants must make use of this equipment in order to increase their
chances of surviving a crash. Not all occupants, however, exercise good
judgment regarding their personal safety, or take simple steps to protect
the welfare of their loved ones. It has been well documented elsewhere
that occupant protection is a matter of public health and safety, and that
the consequences of motor vehicle crashes, injuries and deaths are borne
by society as a whole. Thus, the failure of drivers and other occupants to
take basic steps to insure their protection is not merely an individual
decision but a matter of general concern to society.
Motivating people to take appropriate precautions is a difficult
undertaking in almost every area of public health. With respect to
occupant protection in motor vehicles, it is a monumental task because it
involves changing human behavior to adopt safer practices. This is made
all the more difficult because there is no single solution or one-time
action that will ensure continual occupant protection. A number of
different actions may need to be taken and, to be effective, these actions
must be accomplished for each trip. For example, child restraints, if
removed from the vehicle, have to be properly installed for the next use.
While portions of the population decide to adopt good safety practices,
which may then become a matter of habit, other portions of the population
require outside intervention in order to conform to good safety practices.
At a fundamental level, changing social attitudes has been slow but
effective in making people more receptive to occupant protection. Over the
past 30 years, for example, the safety community in general has been
successful in making safety belt and child restraint use socially
acceptable.
Change in societal attitudes alone, however, is not sufficient to
convince all segments of the population. Educational programs are needed
to reach other segments of society with information on safety actions that
provide occupant protection. This approach has been effective, for
example, with children and new parents regarding the need to use child
restraints. To reach all segments of society, however, state laws and
federal requirements are necessary. Mandatory legal requirements, coupled
with educational materials and information, that are backed up by
effective enforcement strategies, are the most effective means of reaching
the maximum number of people. Safety requirements set in legislation
establish a clear and uniform code of conduct for all citizens. State laws
and federal requirements have played a major role in convincing the
majority of citizens to adapt their behavior on a number of health and
safety issues. Such laws protect not only society's interest in reducing
motor vehicle crashes, deaths and injuries, but they improve the safety of
individuals, even those who abide by the law reluctantly, by increasing
their chances of surviving a crash.
ISSUE: STANDARD ENFORCEMENT OF STATE
SAFETY BELT USE LAWS
Safety belts are widely recognized as the single most effective safety
device in passenger motor vehicles and are estimated to save 9,500 lives
each year. According to government figures safety belts would save more
than an additional 4,100 lives and prevent 102,000 injuries if the
national seat belt use rate was 85 percent. Despite the fact that 49
states and the District of Columbia have enacted mandatory safety belt use
laws, the national rate for buckling up is still only about 70 percent. By
comparison, most other industrialized nations have national belt use rates
in excess of 90 percent.
Both the federal and state governments have focused on how to encourage
people to buckle up. The President has made it a priority to increase
safety belt usage to 85 percent by the year 2000 and to 90 percent by
2005. Congress passed two incentive grant programs to encourage states to
increase belt usage, authorizing a total of $568 million for the programs
enacted as part of the 1998 Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st
Century (TEA-21).
The most effective method of achieving the goal of increased safety
belt use rates is the passage of standard, or primary, enforcement of
state safety belt use laws. Standard enforcement allows police officers to
cite unbelted motorists for not wearing their safety belts just as they
would for any other traffic violation. Currently, 16 states and the
District of Columbia have standard enforcement of safety belt laws.
Thirty-three states have secondary enforcement laws which, unlike any
other traffic law, prevents officers from issuing a ticket for failure to
use safety belts unless another, separate traffic offense has also been
committed.
Standard enforcement laws have proven effective in state after state.
After California upgraded their safety belt law in 1993 to standard
enforcement, statewide belt use increased significantly, from 70 percent
in 1992 to more than 90 percent in 1998. During the first year of its law,
Louisiana experienced an 18 percentage point increase in belt use.
Additionally, the District of Columbia's use rate since standard
enforcement was enacted went from 58 percent in 1996 to 82 percent in
1998.
Although standard enforcement laws are very effective, some state
legislatures have been reluctant to upgrade their secondary enforcement
laws. The two major opposing arguments have been concerns about personal
freedom and the issue of racial "profiling," law enforcement
officers unfairly targeting minority drivers. Some people believe that
they have the "right" to decide not to wear a safety belt
because it is their lives and their safety alone that is at stake.
However, one individual's decision can lead to dangerous consequences
affecting others. In the event of a crash, an unbelted driver has less
control of the vehicle, and unbelted occupants often injure other
occupants. Additionally, medical costs for an unbuckled crash victim are
50 percent more than those of victims who used a safety belt. Furthermore,
85 percent of the cost of crashes are absorbed by society, and not by the
unrestrained individual who was involved in the crash. Moreover, children
imitate the habits of their parents and if their parents don't buckle up
then the children will tend not to buckle up as well.
Other critics claim that standard enforcement safety belt laws will
aggravate the problem of differential stopping and searching of African
Americans and other minorities. However, the findings of a NHTSA study of
several states with standard enforcement safety belt laws suggest that
there were no differences in ticketing by race that would suggest an
unfair bias against minorities.
More important, seat belt use can save lives among minority
populations. Research has shown that once states enact standard
enforcement laws, the greatest increase in belt use is found in minority
populations. According to a study by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), safety belt use by African American men in states with standard
enforcement of safety belt laws is 25 percent higher than in states with
secondary laws. Meharry Medical College, the nation's oldest private
academic institution that is dedicated to providing health sciences
education to African Americans and other under-represented minorities,
released a study in July, 1999, which estimated that 100% belt use among
African Americans could save as many as 1,300 lives per year, prevent
26,000 injuries and reduce societal costs by $2.6 billion.
Furthermore, there appears to be widespread support within minority
populations for standard enforcement. A July 1997 survey by Public Opinion
Strategies found that 68 percent of African-Americans favored standard
enforcement of safety belt laws.
Emerging trends in the U.S. population show the Latino population
growing seven times faster than the population as a whole. By the year
2050, Latinos are expected to be the largest minority group in the
country, comprising one quarter of the total population. Currently, motor
vehicle crashes are the number one cause of death for Latinos under 24,
and the second leading cause in the 24-55 age group.
Another trend is the growing number of young drivers. Across ethnic and
racial lines, young drivers have a lower rate of safety belt use compared
with adults. Over 60 percent of the teens killed in crashes in 1997 were
not wearing safety belts. A survey conducted by CDC found that more than
31 percent of black, 21 percent of white and 18 percent of Hispanic high
school students reported either rarely or never wearing their safety
belts. Researchers at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and the University of Michigan
found that when they adjusted teenager crash data for miles traveled, the
death rate was highest for Hispanics and African Americans. Considering
that the number of young drivers is expected to increase dramatically in
the next ten years, the need for strong safety belt laws and effective
enforcement strategies will become greater than ever before.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Congress should require uniform adoption in every state of
standard enforcement of safety belt use laws or face the loss of
federal-aid highway funds;
States should enact and vigorously enforce standard enforcement
of safety belt use laws.
ISSUE: CLOSING GAPS IN STATE CHILD
RESTRAINT LAWS
Over the past ten years, states have improved their laws regarding
occupant protection, and specifically, child occupant protection. All 50
states and the District of Columbia have enacted standard enforcement
child occupant protection laws. Child safety seats reduce the risk of
fatal injuries to infants by 69 percent and to toddlers by 47 percent.
Safety belts and child restraint systems saved the lives of almost 4,000
children between 1975 and 1997. However, despite these improvements,
approximately 300,000 children are injured and almost 2,000 children die
as a result of traffic crashes each year. In 1997, an alarming 63 percent
of the children under age 15 killed in crashes were totally unrestrained.
A large number of these deaths could have been prevented if the child had
been properly restrained.
Part of the problem is that 27 states have loopholes, or gaps in their
safety restraint laws. These gaps allow children of certain ages, and in
certain seating positions, to ride in vehicles without being secured in
child restraints or without wearing safety belts. Other gaps include:
holding only parents and not other drivers responsible for obeying the
laws; exempting drivers of out-of-state vehicles from state child
restraint laws; applying the laws only to children of state residents; and
exempting children traveling in pickup trucks from safety restraint
requirements. If these gaps in state laws are closed, and all children are
properly restrained all the time, as many as an additional 630 children's
lives would be saved and another 182,000 serious injuries prevented.
Comprehensive child restraint laws and standard enforcement safety belt
laws are strongly supported by the public. A 1996 Lou Harris public
opinion poll commissioned by Advocates found that Americans were
overwhelmingly in favor of requiring children to be properly secured.
Other organizations have reported similarly favorable results. In the 1998
Louis Harris poll, 90 percent of the Americans responded that they favored
stronger enforcement of child safety laws that require all children to be
buckled up.
Even though a new federal regulatory requirement should make the
installation of child restraints in vehicles simpler, the regulation will
not take effect for a few years and then only in new passenger vehicles.
In order to reduce the high rate of child restraint misinstallation in the
near term, more educational programs that teach parents how to properly
install and use safety restraint systems are needed. Some of these
efforts, including cooperative programs between government and the private
sector, are already underway but more funding and resources are needed.
In addition to closing the gaps for younger children in child
restraints, stronger safety belt laws are needed to protect child
occupants. One of the best indicators of child occupant restraint use is
adult safety belt use. Surveys have found that a driver who is wearing a
safety belt will buckle up a toddler 86 percent of the time, versus only
24 percent of the time if the adult does not wear a safety belt. Thus,
enacting standard enforcement safety belt laws which have been shown to
increase adult safety belt use, will also result in more child occupants
being secured either in child restraints or safety belts.
Moreover, many state safety belt use laws do not cover all children in
all seating positions. Children who have outgrown child restraints are at
risk if they ride unrestrained, even if they are seated in the rear seat.
While the rear seat is comparatively safer than riding in the front seat,
children who ride unbelted are still at risk of injury. In 1997, nearly
two-thirds (63 percent) of child occupant deaths occurred in passenger
vehicles, and just over half (52 percent) of those deaths were to children
in the rear seat.
Regardless of whether states require standard or secondary enforcement
of their belt laws, the majority of state safety belt laws apply only to
occupants in the front seat. In a number of these states the child
restraint law only covers children up to age four. This means that no law
requires children older than four years of age to be properly restrained
when riding in the back seat. To protect infant and child passengers,
state safety belt and child restraint laws must complement each other and
provide comprehensive coverage for all children in all seating positions
and in all circumstances.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
States should immediately act to close the gaps in child
restraint laws;
States should extend mandatory safety belt use laws to all
occupants, regardless of age, to all seating positions, and in all
circumstances.
ISSUE: MOTORCYCLE HELMETS
Motorcycle crashes claim the lives of more than 2,100 riders, and
injure an additional 54,000 each year. Because motorcyclists are largely
unprotected in a crash, they are 16 times more likely than passenger car
occupants to die in a traffic crash, and 4 times as likely to be injured.
Head injury is the leading cause of death and serious injury in motorcycle
crashes and the most effective way to reduce the number of deaths and
serious injuries is the use of helmets.
Helmeted riders have up to a 73 percent lower fatality rate than
unhelmeted riders, and the use of helmets has up to an 85 percent
reduction in the incidence of injury. Even though helmet use is not
universal, helmets saved the lives of approximately 7,940 riders from 1984
to 1996.
In addition to saving lives and reducing injuries, helmet use reduces
the strain on public resources. Health care costs associated with head
injuries are higher for unhelmeted riders than they are for helmeted
riders. Estimates show that motorcycle helmet use saved $1.3 billion in
economic costs from 1984 to 1997. An additional $9.8 billion would have
been saved if all motorcyclists had worn helmets during this 13-year
period.
All-rider helmet laws have been shown to dramatically increase helmet
use, and therefore, reduce fatality rates. Helmet use is reportedly near
100 percent in states with helmet use laws covering all motorcycle riders.
Motorcycle fatality rates are also lower in states with all-rider use
laws. For example, California experienced a 40 percent decline in
motorcycle fatalities in 1993, the second full year under the state helmet
law, compared to 1991, the last year prior to the helmet law taking
effect, according to a University of California study. During this period
239 lives were saved by the helmet requirement.
Maryland has also experienced dramatic safety and economic benefits
since that state's motorcycle helmet law went into effect in 1992. Between
1992 and 1997 fatalities were lowered by 50 percent, from 54 to 27, and
associated annual costs also fell from $40 million to $20 million. The
number of motorcycle-related serious injuries also went down from 621 in
1991 to 329 in 1994, a 47 percent reduction.
Nevertheless, only 22 states and the District of Columbia require
helmet use for all riders. Twenty-five other states have laws that only
cover some riders, most often those who are younger than age 18. Three
states, Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa, do not have any law requiring helmet
use. Despite the effectiveness of all-rider helmet laws, some state
legislatures have been reluctant to pass these laws, and in some states
that have enacted all-rider helmet laws there are movements to repeal the
law.
One of the most prevalent myths that opponents use in their lobbying
efforts is that helmets impair sight and hearing. However, there is
sufficient evidence to show that, in fact, helmets do not obstruct
critical vision. Helmets may reduce the loudness of sounds but they do not
affect the rider's ability to distinguish between different sounds.
Another frequently made claim is that age-specific helmet restrictions
are an effective substitute for all-rider laws. Statistics show that the
helmet use rate in states with age-specific helmet laws varies between 28
and 40 percent -- nowhere close to the near 100 percent use rate reported
in states with all-rider helmet laws. Age-specific helmet laws are not
only ineffective, but they also complicate enforcement efforts because it
is difficult to determine the precise age of motorcyclists while they are
riding motorcycles.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Congress should require that states enact all-rider motorcycle
helmet laws or face the loss of federal-aid highway funds;
States that do not have an all-rider motorcycle helmet law
should enact such a law;
States that do have all-rider motorcycle helmet laws should
oppose any efforts to repeal or weaken those laws.
ISSUE: BICYCLE SAFETY
Bicycling has become a serious mode of transportation for a solid core
of citizens. Although not a motorized form of transportation, bicycles are
used as an alternative means of transportation for commuters and bicycle
couriers are frequently used by offices in large cities. Conflicts between
motor vehicles and bicycles are increasing on American roads. As bicycles
become a larger part of the traffic mix, laws governing bicycle safety
need to be reevaluated and improved to address the safety issues presented
by bicycles on the roadway.
The largest portion of the population using bicycles, however, is
children. Nearly 28 million children, 70 percent of those between the ages
of our and 15, ride bicycles. Second only to automobiles, bicycles are
associated with more childhood injuries than any other consumer product.
Bicycle related deaths per million people rise rapidly beginning at about
5 years old and are highest among 11 and 14 year-old bicyclists. A large
percentage of the deaths and injuries can be attributed to the fact that
only 69 percent of children under age 16 wear bicycle helmets on a regular
basis, according to a survey of parents. In bicycle-related crashes, head
injury is the leading cause of death for riders, causing an estimated 900
deaths annually. The National SAFE KIDS Campaign predicts that universal
use of bicycle helmets would prevent between 135 and 155 deaths, between
39,000 and 45,000 head injuries, and between 18,000 and 55,000 scalp and
face injuries each year.
The failure to use bicycle helmets also carries a significant economic
price tag. It is estimated that bicycle-related injuries cost society $3.2
billion annually. Health care costs are much lower when individuals wear
bicycle helmets. According to the National SAFE KIDS Campaign, for
children ages 4 to 15, every $10 bike helmet saves $430 in direct health
care costs, $95 in other tangible costs and $270 in quality of life costs.
When helmet laws are enacted, the percentage of people who wear helmets
increases and bicycle-related injuries and fatalities decrease. Since the
first helmet law was enacted in California in 1986, the use of helmets has
contributed to a significant reduction in bicycle-related fatalities.
Oregon, which enacted a helmet law in 1994, and New Jersey, which did
likewise in 1997, experienced similar dramatic declines in bicycle-related
head injuries. Research also indicates that the national bicycle injury
death rate among children ages 14 and under declined more than 50 percent
between 1987 and 1996 due to the passage of helmet laws. During this nine
year span, 14 states and approximately 60 local governments enacted
bicycle helmet laws. The majority of these laws are age-specific and do
not cover all riders.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should enact or upgrade bicycle safety laws to require
all-rider helmet use;
States should conduct education programs for bicyclists and
those that share the road with bicycles,
States should plan for roadway infrastructure and trail
improvements to better accommodate bicycles.
ISSUE: RIDING IN PICKUP TRUCK CARGO
AREAS
Pickup trucks have become increasingly popular with consumers over the
past decade. Light trucks (including sport utility vehicles and pickup
trucks) make up about 50 percent of all new vehicles sold. Pickup trucks
are not just being used as work vehicles to haul cargo, they are also
being used as passenger vehicles and, quite frequently, as family vehicles
to transport children. One major safety problem associated with pickup
trucks is the fatalities and injuries that occur when people ride in the
rear cargo areas or cargo beds.
Pickup truck cargo beds are not intended for passenger transport
regardless of whether the cargo area is open or covered with a cap. Over
200 people die each year as a result of riding in the cargo area of pickup
trucks and more than half of the deaths are children and teenagers. A
Washington state study reported that the risk of fatality for persons
riding in the cargo areas of pickup trucks is more than 10 times higher
than the risk to the general population of occupants involved in traffic
collisions. The primary cause of injury and death for pickup truck
passengers is ejection from the cargo area during a collision.
Most non-collision deaths are caused by falls due to swerving, braking
or dangerous road conditions. In most cases the passenger who was injured
or killed was seated in the cargo bed, but one-third of the victims were
standing up, sitting on the tail-gate or "horsing around."
Passengers riding in covered cargo areas are unrestrained and are highly
susceptible to injury during crashes and sudden movements of the vehicle,
and they are also exposed to the danger of carbon monoxide poisoning from
exhaust fumes.
Despite the documented hazards of allowing passengers to ride in cargo
areas, fewer than half of U.S. states have laws prohibiting this dangerous
practice. Of the twenty-two states that do have laws prohibiting
passengers in cargo areas, most have exceptions, only apply to children
under a certain age, or only apply under certain circumstances. New Jersey
is the only state that prohibits any passenger of any age from riding in
the cargo area under all circumstances. In order to prevent future
fatalities as the number of pickup trucks on the road increases, states
must enact laws that prohibit all passengers from riding in the cargo
areas of pickup trucks at all times.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should enact laws to prohibit passenger use of the rear
cargo bed of pickup trucks under all circumstances.
B. IMPAIRED DRIVING - INTRODUCTION
Drinking and driving is the most frequently committed violent crime in
America. There are approximately 1.4 million arrests annually for driving
under the influence, and it has been estimated that another 2,000
alcohol-impaired driving trips occur for every arrest made. Alcohol
continues to be the single greatest factor in highway deaths and injuries.
In 1997, over 16,000 people were killed in alcohol-related crashes and an
additional 327,000 persons were injured. This number of deaths on the
roads is equivalent to a major airplane crash every week for the entire
year. Not only does impaired driving cost lives, but there is also a high
economic price that society pays. The direct costs of alcohol-related
crashes are estimated to be $45 billion every year.
Largely due to the efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and
other victims' groups, the past decade has experienced a decrease in
alcohol-related highway fatalities. However, the population which
constitutes the largest percentage of alcohol-impaired drivers in fatal
crashes, young males ages 21 to 34, has also been decreasing during this
time. While this segment of society is predicted to continue decreasing
through 2001, it is expected to then increase rapidly through the first
half of the next century. In addition, the growth of the under 21 driving
population is also expected to increase. The anticipated growth of this
group raises specific concerns that alcohol-related highway deaths will
increase once again unless important changes are made in the way our
nation, the federal and state governments address the issues related to
impaired driving.
Adoption of tougher laws and penalties, including use of ignition
nterlock devices for repeat offenders and vehicle confiscation are
effective means to crack down further on drunk driving. Despite the fact
they are often politically unpopular, Highway Trust Fund sanctions have
played a crucial role in achieving national uniformity in impaired driving
policy, resulting in thousands of lives saved. Two examples are the
21-year-old drinking age and zero tolerance laws which were adopted by all
50 states shortly after the threat of sanctions was imposed by Congress.
In 1998, the U.S. Senate passed a bill containing trust fund sanctions for
states that did not pass .08% BAC laws, but the proposal failed to pass
the House of Representatives.
Strong, comprehensive and uniform laws and increased enforcement
efforts are crucial if we are to achieve the goal of preventing and
reducing alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes in the coming years and
into the next century.
ISSUE: BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION:
.08% BAC
As the 20th century draws to a close, drinking alcohol and
driving remains one of the most serious threats to public safety. It is
the most frequently committed violent crime in the nation. Although great
strides have been made in reducing the toll of highway deaths resulting
from alcohol-impaired driving in the past decade, in 1997 over 38 percent
of highway fatalities, more than 16,000 people, died in alcohol-related
crashes.
Studies have revealed that some individuals begin to experience divided
attention and deficits in steering and tracking with blood alcohol
concentrations (BAC) as low as .02% BAC. By the time alcohol levels reach
.08% BAC, scientific studies have concluded that every driver lacks vital
driving skills. For this reason, most industrialized nations in the world
have set alcohol limits below .10% BAC. Sweden has a limit of .02% BAC.
France, Finland, Australia, and Norway have set .05% BAC as their national
limit, and Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, and Austria are at .08%
BAC.
In the U.S., setting legal impairment limits has generally been left to
state authorities. Thirty three states retain .10% BAC as their legal
limit for driving while intoxicated. However, seventeen states and the
District of Columbia have adopted .08% BAC as the legal limit. In
addition, under the congressional threat of the loss of highway funding,
all 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that require
zero tolerance (.02% BAC or less) for drivers under age 21, the minimum
drinking age in every state. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of
Transportation has established a federal limit of .04% BAC for
professional truck and bus drivers.
The President has recognized the importance of .08% BAC laws. On March
3, 1998, he launched an initiative that sought a federal standard of .08%
BAC for our nation's roads. The President also established a national goal
to reduce the number of alcohol-related motor vehicle fatalities, to
11,000 by the year 2005. Recent studies have concluded that a combination
of stricter laws, including .08% BAC limits, can significantly reduce
alcohol-related fatalities. One such study estimated that 275 lives were
saved in 1997 as a result of .08% BAC laws and that, if all 50 states had
such laws, another 590 lives could have been saved.
Instead, Congress has attempted to entice states to enact .08% BAC laws
through incentive grant programs. More than a year after the .08% BAC
incentive grants were established in the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (TEA-21), only one state has enacted a new .08%
BAC law. The added additional funding from the incentive grant program has
not played a major role in the consideration of .08% BAC laws in state
legislatures. Experience has demonstrated that incentive grant programs
are not the most effective means of improving public health and safety.
By contrast, programs that withhold federal highway funds have been
very effective in motivating state governments. Two successful examples
are the National 21 Minimum Drinking Age Law signed into effect by
President Reagan in 1984, and the National Zero Alcohol Content Law for
Youth, or zero tolerance law mentioned above, signed by President Clinton
in 1995. All 50 states now have these lifesaving laws because of federal
leadership, and no withholding program has ever caused a state to lose
federal funds.
Driving while impaired is a national issue that crosses state and
regional borders. The National 21 Minimum Drinking Age Law was enacted
because of the "blood borders" that were created when adjacent
states had different drinking age laws. Just as the danger posed by an
intoxicated driver does not change when the driver crosses state lines,
neither should the legal test for sobriety. Federal legislation requiring
states to adopt .08% BAC laws is essential. National legislation on
impaired driving issues, including .08% BAC, has overwhelming public
support. A Lou Harris poll conducted for Advocates in 1998 found that 89
percent of the public believes the federal government should set strict
rules about highway safety. Other surveys have found similar results
showing that seven out of 10 adults favor .08% BAC limit.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Congress should require that states enact .08% BAC as the legal
limit for imposing criminal sanctions for drunk driving offenses or face
the loss of federal aid highway funds;
States that have a legal limit of .10% BAC should adopt .08%
BAC as their legal limit for drunk driving offenses.
ISSUE: REPEAT OFFENDERS
Approximately one-third of the 1.4 million people arrested in 1998 for
driving while under the influence of alcohol, or driving while
intoxicated, were repeat offenders. These drivers, already convicted of at
least one impaired driving offense, were arrested and prosecuted for
committing additional, subsequent impaired driving offenses. Repeat
offenders tend to be chronic impaired drivers, generally exhibiting higher
rates of alcoholism or alcohol-related problems. Repeat offenders also
have a greater risk of involvement in, and are over-represented in, fatal
crashes. Addressing the problems of repeat offenders becomes difficult
because they are less responsive to the effects of traditional legal
sanctions, such as license suspension and incarceration.
In order to deal with the problem of repeat offenders, Congress
included in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
(TEA-21) a provision that requires states to enact repeat offender laws
before October 1, 2000, or have a percentage of their federal-aid highway
funds redirected from highway construction to safety programs.
State repeat offender laws must include a number of specific elements
in order to meet the requirements of the legislation: imposing a minimum
one year driver's license suspension; mandatory minimum sentence for
second offenses of at least five days incarceration or 30 days of
community service, and for third offenses of at least 10 days
incarceration or 60 days of community service; impoundment of the repeat
offenders' vehicle during the license suspension period, or the
installation of an ignition interlock system on the vehicle after an
offender's license is reinstated; and, mandatory assessment of a repeat
offenders' alcohol abuse and referral to treatment as appropriate.
The program considers a repeat offender to be anyone who has been
convicted of driving impaired more than once within a five year period.
Three states, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire, had laws which included
these provisions when TEA-21 was enacted. Indiana, Nebraska, and Arkansas
will be in compliance by the October, 2000 deadline. Other states have yet
to take action to ensure that repeat offenders will be subject to minimum
levels of punishment and rehabilitation.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should expeditiously enact repeat offender laws that
comply with or exceed the requirements of federal law.
ISSUE: OPEN CONTAINER LAWS
Contributing to the problem of driving while impaired are the laws in
many states that permit open containers of alcoholic beverages inside the
passenger compartment of moving vehicles.
Studies have shown that possession of open containers of alcoholic
beverages in the passenger compartment of motor vehicles is associated
with a high crash rate regardless of whether the driver has consumed any
alcohol. A survey on this issue reported that of those who admitted to
driving while impaired, 96 percent revealed that they recently drank in a
moving motor vehicle as either a passenger or a driver. An effective
method of reducing the number of impaired drivers on the road is to
prohibit both the possession of open alcoholic beverage containers and the
consumption of alcoholic beverages in motor vehicles.
Only 20 states have open container laws that prohibit both possession
and consumption by all vehicle occupants, and five states still permit
drivers to drink alcohol while driving. Among the states that do have open
container laws, the provisions vary significantly and many have exceptions
that undermine the effectiveness of the law. Some prohibit the possession
of open containers in a motor vehicle but do not actually ban the
consumption of alcohol. Other laws prohibit consumption of alcoholic
beverages but do not specifically prohibit the possession of open
containers. These laws are difficult to enforce because a law enforcement
officer must actually witness the driver drinking from an open container
in order to take action. Still other laws apply only to the driver, not
occupants, and, in some cases, only if the driver's blood alcohol level
equals or exceeds .04% BAC. Further, laws that allow open containers in
easily accessible areas of the vehicle, such as the area behind the last
upright seat in vehicles without a separate trunk compartment (as in
popular SUV models), invite violations of the law. Open container laws are
most effective if they contain provisions that ban both possession and
consumption, apply to all vehicle occupants, and cover the entire
passenger area of the vehicle.
In order to address this issue, Congress passed an open container law
provision in the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21).
That provision requires states to enact and enforce open container laws
that: prohibit both possession of any alcoholic beverage container and
consumption of any alcoholic beverage; apply to all open containers of any
alcoholic beverage; apply to all vehicle occupants (with certain
reasonable exceptions); cover the passenger area of any motor vehicle
(except locked glove compartments, trunks, or the rear storage area of
passenger vehicles not equipped with a trunk); apply to vehicles on a
public highway; and, is subject to standard (primary) enforcement.
Currently, only fourteen states are in compliance, the remaining states
have until October 1, 2000, to comply with the Federal law and avoid
having highway construction funds redirected to safety programs.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should enact laws that comply with or exceed the federal
minimum requirements for laws to prohibit the transportation of open
containers of alcoholic beverages.
ISSUE: ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE
REVOCATION
Administrative License Revocation (ALR), or suspension, provides a
means for immediately removing impaired drivers from the road. ALR laws
permit police officers to take the licenses of drivers suspected of
impaired driving who fail a chemical test or who refuse to take the
chemical test required by state law. The immediate loss of driving
privileges sends a strong message to drunk drivers. Forty states and the
District of Columbia currently have some version of ALR. These laws also
enjoy strong public support, with 77 percent of those surveyed in a 1994
Gallup poll favoring the authority to take away a driver's license as a
means to reduce impaired driving.
ALR laws provide drivers with a right to a prompt administrative
hearing to appeal the arrest, the results of the chemical test and the
license revocation. Before ALR laws were in place, license revocations
could be ordered only by a judge or magistrate at an administrative or
criminal hearing. As a result, nearly all accused impaired drivers
requested hearings, often as a means of delaying the license revocation.
Since the immediate taking of the license under ALR is independent of the
hearing request, hearing requests decreased significantly in states with
ALR. Furthermore, when criminal charges were involved, offenders could
often avoid license revocation as well as other serious penalties by plea
bargaining. ALR imposes an immediate administrative punishment that is
independent of any criminal prosecution.
In addition to eliminating the immediate danger that impaired drivers
pose to the public, ALR also serves as a deterrent to others who might
drink and drive. In fact, 91 percent of those surveyed in the Gallup poll
said that losing their license would discourage them from drinking and
driving. Strict enforcement and educational campaigns about ALR laws have
increased public awareness of the laws and the consequences of impaired
driving.
Opponents of ALR argue that these laws violate an offender's right to
due process and may constitute double jeopardy if they are later
prosecuted for drunk driving. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has upheld
the constitutionality of ALR laws in both instances. Another claim used to
attack ALR is that the penalty affects the offender's ability to get to
work. This argument has not been substantiated and one survey has
indicated that immediate license revocation does not result in loss of
employment or income for offenders. The same survey found no difference
between ALR states and non-ALR states in the percent of impaired driving
offenders who were unemployed one month after arrest.
Effective state ALR laws include: authority for the arresting officer
to immediately take the drivers license; the right to a prompt hearing
without delaying the revocation; an initial revocation period of at least
90 days, with a 30-day "hard" suspension; and a criminal
proceeding which has no bearing on the administrative action taken
regarding the license.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should adopt ALR laws that provide for immediate license
revocation.
ISSUE: NEW PENALTIES FOR IMPAIRED
DRIVING
States are experimenting with new ways to deter impaired driving and to
punish those who nevertheless drink and drive. Beyond the traditional
sanctions such as fines, jail sentences and license suspension, new
approaches are being explored to find more effective ways of reducing
drunk driving. Home detention has been introduced as an alternative to
jail, visible markings or"branding" of license plates serve to
indicate that the driver has a suspended license, ignition interlocks are
used to prevent an offender from driving while impaired again, and vehicle
immobilization, impoundment and forfeiture relieve offenders of their
vehicles.
While incarceration has been used for felony offenses, long term
detention for misdemeanor alcohol-related driving offenses has not proven
to be an ideal solution because it is expensive and burdens already
overcrowded prisons. Alternatives to incarceration are being tested and
include programs such as electronic monitoring of home detention. An
offender is monitored by an electronic system that permits offenders to
work, attend school, and participate in treatment and education programs.
This alternative is less costly and minimizes the interference in the
offender's daily life and affords the offender an opportunity to develop
new behavior patterns while in a stable, familiar, environment.
In addition to criminal sanctions such as jail sentences or home
detention, states are imposing separate administrative penalties.
Administrative sanctions may begin with license suspension, however, as
many as 70 percent of offenders continue to drive while under suspension.
In response, some states have implemented a system to mark vehicles of
drivers under suspension with special license plates or stickers affixed
to the regular plates. This visual signal alerts law enforcement officers
who can stop and verify that the driver has a valid license. This system
restricts the driving of offenders whose licenses have been suspended
while continuing to allow other family members to use the vehicle.
States have also enacted laws that immobilize the offender's vehicle
and can be used in conjunction with license suspension. Immobilization is
accomplished by ignition interlock devices that allow for controlled use
of the vehicle; impoundment or use of a device such as a boot or a club
prevents the use of the vehicle for limited periods of time; and
forfeiture permanently deprives the offender of the vehicle.
Ignition interlock devices are installed on an offender's vehicle to
prevent operation if the driver's blood alcohol concentration as measured
by a sample of the driver's breath is above a predetermined level (often
.025% BAC). This grants offenders full driving privileges so long as they
are not impaired, while also allowing family members to continue to use
the vehicle. In Maryland, the interlock program reduced the risk of an
alcohol traffic violation within the first year by 65 percent. In 1997, 35
states had legislation that allowed ignition interlocks to be imposed on
chronic, repeat and, in some cases, even first-time offenders.
States are also immobilizing vehicles of offenders through the use of a
device such as a boot or club or through impoundment. As an initial
administrative response, many states allow for the overnight impoundment
of the vehicle of an individual arrested for impaired driving. Some states
permit longer periods of impoundment for offenses such as repeat driving
while intoxicated or driving while suspended if the suspension was for an
alcohol-related driving offense. California law has a 30-day impoundment
provision and the state has experienced substantially fewer subsequent
offenses, traffic convictions, and crashes among offenders.
In 22 states, repeat offenders may be forced to forfeit their vehicles.
If the offender is convicted, the forfeited vehicle is sold at auction.
Most forfeiture laws apply only to repeat offenders who continue to drive
while impaired despite other sanctions previously imposed upon them.
Because forfeiture creates complications including preserving the rights
of non-offender owners, many states remain reluctant to impose this
sanction or impose it only on recidivists.
In New York City, the forfeiture policy has been taken one step
further. As of February 22, 1999, the vehicle of anyone arrested for
driving while impaired regardless of their previous record is confiscated
on arrest. Officials felt this extension of the forfeiture laws was
necessary since 87 percent of impaired driving-related deaths in New York
are caused by first time offenders. Between February 22 and April 12,
1999, the number of alcohol-related crashes dropped by 29 percent compared
to the previous year. During the same time period, arrests for driving
while intoxicated and driving while impaired decreased by 14 percent. The
constitutionality of the law has been upheld by both state and federal
courts based on the theory that a vehicle operated by an impaired driver
is a weapon used to facilitate a crime.
While no single solution exists to prevent impaired drivers from
getting behind the wheel of a car, states continue to explore the use of
alternative sanctions such as home detention, marked license plates,
ignition interlock, and vehicle impoundment and forfeiture. These
non-traditional methods have already reduced the number of alcohol-related
crashes and fatalities in some states and localities.
RECOMMENDATION:
States need to adopt measures that will keep repeat offenders
off the road, including
vehicle immobilization, forfeiture and use of interlock devices
as additional penalties for impaired driving.
ISSUE: DRIVER ALERTNESS AND FATIGUE
It has become rapidly apparent in recent years that driving is a
complex task requiring high levels of cognitive processing, good skills
and reasonable physical condition and alertness or attentiveness. It also
has become evident that a large percentage of drivers are impaired due to
fatigue or chronic lack of sleep. Most importantly, there is rising
awareness that driving while fatigued dramatically compounds the dangers
of operating a motor vehicle.
Statistics on the prevalence of crashes due directly to drivers with
low alertness or in the first stages of sleep are unreliable because many
surviving drivers deny that they were drowsy or even fail to recognize
that they suffered a short or "micro-sleep" episode which
resulted in a loss of vehicle control. Surveys, however, have been
conducted both of passenger vehicle drivers and truck drivers in which
more than 25 percent of passenger vehicle drivers and a startling 60
percent or more of large truck drivers admit having fallen asleep at the
wheel. Reliable findings on the incidence of fatigued or drowsy driver
crash involvement also have been produced from carefully controlled
research studies with commercial drivers. For example, studies conducted
by the National Transportation Safety Board in the 1990s indicate that
perhaps as many as one out of three fatal heavy truck crashes are due to
fatigued truck drivers.
Fatigued driving is a problem which affects all age groups, but
especially young drivers and truck and bus drivers. Sleep deprivation
stems from a variety of causes, but is largely the result of either too
little sleep or sleep attempted on an irregular basis due to changing work
schedules, called shiftwork.
Research indicates, for example, that young people in school not only
need more sleep, but in fact regularly live day by day in a state of
chronic sleep deprivation. Chronic sleep deprivation among young drivers
is due to late night socializing, especially on weekends, which often
results in a youthful operator at the controls of a car in the early
morning hours. The traffic safety implications are evident. Many of these
young drivers suffer serious losses of alertness and some even fall asleep
at the wheel with tragic consequences. Use of alcohol and illicit drugs
compound the problem and further increase the chances of a crash.
Truck and bus drivers, especially those in long-haul freight carriage,
are prone to the dangerous effects of sleep deprivation while driving
large trucks because current federal hours-of-service regulations, which
govern driver on- and off-duty time, permit constantly alternating
work/rest cycles which violate basic human biological needs for sleep.
Current federal hours-of-service rules allow commercial drivers to work
and rest on an 18-hour cycle (10 hours driving, 8 hours rest time), a
major reason for widespread sleep deprivation among truck and bus
operators. This cycle can lead to a constantly changing work schedule and
lead to inevitable lapses at the wheel and often catastrophic crashes,
especially between midnight and dawn. The safety problems of this schedule
are magnified by allowing truck drivers to split their sleeping time into
two segments in truck cab sleeper berths.
Multiple strategies are needed to address the problems of
sleep-deprived drivers. In general, society needs to alter its attitudes
about sleep and safety so that the need for sleep is not regarded as a
shortcoming. Regardless of general societal views, educational efforts
about the dangers of fatigued driving and the need for adequate sleep are
essential to parallel those which have made a distinct difference in the
prevalence of alcohol-related driving. For young drivers, school
scheduling times should be evaluated, and graduated licensing can help
reduce the exposure of a large portion of the youngest drivers to the risk
of late night driving.
Dealing with driving for commercial purposes requires several policy
choices involving revised hours of service regulations, increasing the
off-duty rest time of truck and bus drivers and protecting that time
against interruption by dispatchers and consignees, motor carrier safety
management schemes providing ample advance notice to drivers of scheduling
changes, and careful control over the amount of late night commercial
driving. These and other actions, such as automated vehicle tracking and
recordation of commercial driver duty time, are necessary to redress the
balance between the demands of commerce and the need for enhanced public
safety on our highways.
Finally, society in general and government regulators and officials
need to realize that fatigued or drowsy driving is pervasive and a major
issue in traffic safety alongside alcohol and illicit drug use which can
only be reduced through a combination of sustained public education
efforts and judicious choices in how we manage vehicle operations on our
highways, especially those involving motor carriers.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
FHWA should revise current hours of service regulations to
increase truck and bus driver off-duty rest time, to protect that off-duty
time against interruption and to prohibit any increase in driving time
beyond 10 hours;
FHWA should require the use of automated vehicle tracking and
recordation of commercial driver duty time;
NHTSA should develop a sustained public education effort to
advise the public of the dangers of fatigued driving;
States should enact state graduated licensing laws that limit
the ability of teenage drivers to drive during late night hours.
C. OTHER CRITICAL BEHAVIORAL ISSUES
ISSUE: RED LIGHT RUNNING
Red light running, when a motorist deliberately enters an intersection
after the signal light has turned red, has become one of the most frequent
and intractable traffic offenses. Drivers who run red lights are
responsible for an estimated 260,000 crashes every year, of which
approximately 750 are fatal. Roughly 40 percent of motor vehicle crashes
occur at or near intersections or are "intersection-related,"
and they are increasing in number. On a national basis, fatal motor
vehicle crashes at traffic signals increased 24 percent between 1992 and
1997, compared to a 6 percent increase in all other types of fatal
crashes. Red light running, a major contributor to this increase, has been
successfully reduced in localities across the country through the use
photographic enforcement technology.
Red light running cameras have provided communities a reliable means to
enforce traffic signal violations by automatically photographing the
vehicles of drivers who run red lights. Automated red light enforcement
systems are connected to traffic signals and to sensors buried in the
pavement at the crosswalk or stop line. Continuously monitoring the
traffic signal, the camera detects vehicles that pass over the sensors at
a specified interval after the signal has turned red. A photograph is
taken that, in many localities, displays the offending vehicle in the
intersection, records the date, time of day, the speed of the vehicle and
the elapsed time since the beginning of the red signal. Tickets typically
are sent by mail to the registered owner of the violating vehicle after
officials review the photographic evidence. Traffic safety experts,
traffic engineers and other safety professionals agree that automated
photo-enforcement is an effective, cost-efficient method of deterring red
light running and of fining perpetrators.
Preliminary crash data from localities employing red light running
cameras have demonstrated their benefit. Data compiled in Oxnard,
California showed a 42 percent reduction in red light running violations
after cameras were introduced in nine intersections. A similar decline
occurred at intersections that were not equipped with the cameras,
suggesting a possible spillover effect and indicating that
photo-enforcement has a community-wide impact. Another study showed
violations declined approximately 40 percent in Fairfax, Virginia after
one year of camera enforcement. Victoria, Australia experienced a 32
percent reduction in right-angle collisions and a 10 percent decrease in
injuries after the cameras were installed.
Opponents of photo-enforcement technology argue that the photographs
violate the privacy rights of motorists. However, privacy claims for
motorists committing traffic infractions have limited appeal because
drivers are required to abide by traffic ordinances and to obey traffic
signals. The use of cameras is just one means to enforce these laws.
Moreover, camera systems should be designed to take photos only of
violators, and can be designed to photograph only the rear license plate
of the vehicle and not the front windshield and the faces of the
occupants.
Other opponents argue that the cameras are too expensive. While
start-up costs can be expensive with cameras costing about $50,000 and
installation about $5,000, a single camera can be used at several
locations once the sites are set up. Additionally, cost-savings are
realized from reduced crash totals, fines paid by violators, and through
the more efficient use of enforcement resources.
The public continues to indicate support for strong action to deter red
light running. A 1998 national public opinion poll commissioned by
Advocates and conducted by Louis Harris found a decisive 65 percent
majority of the public supports state adoption of red light running laws.
A 1996 survey by the Insurance Research Council found that the highest
support for red light cameras was in large cities, where 83 percent of
respondents supported their use. Strong support is also found in
communities where cameras are used. The programs mentioned above in
California and Virginia were supported by 80 percent of the residents
polled.
The major barrier to increased red light running enforcement is the
absence of enabling legislation in many states. In fact, photo-enforcement
is only authorized statewide in 12 states, the District of Columbia, and a
handful of local jurisdictions that have enacted local ordinances. With
the increasing danger posed by red light running and the growing public
concern, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive and coordinated
response to this threat.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should enact enabling laws that permit the use of
photo-enforcement systems, authorize enforcement agencies to cite red
light violators by mail, and place responsibility for the violation on the
vehicle owner.
ISSUE: SPEEDING AND EXCESSIVE SPEED
After alcohol impairment, speeding is the most important contributory
factor in fatal crashes. In 1997, speeding, either exceeding the speed
limit or driving too fast for road conditions, was a factor in 30 percent
of all fatal crashes. Over 13,000 people died in speed-related crashes and
6,899 of those were killed on roads posted at 55 Miles Per Hour (MPH) or
higher. Younger drivers, both male and female, tend to speed more than
older drivers. As a consequence, more than one-third (37 percent) of male
teenage drivers and one-quarter (25 percent) of female teenage drivers
involved in fatal crashes in 1997 were speeding at the time of the crash.
Several factors contribute to make higher speeds less safe. At higher
speeds the driver has much less time to perceive and react to trouble
ahead. The loss of a second or less in reaction time can make the critical
difference between a safe stop or avoidance maneuver and a serious crash.
Also, at higher travel speeds the physical forces exerted on the vehicle
and the people inside are greater when a crash does occur. An object
striking a car at 65 mph hits with nearly twice the force of an impact at
55 mph. In addition, many drivers view posted speed limits as merely
advisory. An increase in the posted speed limit is an invitation to these
drivers to go even faster and exceed the 65 mph limit by 10 miles per hour
or more. The failure of drivers to reduce speeds after leaving a 65 mph
section of highway may cause a spillover effect that increases travel
speeds on other roadways with lower design speeds, more congestion and
lower posted speed limits.
The overall fatality rate and the total number of annual deaths are not
appropriate measures of increases in speed-related fatalities.
Historically, the national fatality rate has been dropping over the years
for a variety of reasons. In addition, fluctuations in total deaths per
year are also driven by many factors. In order to properly assess whether
highway deaths are increasing as a result of higher speed limits, the
annual national data must be desegregated or separated and data about
particular causes of fatalities must be studied individually. When this is
done it is evident that higher speed limits do lead to more deaths.
In 1974, after the national maximum speed limit was adopted, annual
traffic deaths decreased by 9,000 in one year. The National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) determined in a 1984 study that between 3,000 and 5,000 of
these lives saved were directly attributable to the effect of a uniform 55
MPH speed limit. Likewise, after Congress in 1987 allowed higher speed
limits, up to 65 MPH, on rural Interstate highways, numerous studies
showed a direct relationship between higher speed limits and increased
fatalities on highways with higher speed limits. Those studies bore out
the 1984 NAS study estimate that an increase to 65 MPH would result in 500
more deaths on Interstate highways. Most recently, when Congress repealed
the National Maximum Speed Limit law in 1995, studies and state reports
documented the fact that between 350 and 500 hundred more deaths occurred
nationwide on roads with higher speed limits.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
States should reduce speed limits on roads and highways that
demonstrate an increase in crashes, fatalities or injuries;
States should effectively enforce all posted speed limits on
all roadways;
States should improve the driving safety, highway design,
traffic control devices and remove roadside obstacles on highways posted
at 65 mph or higher in order to provide greater safety for vehicles that
run off the road at high speeds;
Congress should require states to submit appropriate data on
vehicle speed and speed-related crashes to NHTSA.
ISSUE: GRADUATED LICENSING
As the children of the Baby Boom generation, or the "Baby Boom
Echo" as they are often called, come of driving age, more teenagers
than ever before will be behind the wheel. By 2010, there will be a 23
percent increase in the number of 16 year-olds compared to 1995. As a
result of this population surge, there will be a dramatic rise in the
number of teenage crashes unless measures are taken to improve the skill
level and driving behaviors of newly licensed teens.
Although teenagers drive fewer miles than most all other groups, they
are involved in three times as many fatal crashes as are all drivers. In
fact, motor vehicle deaths are the leading cause of death for young people
15 to 20 years of age. Because teenaged drivers lack experience behind the
wheel and have a tendency to engage in risky behaviors, teenagers have the
highest crash rates of all drivers. Teens are less likely than adults to
perceive danger and to respond appropriately. In comparison to more
mature, experienced drivers, teens are more likely to commit a driving
error that leads to their own crash and are more likely to be involved in
a single vehicle crash in which they are speeding, driving recklessly or
over-compensating. Teenagers are also far less likely to wear safety belts
and are, therefore, more vulnerable when a crash occurs. Maturity gained
by even one year of driving experience drastically decreases crash rates
as is evidenced by the fact that the crash rate for 17 year-olds is three
times less than it is for 16 year-olds.
Graduated driver licensing (GDL) systems address this problem by
allowing beginning drivers to acquire significant driving experience in
low risk conditions and under adult supervision. GDL has been shown to be
effective in reducing teenage crash rates by expanding the learning
process, reducing risk exposure, improving driving proficiency, and
enhancing motivation for safe driving. As a result of GDL, teenagers will
be a little older and more mature when they receive full licensure and
will be less likely to be involved in a fatal crash.
A three tier graduated driver licensing system is optimal. In the first
stage, all driving is supervised by an adult over 21 years of age for a
period of at least 6 months. During that time the number of passengers
allowed in the vehicle is limited and the novice driver must comply with
safety belt and alcohol laws and remain crash and conviction-free for six
consecutive months. In the intermediate phase, which also lasts a minimum
of six months, the teen driver may now drive without adult supervision
except during certain high-risk, late night and early morning hours. All
the other provisions of the learner's phase still apply. The final full
license is achieved once the young driver has completed the first two
stages and has successfully driven crash and conviction-free for at least
twelve consecutive months.
GDL systems have proven effective in reducing fatalities and injuries
among teenage drivers in many jurisdictions including Canadian provinces,
New Zealand, Australia and many U.S. states. California reported a five
percent reduction in crashes for drivers ages 15 to 17 after implementing
a partial GDL provisional licensing program. Florida experienced a nine
percent reduction in fatal and injury crash involvements for 15 to 17
year-old drivers in the first full year of its full GDL system for drivers
younger than 18. Studies have found general crash reductions of up to 60
percent during night-time restricted driving hours in states with enforced
night driving restrictions for young beginning drivers.
Along with implementation of GDL systems, states can also incorporate
innovative driver education programs. Teenage crash rates have continued
to climb despite traditional driver education programs which teach teens
basic driving skills as well as the effects of driving while impaired. In
efforts to change this trend, new driver education programs have been
expanded to include a focus on teenagers' attitudes about driving. These
programs are directed at reducing the impact of peer pressure and
risk-taking tendencies on the teen driver. With the GDL
system as its foundation, this approach spreads learning over two extended
periods. The first stage of driver education occurs while the novice
driver holds a learner's permit during which only basic vehicle handling
skills and the rules of the road are taught. The second stage of the
driver education program occurs during the intermediate phase and focuses
on safe driving skills. Teaching safe driving skills after the novice has
obtained behind-the-wheel experience and a minimum level of vehicle
control is intended to enable the teen driver to more effectively
concentrate on developing safe driving procedures.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should adopt three-tier graduated licensing systems for
teenage drivers.
ISSUE: LICENSE RENEWAL
As we grow older the natural effects of the aging process, including
slower perception-reaction time and poorer eyesight, affect our ability to
perform the driving task. This fact merely reflects a decline in a range
of functional capabilities that accompany aging. Thus, while older drivers
have more experience, drivers over the age of 69 are still twice as likely
as middle-aged drivers to be involved in fatal car crashes. In addition,
because of increasing life expectancy and good health, people 85 years of
age and older are the fastest growing cohort of registered drivers. This
safety concern will expand as the Baby Boom generation begins to reach
retirement age in little more than a decade. There is expected to be a 60
percent growth of the 65-plus population between now and the year 2020.
Certainly, not all older drivers or even those of the same age have the
same driving ability. Many older drivers are excellent drivers who are
frequently more careful, more likely to obey traffic laws, and more
experienced than younger drivers. However, some older citizens continue to
drive after they become unsafe to themselves and to others. Because of the
wide range of abilities, older drivers should not be treated uniformly and
the decisions of whether someone should continue to drive needs to be
based on individual assessments.
Currently, self-regulation is the primary method by which older drivers
monitor their driving. Drivers use self-assessment to determine when they
should reduce or eliminate certain driving practices. Consequently, many
current older drivers have opted to stop driving or eliminate higher risk
conditions such as driving at night, in inclement weather, during rush
hours, or on interstate highways. However, older drivers of the future,
including the Baby Boomers who are nearing retirement, will have grown up
in an era when the automobile became a pervasive and essential part of
daily life. As a result, these new older drivers may be less likely to
elect to limit their driving as much as older drivers have in the past.
This trend is exemplified by surveys which reveal that in each year since
1969 the average miles driven by those 65 and over have increased. As a
result, self-regulation may not be as effective in the future.
In addition to self-regulation, "graduated licensing" systems
for older drivers have been proposed to address this issue. Much like
traditional graduated driver licensing is used to allow new drivers to
adjust to increasingly more difficult driving situations, graduated
systems for older drivers operate in reverse, reducing driving privileges
according to the drivers' ability to handle the demands of different types
of driving situations. Instead of placing the burden on the individual to
make often difficult decisions based on self-assessment alone, this form
of "graduated licensing" allows trained professional licensing
authorities to assist by making evaluations of driving skills. Under such
systems, a driver's license can be custom tailored to the driver's
specific abilities and may include such limitations as day driving only,
use of special equipment like wide-angle mirrors or requiring a companion
in the car.
Different states have implemented varying solutions. While some states
provide that older drivers must renew their licenses more frequently
without retesting, others require vision and road tests to be taken after
a certain age, typically 65 or 70. Other states empower examiners to find
a solution that is user-friendly to older drivers in order to maintain as
much mobility and independence as is safely possible.
Most recently, Missouri has adopted a new approach to help regulate
drivers as their abilities change. Peace officers, health personnel, and
close relatives can file a report stating that a driver cannot safely
operate a motor vehicle. The report must be based on personal observation
or physical evidence and can be filed confidentially. The state must then
investigate to determine whether the reported driver should retain driving
privileges. The state can require the driver to retake the driver's
license written and road tests. The state is then able to limit the
driver's license according to ability, suspend or revoke the license,
require a driver to take the driving exam again, and require a driver to
complete a physical or mental examination. Drivers who fail the written
and road tests can be retested at a later date. This approach is
considered beneficial since it focuses on continuing driving privileges
based solely on ability, not the age, of the driver.
As a growing proportion of our driving population falls into a
higher-risk category for crashes, efforts must be made to retain the
mobility of older citizens while promoting safety on the roads for
everyone. As a society, we can make changes that appropriately balance
these concerns as the proportion of older drivers increases.
RECOMMENDATION:
States should explore reasonable graduated licensing systems
for older drivers that
incorporate individual evaluations of driver performance based
on consideration of driving skills rather than on chronological age alone.
ISSUE: DRIVER DISTRACTIONS
Widespread cellular telephone use, already a subject of considerable
concern to traffic safety advocates, has recently been accompanied by
another source of driver distraction: in-vehicle displays. Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) and interactive computer screens, in-vehicle
fax machines, and even television sets and computer monitors within the
driver's view, have recently been introduced in new models of cars and
light trucks. In addition, in-vehicle displays, such as Doppler Radar
collision warning systems and other screens, are gaining favor in the
motor carrier industry to monitor vehicle and driver parameters for both
safety purposes and regulatory compliance.
It is obvious that these new devices increase the chances of diverting
attention from the driving task and lower the ability to perform often
complex maneuvers at the wheel. NHTSA has compiled a long list of cellular
telephone studies conducted in recent years which show that relative crash
risk is significantly increased with drivers using cell telephones while
underway, even if the telephones are "hands-free" designs. No
doubt telephones are used to report crashes but this does not override the
safety concern that they contribute to crashes when used while driving. In
addition, automated crash notification would eliminate the need for manual
reporting of crashes by telephone. NHTSA, however, has not responded to
the need to evaluate safety risks and acted to control the proliferation
of in-vehicle displays and other distractions which can lower the level of
driver attention to safely operating a vehicle and result in more crashes.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
NHTSA should develop human factors criteria and determine needs
for driver attention;
NHTSA should regulate the proliferation of in-vehicle displays;
NHTSA should regulate the proliferation of other in-vehicle
technology that can divert driver attention.
ISSUE: THE DRIVER AND HIGHWAY DESIGN
Although some might think a discussion of highway design is misplaced
here, in fact, one of the key deficiencies in geometric design and traffic
engineering recognized repeatedly over the years is the failure to produce
design standards and practices carefully indexed to different types of
theoretical "design drivers" that are representative of segments
of the driving population.
Unfortunately, no consistent criteria derived from driver capabilities
have governed major road design parameters such as passing and stopping
sight distance, intersection sight distance, perception-reaction times,
static and dynamic visual acuity (and Useful Field of View), and other
important human factors which ultimately control how well or badly drivers
negotiate roads and streets. Although some criteria are derived from human
factors studies, many of these studies are outdated and often the product
of research which relied on driver behavior and skills of youthful
operators rather than older or short-statured drivers.
It is noteworthy that the major geometric design guides and traffic
engineering manuals currently relied on by practitioners deal with human
factors issues on a piecemeal basis - no coherent and comprehensive
treatment of the basic human skills and capabilities to safely perform the
driving task is provided. It is clear that this fundamental shortcoming of
highway and traffic engineering standards continues to allow inconsistent
road and traffic control device designs which fail to meet the needs of a
large part of the driving population and, more importantly, which reduce
the margins of safe operation to unacceptable levels.
RECOMMENDATION:
FHWA should develop a uniform set of human factors criteria
which specify "design drivers" governing highway geometric
design and traffic engineering standards.
HADDON MATRIX PART THREE:
THE HIGHWAY
THE HIGHWAY ENVIRONMENT -
INTRODUCTION
The highway and its complementary traffic engineering design is a
complex subject which needs individual attention in this Report to
emphasize the public health implications of how well or badly the
operating environment provides for safe and efficient use by motorists.
Although behavioral changes are both necessary and desirable to improve
traffic safety, the fundamental premise of highway engineering is to
anticipate and compensate for human errors so that people are given a
chance to make mistakes without serious risk to their lives.
The basic goal of good highway and traffic engineering design is to
assure drivers that their moment-to-moment decisions in carrying out the
driving task are guided and reinforced by both predictable and safe
highway design features. This theory and practice, called "Positive
Guidance," means that drivers should not be subject to unexpected
conditions or surprises while driving on a road or street. Unfortunately,
there are still many tens of thousands of miles of roads and streets in
the U.S. which repeatedly violate this hallmark of good highway design by
demanding rapid responses from unprepared drivers in order to avoid a
crash.
These brief considerations show that designing and managing the highway
environment should be consistent with the basic concepts of the Haddon
Matrix. The job of the geometric designer and traffic engineer is twofold.
First, to prevent crashes by keeping the driver on a safe travel path with
consistent and predictable alignment and as few conflicts with other
vehicles as practicable. Second, when crashes nevertheless occur, provide
operating conditions which either reduce the chances of a collision or
ensure that collisions do not have severe consequences.
ISSUE: INTERSECTION SAFETY
Vehicle conflicts at intersections produce an overabundance of severe
crashes with fatalities and serious injuries. Estimates by NHTSA and other
organizations indicate that more than 40 percent of all fatalities occur
in vehicle collisions at or near intersections. This figure includes
crashes resulting from any crossing conflicts, including ramp merging
areas, driveways, and divided highway median crossovers. Between 1992 and
1996 fatal crashes at intersections increased by 19 percent compared to
only a six percent increase for all other types of fatal crashes. A recent
study by the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm)
has reinforced these statistics finding that 32 percent of all crashes
occur at intersections. Based on 1998 policyholder claims data, the State
Farm study compiled a list of dangerous intersections throughout the
nation, providing a national context for intersection safety.
Intersection conflicts and crashes pose dangers to both vehicle
occupants and pedestrians. In crashes at intersections vehicle occupants
are vulnerable to severe injury and death because the majority of the
collisions involve side impacts into one of the vehicles. As discussed
earlier, side impacts have higher rates of deaths and serious injuries
because there is comparatively little vehicle protective structure to
safeguard occupants in the struck vehicle.
Pedestrians are particularly vulnerable when they cross a road because
a driver failing to obey the direction of signs, markings, and signals can
easily kill or seriously injure a pedestrian. Regular violation of
crosswalk requirements pose safety dangers at intersections. Drivers
frequently fail to notice poorly marked crosswalks or ignore the need to
stop for pedestrians who are in, or about to enter, a crosswalk.
Pedestrians may be forced into conflicts with vehicles where no crosswalk
is provided, or in construction zones where no adequately marked crossing
is provided. One of the many problems with current traffic engineering
criteria for addressing safe pedestrian crossing of highways and streets,
is the inadequate time allotted by most traffic control signals for older
citizens and those with ambulatory disabilities to cross busy streets.
Many thousands of intersections permit pedestrian crossing, yet their
signals are timed to provide for the maximum movement of vehicle, not
pedestrian, traffic. The result is a street crossing pace which cannot be
met by a large percentage of people, especially older pedestrians, and
those in wheelchairs. Collisions could be avoided if a better balance were
struck between the competing needs of pedestrian and vehicle traffic.
As a result, the issue of intersection safety is a growing concern to
the American public. This fact is reflected in the Louis Harris poll
results on intersection safety released by Advocates. In the survey, 85
percent of those asked said that more attention should given to making
dangerous intersections safer for pedestrians. Over half of the
participants, 57 percent, stated that much greater attention should be
focused on intersection safety. This issue includes changes to the
physical infrastructure such as dedicated left turn lanes, better traffic
control devices and changing traffic signal timing. The poll also found
strong support among those polled for the use of photo radar as a
supplement to police enforcement in order to improve driver behavior at
intersections. Seventy-four percent supported the use of this technology.
Intersection design is crucial to safe vehicle operations because
vehicle crossing conflicts must be controlled by a carefully selected mix
of traffic control devices (signs, pavement markings, and signals),
specific geometric design features, and traffic management decisions
affecting pedestrian movement, traffic volumes, vehicle type, and parking
practices, among other things. Engineering intersections to ensure high
levels of safety for both vehicle occupants and pedestrians while
simultaneously avoiding congestion is a complex task.
Without a high level of voluntary compliance, intersection safety
rapidly declines. As traffic volume grows there is increasing disregard by
drivers of traffic control laws and devices, especially violations of stop
and yield signs, signals (red lights), and pedestrian crossing controls
(Walk and Wait pedestrian signals, for example). Solutions to such
violations vary with location, but center on consideration of redesigning
certain physical characteristics of the intersection, such as increasing
available intersection decision sight distance for drivers to see crossing
vehicles in enough time to take appropriate action and correcting for
insufficient stopping sight distance by warning drivers of an impending
intersection, including the fact that it may be signalized. Other
strategies are applied to reduce the temptation of drivers to violate
traffic controls, such as desirable increases in meeting the demand for
turning movement traffic volume by installing dual dedicated turn lanes
with protected turning arrows and by extending turn storage lane lengths
to accommodate more vehicles in the bay thereby reducing moving lane
conflicts which often result in rear-end crashes. Due to high cost and
often limited right-of-way, although many intersection safety problems
could be cured with substantial redesign of the intersections, this is
frequently not a feasible alternative.
A countermeasure quickly growing in popularity and effectiveness is
known as photo radar. Vehicles violating intersection traffic control pass
through a radar beam which simultaneously trips a camera shutter and
triggers stroboscopic lighting for enhancing picture quality. A picture of
the license tag of the vehicle is taken and the speed of the vehicle
violating the intersection traffic control is recorded along with the date
and time of the violation. Tickets are then mailed to the registered owner
of the vehicle. Photo radar has several, highly desirable effects on
intersection safety. First, drivers actually cited for violations are
caught. This enables repeat signal violators to be detected, resulting in
license restrictions, suspension, or revocation. Second, enforcement
resources, always limited in a number of ways, are electronically
extended. In effect, photo radar becomes the police officer stationed at
an intersection whose primary task is to stop red light running.
Regular detection, citation, and punishment of intersection traffic
control violators have important collateral safety effects: ticketed
violators may be deterred from repeated offenses; other drivers are
similarly deterred from committing initial violations; intersection speeds
are reduced, a highly desirable safety goal resulting in fewer and less
serious collisions; pedestrian safety is improved; and intersection
congestion is often significantly alleviated because drivers refrain from
entering an intersection when they are unable to clear it before a change
in signal phase. These outcomes do not exhaust the benefits of controlling
signal violations. Other benefits, still unproven, may be an increase in
voluntary compliance by motorists with other traffic control devices,
especially stop and yield signs, for example.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
States should enact legislation that enables localities to
install photo radar;
FHWA and the states should revise the existing practices for
traffic control devices to permit longer phasing for pedestrian signals to
enable safer pedestrian crossing on high volume roadways;
FHWA should emphasize the need for state and local governments
to provide safer intersections for vehicles and pedestrians through better
design, improved traffic control measures and, where warranted,
rehabilitation or reconstruction of intersections.
ISSUE: HIGHWAY WORK ZONE SAFETY
This area of highway design and operation deserves treatment in its own
right because major reconstruction and resurfacing of U.S. roads and
streets has continued to increase over the last 20 years as roads and
bridges have reached the end of their useful lives. Correcting the defects
of aging infrastructure usually requires even full reconstruction of most
highways in stages because of the necessity of maintaining access and use
of these facilities by traffic.
As a result, providing drivers safe travel paths and guarding against
crashes in highway work areas become even more critical due to the
increase in opportunities for severe crashes simply because of the nature
of the work being pursued in the construction or maintenance zone. Workers
are often directly adjacent to moving traffic, heavy equipment is
operating or stored near travel lanes, and flaggers are standing on the
roadway. Over 750 people are killed each year in work zone crashes.
Temporary reductions in overall safety as compared with a permanent
facility are unavoidable because traffic diversions are necessary, lane
widths must be reduced, and barriers need to be erected close to traffic
to protect workers and equipment, thereby increasing the opportunity for
crashes. Over the years, an entire complement both of devices and specific
engineering practices has evolved which is specifically directed towards
offsetting the risks of permitting through traffic while a facility is
undergoing maintenance or construction. Work zone safety strategies
include special signs, channelizing and delineating supplements to or
replacements for pavement markings (e.g., cones, barricades, and barrels),
temporary and moveable barrier systems, and specific design criteria for
the temporary alignment and cross-section values necessary to promote a
high level of operating safety.
One major feature of construction and maintenance zone traffic control
devices is the exemplification of the principle behind traffic engineering
theory and practice of dedicating certain colors to specific kinds of
devices. In the case of temporary work zone devices, the color used is
orange. Another important principle controlling work zone traffic control
is to provide positive guidance to motorists much more often than
encountered on permanent roadways. Signs, including advance warning signs,
are periodically spaced to advise motorists that a work zone is ahead,
speed zone reductions are repeatedly made with the appropriate signs, and
vehicles are guided into travel paths which often diverge from the
permanent alignment of the road by means of closely spaced, temporary
devices so that drivers are safely "channelized" through the
hazards of the work area.
However, standards for specific traffic engineering countermeasures
often are not observed by some authorities and contractors. Missing or
illegible signs, damaged or inadequate temporary delineating devices,
failure to supply necessary temporary barriers, and a host of other
well-known defects can unfortunately be encountered in numerous highway
work areas. Other common deficiencies are a failure to provide for safe
pedestrian movement through or adjacent to the work area, failure to
control working practices which needlessly expose workers to a high chance
of vehicle collisions, and design of the temporary roadway conditions to
meet the needs only of passenger vehicles and not of heavy commercial
vehicles. This last deficiency has led to a serious overrepresentation of
large commercial vehicle crashes in highway work zones. Although medium
and heavy trucks are only about three percent of registered vehicles in
the U.S., almost one out of four fatal crashes in highway work areas
involve large commercial vehicles. This means that, among other things,
work zones are not being designed to meet the very different operating
needs and performance capabilities of big trucks and buses.
Another problem with work zone safety is the lack of reliable exposure
data. Although most states report work zone fatality data, the reporting
is very uneven and no measure of exposure for crashes, deaths, and
injuries sustained is available. Consequently, much of the design of work
zones and their effectiveness in providing safety for workers, motor
vehicles, and pedestrians is based on anecdotal information rather than on
"hard data." This problem is further compounded by the fact that
different jurisdictions use different working definitions of where a
highway construction zone begins and ends, for example, so that in some
states crashes are included in reporting on work zone safety which are
excluded in other states.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
FHWA should evaluate and revise the standards for temporary
traffic control in highway work zones, especially for driver decision
sight distance, temporary alignment, and cross-section design features
contained in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), to
provide a safer operating environment for commercial vehicles on roads
undergoing reconstruction and maintenance;
FHWA should also revise the MUTCD sections on pedestrian and
worker safety given the unnecessary pedestrian deaths and injuries that
occur in highway and street work zones, and the very high fatality rate
for construction workers;
FHWA also needs to require the states to report work zone
injury and fatal crash data with appropriate measures of exposure in order
to determine whether specific traffic
control practices and other safety countermeasures have
measurable benefits.
ISSUE: HIGHWAY ALIGNMENT AND WIDTH
(CROSS-SECTION)
Highway design is one of the most important factors in highway safety.
Different types of roads present different safety risks depending on how
well they are designed and built. Freeways and expressways using the
highest level of design and carefully applied traffic engineering
techniques tend to have very low fatal crash rates, on some highways less
than one death per one hundred million vehicle miles traveled. As one
descends in what is called the functional classification of type of road
(from freeways to arterial highways to collector roads and then to local
streets), there is a clear trend of increasing fatal crash and fatality
rates that has persisted for several decades. For example, a county
collector road with the poor design and traffic control can often have a
fatal crash rate far higher than a nearby rural Interstate highway built
and maintained to the highest standards.
The configuration, or geometry, of a highway has two main parts: (1)
its alignment, that is, how the road is laid out linearly before the
driver, and (2) the width of its lanes, shoulders, and immediate roadside
environment which together are referred to by highway designers as
cross-section elements. Both of these basic components of highways are
crucial to operating safety.
On poorly designed and maintained roads, drivers are placed at
considerably increased risk of losing control of their vehicles and having
either a single-vehicle crash especially off the road or a collision with
another vehicle. The central reason for the increased chances of a driver
making a life threatening mistake is the demand that the driver exercise
extraordinary vigilance under conditions which frequently mislead the
driver. On poorly designed roads the driver cannot see far down the
highway because of what are called sight distance restrictions (the sharp
curves and the vertical slopes near the travel lanes). These restrictions
deny the driver a view of the road ahead and sufficient time to make
correct driving decisions and to avoid conflicts with other vehicles, such
as entering traffic from a side road.
Additional failures of good traffic engineering which are commonly
found on American roadways include narrow or non-existent shoulders,
narrow lanes, uncontrolled access from other roads, streets, and
driveways, poor roadway lighting, and faded pavement markings and signs.
Roads with these engineering flaws often have high crash rates because all
of the earmarks of Positive Guidance and avoidance of conflicts have been
ignored.
The hallmarks of good highway design which strongly reinforce safe
driving include:
Long sight distances both for stopping, passing, and making avoidance
maneuvers are provided;
Vehicle conflicts are reduced and controlled by preventing uninhibited
access into the facility from cross streets and driveways;
Conflicts are lowered further by separating traffic with a median
rather than simply a centerline, thereby dramatically reducing the chances
of head-on collisions;
Lanes are wide so all types of vehicles using the facility can have
reasonable lateral movement without collisions with adjacent vehicles;
Roadsides are cleared not only so drivers can see far around curves,
but also to allow vehicle departures from the travel lanes into the
adjacent environment without suffering serious impacts with dangerous
features such as telephone poles, trees, boulders, drainage structures, or
encountering steep ditches that can induce vehicle rollovers;
Lanes, shoulders, and intersections are clearly marked;
Both guidance and warning signs are large, bright, and legible so that
drivers have ample time to make decisions before encountering changed
operating circumstances.
Unfortunately, these basic elements of safe highway design and traffic
control are often disregarded in many ways. The undoubted value of
implementing well-known design and traffic engineering features in road
design and maintenance is borne out consistently by the crash data
collected over many years by type of highway.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
FHWA should require the use of state-of-the-art engineering
standards on the National Highway System and Federal-aid Highways;
FHWA should issue standards, not just guidelines, to regulate
geometric design on highways constructed with federal funding.
ISSUE: ROADSIDE ENVIRONMENT
A drive along a rural or even a suburban road will reveal numerous
conditions, sometimes only a few feet outside the travel lane, which are
the source of nearly one-third of all fatalities each year in the U.S.
Leaving the travel lanes and entering the off-road area is especially
dangerous because many fixed object hazards at or near the edge of the
travelway. Oftentimes, these fixed objects are also narrow, such as trees,
light poles, signal supports, or the leading ends of barriers, so that
impacts involve tremendous crash forces concentrated in only a small part
of the vehicle. The result is usually deep intrusion into the occupant
compartment with predictably severe injuries and fatalities.
Although various federal and state programs have for many years
specifically addressed this major issue of roadside safety, it is apparent
to any perceptive driver that many hundreds of thousands of miles of
America's roads still have not had proper countermeasures applied to
remove or clear such hazards. These corrections take many forms, but
primarily they consist of creating what highway engineers term a
"forgiving" off-road environment, including a flat, traversable
"clear area" with no fixed objects at the roadside. This
"forgiving" environment means that even if a driver loses
control of a vehicle they can come to a safe stop without a collision.
This principle is at work on Interstate highways in most states.
When removing fixed objects or changing difficult terrain is too
demanding, the next best strategy is to displace dangerous roadside
conditions further from travel lanes to reduce the chances that vehicles
can reach these features with the velocity which can still cause serious
injury.
Where removal or displacement are not possible, the highway should be
fitted with appropriate barrier systems and impact attenuators (crash
cushions) so that vehicles are deflected from impacts with objects that
inflict nearly certain death if collisions occur at higher speeds.
Barriers and crash cushions are themselves fixed objects which are
designed to inflict less damage and injury than the dangerous roadside
conditions they are shielding. Under many circumstances, it is better to
apply other engineering treatments instead of barriers or crash cushions.
These include designing overhead sign supports or lighting poles to bend
or break away on impact so that, at worst, only minor injuries are
inflicted on vehicle occupants.
In many cases, however, both improper barrier designs, for example,
have been chosen for highway locations or the correct barrier design has
been placed improperly or even installed where, in fact, there is really
no need for barriers at all. It is apparent that metal guardrail, in
particular, has been overused and improperly installed in some
jurisdictions.
The current generation of barriers and crash cushions, in particular,
are designed primarily to respond to impacts by passenger vehicles. This
means that safety hardware on our roadsides either fail to protect larger,
heavier vehicles from the hazards that are being shielded or, in some
cases, actually create more dangerous crash conditions.
For example, metal guardrail that will redirect a car will fail to
contain and redirect the impacts of commercial vehicles and also are
placed too low in relation to the centers of gravity of even larger
passenger vehicles such as pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles. This
low placement provides a tripping force to the wheels of large light
trucks and vans tending to increase the rate of rollover crashes by these
vehicles. New barrier systems are being designed which can prevent larger
vehicles from rolling over or from breaking through or vaulting the
systems. However, replacing current barrier systems and substituting
improved designs is a long, expensive process which will take many years
to achieve.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
FHWA needs to establish specific standards for barriers and
impact attenuators that can reduce the severity of heavy vehicle roadside
crashes and to require the use of these improved safety designs as a
condition of receiving federal assistance for highway reconstruction and
rehabilitation.
ISSUE: TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES
Traffic control devices are essential in promoting safety because they
assist drivers in knowing exactly where they are on a roadway, especially
at night and under adverse weather conditions, as well as signal drivers
as to what to expect ahead. This means that a wide variety of traffic
control devices is necessary, including warning and informational signs,
pavement markings, and other devices for channelizing traffic within safe
travel paths.
A crucial feature of both warning and guide signs is early detection of
the signs and comprehension of their messages so that drivers have enough
time to make corrections in their driving or to make choices of
destination. Consequently, signs need to beconspicuous and legible so that
drivers can safely perform maneuvers consistent with the information
supplied.
Conspicuous traffic control devices are easily detected both day and
night, and in all weather conditions, because they can be seen by all
drivers with enough time to make a correct driving decision. At night,
traffic control devices, including signs, are conspicuous because they
rely overwhelmingly on retroreflectivity. In the case of motor vehicles,
retroreflective traffic control devices are designed so that headlamps
illuminate the signs and the light is then bounced back to the eyes of
drivers seated behind the headlamps. This issue is especially important
for older drivers who need several times the amount of light for early
sign and pavement marking detection when driving at night.
Legible traffic signs are easily read and understood by all drivers,
again, in enough time so that crucial driving decisions can be made early.
Signs rely on both word messages and symbol messages, and sometimes a
combination of the two.
There are problems, however, with the current practices governing both
the conspicuity and the legibility of traffic control devices. Currently,
each state governs the level of sign and pavement marking brightness and
these policies vary widely in quality. Despite 20 years of research on
establishing minimum levels of brightness or retroreflectivity no uniform,
standards exist.
As for legibility, it is well recognized that current standards for one
inch of letter height on signs for each 50 feet of viewing distance is
inadequate for older drivers, particularly now that average travel speeds
have increased with the repeal of the National Maximum Speed Limit. In
addition, many thousands of legally licensed drivers have corrected vision
which still does not permit early enough reading and comprehension to
provide time for safe vehicle maneuvers. Repeated research findings
indicate that legibility standards should probably be lowered to one inch
of letter height for each 40 feet of viewing distance.
Another problem is where traffic control devices are located on the
highway. Even the biggest and brightest sign is of little value if it is
improperly located on the highway so that drivers are given inadequate
perception-reaction time in order to comprehend and act on the message. In
fact, improper location of signs can often increase the risk of crashes
because placement too near a maneuvering decision point for a driver can
promote sudden and erratic driving maneuvers.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
FHWA should establish standards with minimum levels of
brightness for traffic signs;
FHWA should amend current standards to require one inch of
letter height on signs for every 40 feet of viewing distance.
APPENDIX A
LISTING OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY STANDARDS
AND OTHER VEHICLE REGULATIONS
THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and certain other
regulations have been issued under authority granted by Congress in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. The initial body of
FMVSS were proposed by the National Traffic Safety Agency of the
Department of Commerce on November 30, 1966, and were issued on February
3, 1967. The first FMVSS, Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, took
effect on March 1, 1967. In June, 1967, jurisdiction over the FMVSS and
other provisions of the 1966 Safety Act was transferred to the National
Highway Safety Bureau in the Department of Transportation and, since 1970,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a modal
administration of the Department of Transportation, has had responsibility
for the FMVSS and related regulations.
The FMVSS are regulations that contain the minimum safety performance
requirements prescribed for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.
Each FMVSS must be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and be stated in objective terms. The safety standards are intended to
reduce traffic deaths and injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes.
The FMVSS are divided into three categories according to the
categorical system adopted in the Haddon matrix. Standards intended to
prevent crashes and improve pre-crash safety, crash avoidance, are in the
100 series of the FMVSS, those intended to improve crash performance and
survivability, crashworthiness standards, are in the 200 series of the
FMVSS, and the standards intended to have greatest effect after a crash
has occurred, post-crash standards, are designated in the 300 series of
the FMVSS. The FMVSS are located in Part 571 of title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
CRASH AVOIDANCE SAFETY STANDARDS
FMVSS No. DESCRIPTION
No. 101 Controls and Displays
No. 102 Transmission Shift Lever Sequence, Starter Interlock,
and Transmission Braking Effect
No. 103 Windshield Defrosting and Befogging Systems
No. 104 Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems
No. 105 Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems
No. 106 Brake Hoses
No. 107 [Reserved]
No. 108 Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment
No. 109 New Pneumatic Tires
No. 110 Tire Selection and Rims
No. 111 Rearview Mirrors
No. 112 [Reserved]
No. 113 Hood Latch System
No. 114 Theft Protection
No. 115 [Reserved]
No. 116 Motor Vehicle Brake Fluids
No. 117 Retreaded Pneumatic Tires
No. 118 Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel
Systems
No. 119 New Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger
Cars
No. 120 Tire Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles Other Than
Passenger Cars
No. 121 Air Brake Systems
No. 122 Motorcycle Brake Systems
No. 123 Motorcycle Controls and Displays
No. 124 Accelerator Control Systems
No. 125 Warning Devices
No. 126 [Reserved]
No. 129 New Non-Pneumatic Tires for Passenger Cars
No. 131 School Bus Pedestrian Safety Devices
No. 135 Light Vehicle Brake Systems
CRASH WORTHINESS SAFETY STANDARDS
FMVSS No. DESCRIPTION
No. 201 Occupant Protection in Interior Impact
No. 202 Head Restraints
No. 203 Impact Protection for the Driver from the Steering
Control System
No. 204 Steering Control Rearward Displacement
No. 205 Glazing Materials
No. 206 Door Locks and Door Retention Components
No. 207 Seating Systems
No. 208 Occupant Crash Protection
No. 209 Seat Belt Assemblies
No. 210 Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages
No. 211 [Reserved]
No. 212 Windshield Mounting
No. 213 Child Restraint Systems
No. 214 Side Impact Protection
No. 216 Roof Crush Resistance
No. 218 Motorcycle Helmets
No. 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion
No. 220 School bus Rollover Protection
No. 221 School bus Body Joint Strength
No. 222 School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection
No. 223 Rear Impact Guards
No. 224 Rear Impact Protection
POST-CRASH SAFETY STANDARDS
No. 301 Fuel System Integrity
No. 302 Flammability of Interior Materials
No. 303 Fuel System Integrity of Compressed Natural Gas
Vehicles
No. 304 Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity
No. 500 Low Speed Vehicles
OTHER REGULATIONS
Part 531 Passenger Automobile Average Fuel Economy Standards
Part 533 Light Truck Fuel Economy Standards
Part 541 Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention
Part 555 Temporary Exemptions from Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards
Part 557 Petitions for Hearings on Notification and Remedy of
Defects
Part 564 Replaceable Light Source Information
Part 565 Vehicle Identification Number-Content Requirements
Part 566 Manufacturer Identification
Part 567 Certification Regulation
Part 568 Vehicles Manufactured in Two or More Stages
Part 569 Regrooved Tires
Part 570 Vehicle In Use Inspection Standards
Part 571 FMVSS
Part 572 Anthropomorphic Test Devices (Crash Test Dummy
Specifications)
Part 573 Defect and Noncompliance Reports
Part 574 Tire Identification and Record Keeping
Part 575 Consumer Information Regulations
Part 577 Defect and Noncompliance Notification
Part 579 Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility
Part 580 Odometer Disclosure Requirements
Part 581 Bumper Standard
Part 582 Insurance Cost Information Regulation
Part 583 Automobile Parts Contents labeling
Part 589 Upper Interior Component Head Impact Protection
Phase-In Reporting
Part 591 Importation of Vehicles and Equipment Subject to
Federal Safety, Bumper, and Theft Prevention Standards
Part 595 Retrofit On-Off Switches for Air Bags
APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION PAPERS ON THE FMVSS
FMVSS DISCUSSION PAPERS
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) is
one of the cornerstones of modern vehicle safety. The success of the FMVSS
in raising levels of safety and occupant protection and in saving lives in
the real world is beyond question. However, the FMVSS remains a work in
progress.
Important issues of motor vehicle and equipment safety have been
neglected or ignored and not all the existing FMVSS adequately regulate
the areas of vehicle performance and equipment the standards purport to
address. Despite the assertion that all the hardware and design issues
have been properly regulated, many of the FMVSS are in need of upgrading
and updating in order to ensure that future generations of vehicles will
provide adequate safety protection to all vehicle occupants.
In the following pages, Advocates provides in depth discussion of a
number of major safety issues and standards. Three areas require that new
vehicle safety standards be promulgated by NHTSA to address issues of
vehicle stability (rollover prevention), vehicle crash compatibility, and
pedestrian safety (vehicle-pedestrian impact). As to existing standards
and regulations, Advocates details fifteen other FMVSS or NHTSA
regulations in need of revision to improve the safety protection afforded
to the general public.
ROLLOVER PREVENTION: NEW FMVSS REQUIRED
BACKGROUND: In 1997, the latest year for which U.S. DOT figures are
available, there were 7,661 light vehicle fatal rollover crashes. This
represents nearly one-fourth of all fatal crashes involving light
vehicles. Rollover crashes rank third after frontal and side impact
crashes as leading causes of occupant deaths in passenger vehicles. More
than 90 percent of all rollover crashes occur after the passenger vehicle
has left the road.
Light trucks are involved in half of all fatal rollover crashes. Sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) were involved in 1,389 of these fatal crashes in
1997. SUVs have about 100 fatal rollover crashes for every million
registered vehicles. This is twice the rate of all light vehicle types
combined. Pickups as a class have only a slightly lower rate of 93 fatal
rollover crashes per million registered vehicles.
Light truck rollovers have the additional lethal consequence of
increased occupant ejection. The risk of death for an occupant who is
ejected is more than three times that of an occupant retained within the
vehicle. Deaths due to ejection occur in over 20 percent of rollover
crashes, a figure that is essentially unchanged since 1982. According to
NHTSA, this is despite a tremendous increase over the past 15 years in
seatbelt use, including a 35 percent rate use among fatally injured
occupants. Major reasons for this tragic figure adduced by NHTSA are the
higher rollover crash rates of light trucks, especially SUVs and pickups,
the increased market share for this portion of the light vehicle fleet,
and the higher rates of speeds of passenger vehicles preceding rollover
crashes. There also appears to be an intrinsic difference in rollover
dynamics for light trucks that results in more ejections when they
rollover than when passenger cars rollover. This even includes an
adjustment for the disparity in seat belt use rates between the two
different classes of vehicles.
The overwhelming majority of rollover crashes occur in the roadside
environment and usually involve a tripping force applied to the sides of
vehicles' tires. Current NHTSA research is concentrating predominantly on
uncrippled, on-roadway rollovers which comprise a very small portion of
annual rollover crashes.
Although NHTSA began in 1993 to consider adopting rollover prevention
standards by establishing criteria for vehicle stability, the agency
terminated rulemaking in 1994. NHTSA argued that it could not establish
vehicle stability requirements for only one class of vehicles, such as
SUVs, without setting requirements for all light vehicles. The agency also
argued that a benefits-driven standard would require dictating basic
vehicle design changes to industry. NHTSA claimed it did not have the
statutory authority to require basic vehicle platform designs. A coalition
of safety organizations and insurers petitioned for reconsideration in
1994, pointing out that the agency could establish standards for only a
portion of the light vehicle fleet. NHTSA denied the petition in 1996.
BENEFITS: The benefits of fatalities prevented and injuries avoided
depends on the extent of corrective changes made to reduce rollover
crashes. NHTSA has claimed that financial burdens on manufacturers
outstrip the value of the reduction in deaths and injuries. However,
substantial improvements in vehicle roll stability could save hundreds of
lives and avoid thousands of injuries. Preventing a large portion of
annual rollover crashes has major collateral benefits in preventing deaths
and severe injuries involving trauma that result from roof crush and
ejection. Cost burdens can be mitigated by focusing rollover stability
improvements in SUVs and pickups which are the members of the class of
light vehicles that experience the highest rates of rollover crashes.
VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN IMPACT: NEW FMVSS REQUIRED
BACKGROUND: According to NHTSA, pedestrians suffer more severe injuries
when struck by motor vehicles than passenger car occupants do who are
involved in crashes. In 1996, the latest year for which complete U.S. DOT
figures are available, nearly 5,000 pedestrians were killed and 80,000
were injured from being struck by motor vehicles. Impacts by cars and
light trucks were responsible for more than four out of five of these
deaths and nearly all of the injuries. The number and the loss severity of
pedestrians struck by motor vehicles can be expected to increase due to
the rapid increases in the proportion of older citizens in the American
population.
The front areas of cars, vans, pickups, and SUVs are unyielding when
they impact pedestrians . Front grills, fenders, hoods, and cowls are
structurally rigid and inflict serious upper body and head trauma.
Pedestrian head and face impacts with hoods and fenders are responsible
for more than 90 percent of all pedestrian fatalities. Most pickups, vans,
and SUVs have bumpers that are higher than passenger cars. This results in
serious injuries to knee joints in even low speed impacts. The light truck
market, which is comprised of pickups, vans and SUVs, has
disproportionately grown over the past several years so that current sales
constitute nearly 50 percent of new vehicle purchases.
NHTSA specifically issued a preliminary notice in 1991 to address
softening the aggressive front-end designs of passenger vehicles in order
to reduce both deaths and injury severity. The agency subsequently
announced, in June 1992, that no further action would be forthcoming
because, in the agency's view, altering passenger vehicle front-end
designs to reduce pedestrian injury severity was not feasible. However,
Acura recently announced that the 1999 Acura RLL was redesigned
specifically to reduce severe injuries to pedestrians. Acura's design
approach involved multiple strategies including many of which that had
been explored by NHTSA in 1991.
BENEFITS: Preliminary benefits assessments by NHTSA indicate that a
significant number of lives could be saved and a substantial reduction of
overall injury severity, especially head injuries, could be achieved by
increasing the distance between the underlying rigid engine compartment
components and the vehicle hood, as well as by softening hood, cowl, and
fender tops.
VEHICLE CRASH COMPATIBILITY: NEW FMVSS REQUIRED
BACKGROUND: Two different fleets of passenger vehicles presently share
U.S. roads. These two fleets are fundamentally incompatible in
multiple-vehicle crashes. One fleet is comprised of comparatively light,
vulnerable passenger cars that are relatively stable in both weight and
mass. The number of these cars registered has remained relatively constant
for the past several years. The second fleet consists of substantially
heavier, crash-aggressive light trucks and vans (TVS) whose market share
has surged during the 1990s. The average disparity in mass between these
two fleets is now close to 1,000 pounds.
As a class, TVS are heavier, have chassis which are usually higher from
the ground, and are designed to be stiffer than passenger cars. In crashes
between members of the two fleets, the TVS are more
"aggressive," that is, they transmit higher and more lethal
impact forces to the smaller passenger car. In addition, TVS strike
smaller cars above the bumpers, or in side impacts, above the rigid sills
and rocker panels and the side impact bars which are more vulnerable
impact points since crash energy management is poorer in these areas .
Losses from this crash mismatch of incompatible vehicle designs have
mounted over the last decade. Since 1992, for example, there have been
more fatalities in LTV.-to- car collisions than in car-to-car crashes.
Furthermore, in LTV-to-car impacts, 80 percent of the fatally injured
occupants are in the cars.
BENEFITS: In a recent study, NHTSA tentatively concluded that a 100
pound reduction in the average weight of TVS even with no change in
passenger cars would produce significant gains in crash protection for car
occupants, as well as for motorcyclists and pedestrians, without
decreasing the crash protection of LTV. occupants.
A variety of strategic changes in LTV design could significantly reduce
the deaths and injury severity in crashes between any two members of the
overall passenger vehicle fleet. For example, reducing LTV height would
ensure more effective interaction between the designed crash responses of
cars and LTVs. Similarly, designing more forgiving front ends for LTVs by
reducing their linear stiffness would create more equal crash responses
between any two colliding passenger vehicles. In addition, lowering LTV
height and weight would also have collateral safety benefits by reducing
LTV rollover propensity.
Making these two passenger vehicle fleets closer in height, weight, and
crash dynamics simultaneously generates both multi-vehicle and
single-vehicle crashworthiness and crash avoidance safety benefits.
However, any decrease in general LTV crash aggressiveness must also
acknowledge the twin needs of (1) protecting occupants from the severe
consequences of impacts with commercial vehicles which are substantially
larger than LTVs, i.e., medium and heavy trucks, and (2) ensuring that LTV
occupants are not placed at increased risk of death and severe injury in
collisions with non-deformable fixed object hazards, such as sign posts
and trees, in the road environment.
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS: FMVSS NO. 101
BACKGROUND: First adopted in 1971 with several amendments through 1995,
this standard has crucial safety importance because it specifies the
requirements for the location, identification, and illumination of motor
vehicle controls and displays. Important vehicle controls and information
displays must be conspicuous, easily accessible, and quickly understood or
engaged to facilitate crash avoidance.
Unfortunately, Standard No. 201 allows excessive flexibility in
locating both instrument panel and other dashboard readouts and controls
which has been shown in some studies to delay the timely action needed by
a driver to avoid a crash or to reduce its severity. For example, the
advent of driver-side air bags led many manufacturers to reduce the
steering wheel area used for engaging the horn to only small buttons which
were also often placed in ergonomically inappropriate locations. Although
this situation has been improved in recent years, some vehicle brands and
models still have very small horn buttons.
Similarly, fundamental drive train control layouts are not mandated by
the standard. Hazard warning button location and reversed turn signal and
wiper locations (i.e., turn signal placed on the right side, wipers on the
left side, of the steering column) are among the many examples in this
important safety area. Moreover, other optional features, such as cruise
control buttons, on current passenger vehicles are not governed by any
regulatory requirements. In many cases, steering wheel assemblies mask
visual detection of these controls. A further problem with the standard,
especially for older drivers, is that these controls are often not lit or
are inadequately lit during nighttime.
Recently, increasing attention has been to the potential safety risks
involved with audio systems in passenger vehicles. Studies indicate that
crash risks and the incidence of crashes have both risen due to the
diversion of driver attention and the movement of drivers to suboptimal
out-of-position crash attitudes needed in order to access and operate tape
and compact disc audio systems.
Recent retrospective crash studies and driver simulator research
indicate that cellular telephone use significantly increases the chance of
crashes due to the multi-tasking demands on drivers which result in
reduced situational awareness and diverted cognitive processing. Studies
have shown that even with the use of hands-free cellular telephones, as
opposed to handheld, portable, cell phones, crash risk is still increased
because overall driver attention to the driving task is measurably lower.
Perhaps most disturbing is the advent over the past few years of visual
displays, some of them interactive, provided as available options in both
cars and in LTVs. These include global positioning satellite (GPS)
screens, as well as navigation systems which also include touch-screen
interactive menus for choosing specific kinds of destinations (such as
food, fuel, entertainment, medical services, etc.). Recently, a major
manufacturer has offered in its vans the option of in-vehicle television
sets mounted at the front header rail which are within the driver's line
of sight. All of these systems can operate while the vehicles are in
motion.
BENEFITS: Visual displays, especially those involving interactive use
by the driver, can be a serious threat to traffic safety. However, there
is no reliable quantification of the number of crashes that are occasioned
by reduced driver alertness except for one study of cellular telephone
use. Currently, Standard No. 101 is silent on the use of visual displays
in vehicles while they are moving. GPS, interactive computer screens, and
televisions within driver reach need to be appropriately regulated by
NHTSA to ensure that driver attention to the task of safely operating a
vehicle is not undermined by these serious distractions.
LAMPS AND REFLECTIVE DEVICES: FMVSS NO. 108
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 108 governs all external lighting systems for
both passenger and commercial vehicles. In recent years, the requirements
for lamps and other conspicuity measures (such as reflectors and
retroreflective sheeting) on both passenger vehicles as well as trucks and
buses have undergone revisions. Several proposed and prospective
amendments to passenger car lighting requirements are also being evaluated
by NHTSA.
A crucial area of safety design for drivers is nighttime roadway
illumination by vehicle headlamps. Unfortunately, vehicle manufacturers
noted in the early 1990s that the photometric criteria in Standard No. 108
specified maximum, but not minimum values for the amount of light produced
by headlamps above the horizontal level of the beams. As a result, many
manufacturers began building and importing vehicles conforming to the
highly different headlamp performance standards of Europe and Asia which
allow no headlamp illumination above the horizon.
The result was the failure of these headlamps to adequately illuminate
the U.S. nighttime traffic control environment. Signs and other traffic
control devices which rely on retroreflectorized light were not bright
enough for easy and early detection of crucial traffic information. This
deficiency was especially dangerous for older drivers who require several
times the amount of light needed by young drivers to see traffic signs.
Although NHTSA recognized this defect and addressed the need to
increase photometric performance of headlamps a few years ago, the
agency's final rule lowered the originally proposed values by half,
resulting in ongoing inadequate traffic sign illumination. Moreover,
manufacturers have continued to press the agency to adopt a European-type
headlamp standard.
Apart from other lighting actions involving taillights, daytime running
lights, and the type and design of bulbs used in vehicle exterior lighting
systems, another major area of passenger vehicle safety has been the
inadequate conspicuity of large trucks. Many motorists crash into the
sides and rear-ends of commercial vehicles because current lighting
standards for trucks and buses are clearly inadequate. Although the
underlying lighting standards for tractor-trailers have remained unamended
since their adoption 30 years ago, NHTSA has adopted a final rule
requiring supplementary reflective markings to be applied to truck
trailers to make them more conspicuous and identifiable for other
motorists.
BENEFITS: Although, NHTSA's own economic analyses have demonstrated the
substantial benefits already secured by increasing the amount of
illumination produced by passenger vehicle headlamps to improve the
detection of traffic control devices, the values in current regulation are
still inadequate and need to be increased further. Given the rapid,
disproportionate increase in the numbers and percentage of older drivers
in the U.S., more light from headlamps above the horizon while avoiding
excessive glare, would improve nighttime operating safety. Similarly,
although NHTSA has implemented a minimum standard for applying
retroreflectors to truck trailers to aid in their early detection and
recognition by other motorists, the agency needs to coordinate this
supplementary treatment with basic reform of the lighting performance
standard for medium and heavy vehicles. The lighting currently allowed by
regulation on large trucks and buses is too dim and placement of some of
the lamps is not related to the visibility needs of other drivers.
Regulatory improvement in both of these areas of Standard No. 108 could
reduce the number and severity of nighttime crashes.
PASSENGER CAR HYDRAULIC BRAKES: FMVSS NO. 135
BACKGROUND: The current hydraulic brake standard, FMVSS No. 135, was
adopted by NHTSA in 1995 for all passenger cars beginning with year 2000
models. In 1996, the agency proposed extending this standard to other
passenger vehicles (pickups, vans, and sport utility vehicles). That
proposed rulemaking is still pending.
Standard No. 135 replaced the original brake standard, FMVSS No. 105,
which had been adopted in 1976 and amended on numerous occasions until the
last iteration of FMVSS No. 135 was offered for public comment in 1992.
The major reason advanced by NHTSA for adoption of FMVSS No. 135 was the
desire of manufacturers to design and build hydraulic brake systems
throughout the world without conforming to the special requirements of the
U.S. market. Hence, arguments claiming benefits of international
harmonization were offered by both manufacturers and the agency during the
protracted rulemaking on FMVSS No. 135.
Despite the opposition by safety organizations, many important safety
features present in Standard No. 105 were eliminated from the final rule
adopted in 1995. In fact, one of the hallmarks of the successive proposals
published by NHTSA on FMVSS No. 135 was this progressive weakening or
elimination of key safety features of FMVSS No. 105. For example, the
final proposed version of Standard No. 135 substantially increased the
permitted stopping distances, deleted a requirement for pre-burnish brake
performance, reduced the stringency of the brake burnish test, weakened
the requirements for parking brakes, allowed momentary wheel lockup during
certain compliance tests, lengthened brake system reaction time, weakened
the fade-and-recovery test, deleted the brake lining wear audible or
visual alarm requirement, and permitted Original Equipment Manufacturers
to supply vehicles with manual instead of automatic brake system status
checks. Similarly, it eliminated the water test previously required to
ensure quick wet brake recovery capability and resistance of drum brake
equipped cars to degraded braking due to wet brake shoes. Taken together,
these changes can easily result in poor braking performance such as longer
stopping distances and slower brake system reaction time. Standard No. 135
also provides less information about the safety condition of a car's brake
system which is critical to the driver.
NHTSA proposed extending the new hydraulic brake standard to all other
light passenger vehicles in 1996. Safety organizations strongly opposed
this move, arguing that it would guarantee that the defects and mistakes
of the current car-only standard would be extended to light trucks and
vans. To date, no further action has been taken on this proposed
enlargement of the scope of the standard.
NHTSA has been notified of the need to verify the actual in-service
safety performance of the new standard when it goes into effect with model
year 2000 cars. This includes not only a demonstration of actual braking
effectiveness of service brakes designed to minimum values permitted by
the new standard, but also data showing the on-road performance of the
weakened parking brake requirements. The agency also needs to prove that
consumers are not operating vehicles with dangerous brakes because of the
elimination of brake lining and brake status warning requirements from the
new regulation.
BENEFITS: Standard No. 135 is a serious mistake. Considerations other
than advancing public safety on the road were the basis of amending the
major crash avoidance regulation. The result was a standard that
eliminated the safety benefits of an existing, more stringent brake
standard. Standard No. 135 should not be extended to light trucks and
vans, and it should also undergo careful review to restore important
testing and performance safeguards that were deleted in 1995.
UPPER INTERIOR HEAD IMPACT PROTECTION: FMVSS NO. 201
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 201 is a technically complex and broad
crashworthiness standard. It contains separate performance and compliance
requirements for unrestrained front occupant impact protection than for
interior collisions with passenger vehicle instrument panels, in addition
to countermeasures to reduce injury severity from occupant front and
lateral head impacts with rigid upper interior components. It represents
the most general and comprehensive regulatory synthesis of occupant
compartment safety geometry and energy absorbing countermeasures as they
relate to the overall controlled crush response of a passenger vehicle in
a collision. Because manufacturers currently rely on interior impact
protection through the use of both active and passive restraints, the
requirements of Standard No. 201 intersect with those addressing seat belt
and air bag systems in Standard No. 208.
An important part of the current standard involves appropriate
protection of the human head from front and side impacts with inherently
rigid features and components of the upper interior portion of the
passenger vehicle occupant compartment. Upper interior features which have
been a major source of numerous lethal and severe head injuries include
pillars, seat belt anchorage points, front and rear headers and side rails
at the roofline, and sunroof framing. Prior to establishing the new
requirements in 1995, NHTSA estimates that nearly 2,500 people a year died
and more than 4,000 received severe injuries from impacts with unyielding
components in the upper portion of passenger vehicles . Many of these
injuries involve brain damage resulting in lifelong disabilities.
BENEFITS: In 1995, NHTSA adopted a final rule establishing maximum
levels of injury for these upper interior head impacts. Both front and
side impacts with a head surrogate could not exceed a level of 1,000 head
injury criterion (HIC) in a 15 miles-per-hour (mph) test. NHTSA calculated
that more than 1,000 deaths and nearly 1,000 serious injuries could be
prevented by the new addition to Standard No. 201, with 28 percent of the
benefits accruing in rollover crashes alone.
The final rule, however, was the weaker regulatory alternative proposed
by the agency. Safety organizations had urged NHTSA to increase the test
speed to 20 mph and to lower the acceptable HIC score for lateral impacts
to 800 because of the more serious nature of side-of-head collisions. The
strength of the final rule was limited by available technology since NHTSA
believed that the only feasible countermeasure was nonreboundable foam: at
20 mph and/or 800 HIC for side impacts, many vehicles, especially LTVs,
would have to add 2.5 or more inches of padding to the upper interiors of
their vehicles.
In 1998, NHTSA increased the level of protection for upper interior
head impacts by adopting an amendment to Standard No. 201 specifying an
optional compliance test that must be used if a manufacturer chooses to
use dynamic rather than static technologies. The agency also substantially
increased the severity of a compliance test for dynamic protection systems
by requiring a lateral impact with a pole at 18 mph which results in
serious intrusion into the occupant compartment, but permitted a 12 mph
impact compliance level for the upper interior zones immediately
underneath and adjacent to a stowed dynamic protection system. The agency
estimates that if 100 percent of cars and LTVs were equipped with these
sophisticated devices up to an additional 500 or more deaths would be
prevented by complying with this more rigorous option above the benefits
already calculated for the 1995 upper interior rule.
The 1995 regulation for static protection is too weak and it is
doubtful that all manufacturers will embrace the more complex and
expensive dynamic protection option, especially for smaller, cheaper
passenger vehicles.
LOWER INTERIOR HEAD IMPACT PROTECTION: FMVSS NO. 201
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 201 also requires protection for occupants
with interior surfaces on the instrument panel (dash board), seat back,
interior compartment doors, sun visors and armrests. The most important of
these from the standpoint of injury causation is the instrument panel and
interior surfaces directly ahead of the front passenger seating area. In a
crash, an unrestrained passenger in the front seat is almost certain to
have either their knees, chest, head, or some combination of these body
parts contact the instrument panel. Prior to Standard No. 201, instrument
panels were made of hard materials, often with metal trim with sharp
surfaces and protruding objects, such as knobs or buttons, made of metal
or hard plastic. These presented extremely hazardous projections for
unbelted occupants that, in a crash, cause serious injuries, such as
facial lacerations, head injuries and fatalities commonly resulted from
contact with these surfaces.
In the 1960's and 1970's instrument panels were modified to use energy
absorbing materials, add padding, reduce or eliminate sharp edges and
protruding objects. Standard No. 201 required padding on instrument panels
and other interior surfaces of cars by 1968, and was amended to require
similar treatment of interior surfaces of light trucks by September 1,
1981. Other design changes, such as extending instrument panels further
back toward the passenger permitted larger knee impact areas and the
introduction of padded knee bolsters. Larger, softer instrument panels
also improve impact protection for unrestrained occupants by keeping the
passenger in an upright position once they have moved forward toward the
instrument panel during a crash. In doing so the instrument panel enhances
safety in two ways: first, by reducing passenger interactions with the
windshield, headers and other hard upper interior components which have
traditionally been major contributors to head injury causation; and
second, by providing a longer period of deceleration during which the
crash forces exerted on the passenger are reduced because they are spread
over a longer period of time and because the instrument panel padding
absorbs more of the crash energy.
NHTSA has calculated that improvements to the instrument panel,
including those required by Standard No. 201 and other changes introduced
voluntarily, have reduced fatality and serious injury risk by about 25
percent in current production model passenger vehicles compared to earlier
models. The agency estimates that about 700 lives per year are saved in
cars alone.
BENEFITS: Improvements can be made to the geometry and energy
management characteristics of instrument panels to ensure that all models
provide the positioning benefits to unrestrained passengers in the front
seat.
Moreover, with the introduction of air bags into the instrument panel
careful attention needs to be given to the placement and the direction of
air bag deployment in order to optimize the interaction between
passengers, both belted and unbelted, and deploying air bags. This
includes ensuring the air bag module covers do not become hazardous
projectiles when air bags are deployed.
Standard No. 201 must also be upgraded to improve protection from foot
and leg injuries. Increased seat belt use and air bags are saving lives
but surviving front seat occupants are suffering more severe lower torso,
leg and foot injuries. Such injuries, while not necessarily life
threatening, can seriously diminish the quality of life especially for
vulnerable populations such as older occupants who have much longer
recovery periods. Further improvements in instrument panel design, knee
bolsters, and other energy absorbing materials should be complemented by
improvements in vehicle front end design especially in the forward portion
of the occupant compartment and the floor pan area to provide greater
protection from foot, leg, and knee injuries for front seat occupants.
HEAD RESTRAINTS: FMVSS NO. 202
BACKGROUND: NHTSA estimates that there may be nearly a million
"whiplash" type neck injuries each year. Annual losses from
cervical spinal injuries and associated disorders due to rear impacts are
estimated by insurers to cost $10 billion.
The standard for head restraints was set in 1969 for cars; the only
significant change was its extension in 1991 to light trucks and vans. The
standard requires passenger vehicles to have head restraints for front,
but not rear, outboard seating positions. Head restraints must be at least
27.5 inches above the measured Seating Reference Point (SRP) when extended
to their highest position and they must not deflect more than four (4)
inches under application of a 200 pound load. In the alternative, head
restraints can meet a performance test that specifies a limiting rearward
angular displacement of the original head position reference line in its
relation to the torso reference line. This latter performance test does
not specify the height of the head restraint.
The current standard is widely recognized to be seriously inadequate in
that it promotes a variety of neck and head injuries collected under the
term "whiplash." This has been repeatedly demonstrated in rear
impact tests conducted by government and safety organizations. For
example, recent tests of 203 head restraints in 1997 model passenger
vehicles found only five (5) to have good protection against injury in
rear-end crashes. FMVSS No. 202 allows head restraints to be adjustable;
therefore, they actually can increase the severity of neck injuries unless
raised to their highest possible settings. When lowered, they can provide
a fulcrum point for cervical hyperextension. Surveys by NHTSA have shown
that most vehicle occupants fail to raise their head restraints above the
fully retracted settings.
However, even when raised to their maximum heights, current head
restraints in the U.S. light vehicle market usually have no fore-and-aft
adjustment capabilities. Both the performance measure and the 4-inch
excursion test specified in the current standard allow excessive head and
neck movement in a rear impact crash which result in injuries.
BENEFITS: NHTSA has shown that proper head restraint design
dramatically reduces neck injuries. The current Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE) head restraint standard prevents the use of designs that are
too low. The ECE standard also requires head restraints for rear outboard
occupants, a requirement presently missing from the U.S. standard.
Adopting the essential features of the new ECE regulation alone could
substantially reduce rear impact injuries. However, even more promising
head restraint designs have been innovated by a few manufacturers in the
last few years, including dynamic configurations that react to rear-end
crash forces to prevent any head and neck excursion. The U.S. standard
could be amended to ensure that manufacturers use the best static designs
while also encouraging the use of dynamic designs that can further lower
the chances of injury. These amendments should be coordinated with
appropriate improvements to the current U.S. seatback standard, FMVSS No.
207.
GLAZING MATERIALS FOR CRASHWORTHINESS: FMVSS NO. 205
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 205 targets the reduction of injuries from
impacts with glazing surfaces (windows) in vehicle occupant compartments.
Part of the standard also ensures adequate light transmittance for driver
visibility. The standard has undergone numerous changes since it was
established in 1972.
Of the approximately 13,000 people who die each year because they are
ejected from their vehicles in crashes, more than 8,000 are killed from
being entirely or partially ejected through vehicle window openings. Of
this number, about two-thirds of the deaths, or 5,350, are ejected through
glazed windows.
Since 1966, windshields have used high penetration resistant tempered
glass. Rulemaking in the early 1980s resulted in amendment of Standard No.
205 to permit the use of a coating of soft polyurethane plastic on the
inner surfaces of vehicle windows. However, the primary purpose of this
new technology was to reduce the risk of lacerations from broken glass
rather than dramatically reduce glazed window ejections.
Ejection reduction through glazing can be accomplished only with hard
rather than soft plastics and combinations of soft plastic and glass
laminates. NHTSA has researched the use of these hard plastics and
plastic/glass laminates since the early 1980s. However, one of the
problems with plastics and plastic/glass laminates is abrasion resistance.
Without good scratch resistance, in-service degradation of light
transmittance can occur to the point where driver visibility is
substantially impaired. Although NHTSA has evaluated several proprietary
glazings for both sustained transparency and ejection prevention, the
agency has not issued a proposed rule modifying the current standard to
permit these new glazing technologies in vehicle windows because none meet
the agency requirements for the crucially important characteristic of
safety for long-term driver visibility.
BENEFITS: New glazing technologies with acceptable light transmittance
values for long-term service could dramatically reduce deaths due to
ejection. NHTSA's 1995 benefit analysis has shown that about 1,300 deaths
from ejection through side windows can be prevented through the use of new
hard plastic or plastic/glass laminates. The benefit analysis shows that
of these 1,300 ejection deaths prevented, 1,000 of them would occur in
passenger vehicle rollover crashes. However, benefits must be balanced
against potential increases in head impact forces against more rigid
glazing materials. Consequently, any ejection-preventing glazing proposals
must be considered within the wider context of overall upper interior head
impact protection. A corollary benefit of ejection-preventing glazing is
substantial improvement in theft prevention by reducing one of the most
common forms of forced vehicle entry, i.e., smashing windows.
GLAZING MATERIALS FOR CRASH AVOIDANCE: FMVSS NO. 205
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 205 currently specifies performance
requirements governing different levels of light transmittance, the amount
of light that passes through a material, for vehicle glazing (windows) at
different locations. The requirement for windshields and windows crucial
to driver visibility and safe vehicle operation specifies a 70 percent
laboratory-measured light transmittance level.
The laboratory test is conducted with the glazing material mounted at a
90-degree angle to the light source. This test does not reflect real-world
vehicle designs since many passenger vehicles, both cars and multi-purpose
passenger vehicles (MPVs), now have windshields installed at increasingly
severe angles to accomplish fundamental changes in occupant compartment
design ("cab forward" design). These severe windshield mounting
angles, up to 70 degrees in a few instances, substantially reduce light
transmittance so that actual amount of light reaching the driver can reach
levels are as low as 60 percent. The detrimental effect on driver
visibility is most acute at dawn, dusk, and severely overcast daytime
operating conditions. The reduction is especially severe for older drivers
who not only require many times the light levels of younger drivers to see
road conditions and traffic control features but who also have far poorer
contrast sensitivity. The amount of light entering through the rear window
is also of significant importance in backing situations, particularly
where pedestrians and young children may be located.
In 1992, NHTSA proposed allowing manufacturers to provide more highly
tinted side and rear windows in new passenger cars and reducing the
current light transmittance performance standard for windshields from 70
percent to 60 percent. However, the agency terminated rulemaking on this
and other proposed amendments to Standard No. 205 in mid-1998.
Benefits: NHTSA, in response to petitions asking the agency to allow
more highly tinted glazing as Original Manufacturer Equipment, did not
change the standard to permit increased tinting for certain glazing. The
agency, however, failed to adopt important amendments to Standard No. 205
that would have required light transmittance compliance testing at the
actual angle of the installed windshield to ensure that the minimum light
transmittance performance requirement of 70 percent is maintained
regardless of the angle of the glazing as installed. Some 1999 cars and
vans now have windshields installed at severe angles which lowers light
transmittance to inadequate levels.
Also, NHTSA has reviewed the need to eliminate the regulatory exemption
for MPVs that allows darker tinted glazing in rear side windows which are
now determined to be as important for driver visibility. However, the
agency has not acted to remove this exemption.
DOOR LOCKS: FMVSS NO. 206
BACKGROUND: About 13,000 people die each year in crashes in which they
are partially or completely ejected from their vehicles. Post-crash
reconstructionists have conservatively estimated that about 2,500 of these
deaths occur in crashes in which the occupants are ejected through the
side doors. This figure may well be higher since it is often difficult to
determine the ejection pathway of the occupant.
Despite enormous improvements in motor vehicle occupant restraint use
over the past 20 years, the ejection rate of fatally injured passenger
vehicle occupants is essentially unchanged. While the rate of ejection for
belted occupants is very low at only 2.5 percent of those fatally injured;
nearly 30 percent of unbelted occupants die because they are ejected from
their vehicles. According to NHTSA, the risk of fatality is three times
greater for an occupant who is ejected than for one who remains in the
occupant compartment.
Preventing ejections is a complex issue requiring a strategy involving
both crashworthiness and crash avoidance countermeasures. Crashworthiness
measures such as seatbelt use, ejection-deterring window glazing, door
locking and latching, and general vehicle side structure design integrity
are combined to prevent occupant ejection. Crash avoidance of rollovers,
especially in light trucks and vans, can prevent the leading kind of crash
responsible for most ejection fatalities.
The current standard governing door locks and door mounting designs is
essentially unchanged since its adoption in 1967. Improvements to latch
design in the early 1960s in addition to the later secondary latching
requirement added to the original Standard No. 206 appear to have helped
lower the rate of ejection deaths and injuries.
However, a mark of the inherent weakness of the present standard is
that secondary latching was judged to be needed as a backup to the
widespread failure of primary latching. Although NHTSA conducted research
and held public meetings several years ago on a new, dramatically improved
latch using a vertical spring-loaded pin design, no rulemaking action has
been initiated to adopt this approach or to set a performance requirement
ensuring its use. Instead, current manufacturing designs continue to use
the forkbolt primary latch which experiences repeated failure in side
impact crashes and in rollovers accompanied by significant roof crush.
NHTSA attempted to abate the growing problem of rear tailgate ejection
fatalities and injuries a few years by adding a secondary latching
requirement for rear entry doors on passenger vehicles. The agency is
aware that this countermeasure, although helpful, simply duplicates the
current standard's obsolete requirements for side entry door latching.
BENEFITS: Side door ejections rank second behind side windows as the
pathway responsible for fatal injuries. NHTSA emphasized in a 1995 public
meeting on the need to upgrade Standard No. 206 that perhaps hundreds of
side door fatal ejections annually could be prevented by simple,
inexpensive design changes to both latches, strikers and door mounting
systems. However, no rulemaking action by the agency has been undertaken
since the 1995 public review of research findings and crash data.
OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION: FMVSS NO. 208
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 208, occupant crash protection, requires
vehicle manufacturers to provide protection that meets prescribed
performance requirements through the installation of manual (lap and
shoulder seatbelts) and automatic inflatable (air bags) restraint systems.
Standard No. 208 requires safety belts and air bags in all passenger
vehicles. The standard has long required seat belts and currently requires
lap/shoulder belt systems at all outboard seating positions, but only lap
belts in non-outboard seating positions. Safety belts have saved tens of
thousands of lives since they were first required, yet 30 percent or more
passenger vehicle occupants, especially young people ages 16 to 24, do not
buckle their seat belts.
Air bags are currently required for the protection of belted and
unbelted occupants in both outboard front seating positions in all new
passenger vehicles. Air bags have proven effective, especially for
unbelted occupants. According to NHTSA's estimate, air bags have saved
nearly 4,000 lives since they began to be installed in vehicles. However,
the deaths of more than 120 people, many of whom are children, have been
associated with air bag deployments. These fatalities have occurred
predominantly in low-speed crashes when air bag protection is generally
not necessary. This safety problem requires an upgrade of the standard to
ensure that performance requirements for advanced air bags systems will
result in adequate protection in relatively high speed crashes while not
causing harm in comparatively low-speed incidents.
Frontal crashes often involve high speed impacts that present a serious
threat to safety. To address the danger of death or serious injury in
frontal crashes the standard requires a frontal crash test at any speed up
to and including 30 miles-per-hour (mph), and at any angle up to 30
degrees in either direction. Currently, however, the standard permits the
use of a generic sled test in the unbelted mode as an alternative test
procedure for air bag restraint effectiveness. Safety performance is
assessed based on established injury criteria for head, chest, neck, and
leg loading, and is evaluated by use of test surrogates (crash test
dummies) during crash testing.
BENEFITS: While the existing standard has saved thousands of lives
through seat belt and air bag requirements, major elements of the standard
need to be upgraded to improve safety. First, frontal crash testing under
the standard should be conducted at speeds above 30 mph. While the vehicle
fleet mix and vehicle designs have changed, and prevailing highway speeds
now often exceed 65 mph, compliance testing is still limited to frontal
crashes up to 30 mph. NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) crash
tests vehicles at 35 mph but only for consumer informational purposes and
only with belted crash test dummies. Frontal crash protection,
particularly in conjunction with advanced air bags, should be required at
compliance test speeds of 40 mph or higher.
Second, additional crash test modes need to be added to Standard No.
208 to ensure the standard provides adequate crash testing that is
representative of the majority of real-world crashes. A high speed off-set
crash test should be added to better test for intrusion into the occupant
compartment. Moreover, the substitution of non-real-world, generic sled
testing as an alternative test procedure must be deleted from the standard
since it is not representative of real-world crashes and does not provide
a test of the dynamic interaction between the air bag, the vehicle and the
occupant, especially for the unrestrained occupant. Some of these issues
are now under consideration by the agency as part of the rulemaking on
advanced air bag systems.
Third, improvements can be required to provide better lap/shoulder belt
protection for belted occupants. Lap/shoulder belts should be required in
all seating positions, not just the outboard seating positions. In
addition, pre-tensioners and load limiters would improve the performance
of seat belts and their interaction with air bags. Finally, new electronic
and technological methods should be adopted to remind occupants to buckle
their seat belts when they enter the vehicle.
SEAT BELT ASSEMBLIES: FMVSS NO. 209
BACKGROUND: The technical specifications for seat belts are contained
in Standard No. 209. Seat belts that adjust to the users body size and
shape, and that fit more comfortably, are more likely to be worn by
vehicle occupants. However, other than requiring lap/shoulder belts in
outboard seating positions, improvements in seat belt systems have been
limited. Although NHTSA adopted a minimum requirement for adjustable upper
anchorages, that requirement did not dramatically improve seat belt design
nor contribute to an increase in seat belt use rates. Moreover, no new
requirements have been added to ensure the use of safety design
improvements such as load limiters, pre-tensioners, or inflatable belt
systems. Seat belt systems can and should be designed as part of the
seating system, a concept referred to as an integrated seat belt system.
Benefits: Integrated seat belt systems will reduce injuries among those
who wear seat belts. The integrated seat belt would be part of the seat
back and would move along with the seat when the seat is repositioned.
This design improvement would ensure that the angle of the seat belt would
not change as the vehicle seat is moved. This will ensure a better, more
comfortable fit for a broader cross section of the public. It could also
result in more non-users deciding to wear seat belts since integrated seat
belts would provide a more comfortable fit.
In addition, seat belt systems must be equipped with load limiters and
pre-tensioners as standard equipment on all models to improve the
effectiveness of seat belts and to reduce the possibility of belt-induced
injuries, especially among older occupants.
CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS: FMVSS NO. 213
BACKGROUND: Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for
children ages five through fifteen. While Standard No. 213 applies to all
types of infant and child restraint systems designed for children, it only
covers children up to 50 pounds in weight. Thus, children who weigh over
50 pounds, or who are above the age (often 4 years old) or weight (usually
40 pounds) designated in state mandatory child restraint use laws, are not
protected. In 1997, 446 children between the ages of five and nine were
killed, and another 104,000 in that age group were injured as passengers
in motor vehicles. In addition, many more children above the age of nine
are killed or injured because, while too large for child restraint
systems, they are not large enough to safely fit seat belt systems
mandated for adults. Although Standard No. 213 permits the voluntary use
of belt positioning booster seats, it provides no performance requirements
for booster seats and the use of booster seats as a transition from child
restraint systems to adult seat belts is not required by either state law
or federal regulation.
Young children are not adequately protected as passengers in motor
vehicles. Despite the fact that all states require the use of child
restraint systems for children under the age of five years old, and
Standard No. 213 regulates child restraint performance requirements, in
1997, there were 652 deaths and 81,000 injuries to children under five
riding in motor vehicles. Part of the problem is the failure to use
appropriate child restraints in addition to the gaps in current child
restraint laws. Although child restraint systems are the most effective
means of protecting young children in motor vehicles, the high rate of
misinstallation of child restraints and the incompatibility of certain
child restraints with some vehicles represent serious dangers to children
under five. In order to reduce instances of child restraint
misinstallation, NHTSA has adopted changes to Standard No. 213 and has
established a new standard for uniform child restraint anchorages. Despite
the safety improvement the new child restraint anchorage system will
eventually bring, the new requirements will not affect vehicles on the
road today and will take years before most vehicles in the fleet are
properly equipped.
Child restraints are predominately manufactured as add-on, or
aftermarket, consumer items. Built-in child restraint systems that are
part of the vehicle structure afford greater stability but are only
offered as optional equipment on a limited number of makes and models.
Standard No. 213 requires child restraint manufacturers to make
appropriate use recommendations based on child height and weight (mass)
ranges determined by testing with child test dummies. The standard also
requires instructional information and warning labels as well as the
inclusion of child restraint registration cards to facilitate
communication of recalls by the manufacturer to the purchaser.
Benefits: Children are the most vulnerable occupant population and have
the least control over their safety. Improving the safety environment in
the vehicle to accommodate children would reduce the number of fatalities
and injuries suffered by children from infants to 15 years old. To improve
safety for older children NHTSA should extend the scope of Standard No.
213 to cover children who weigh up to 80 pounds, require performance
standards for child booster seats, and require additional child-sized
surrogates to test those seats, regulate for after-market seat belt
positioning devices, and require better designs for adult seat belts to
properly fit older children.
SIDE IMPACT PROTECTION: FMVSS NO. 214
BACKGROUND: Side impacts are a leading source of motor vehicle deaths
and severe injuries. More than one-third of serious to severe injuries
sustained each year by occupants in passenger vehicle crashes are the
result of side impacts. The safety problem of side impact crashes has
become more acute over the past decade because of the rapid,
disproportionate growth in the popularity and market share of light trucks
and vans (LTVs), particularly sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Even though
LTVs are still only one-third of registered passenger vehicles, about half
of all deaths in side impact crashes are the result of crashes in which an
LTV struck another vehicle.
On average, LTVs are heavier, higher, and stiffer than passenger cars.
When a large LTV strikes a passenger car or small LTV in its side, the
differences in mass between the two vehicles are further compounded
because the large LTV is manufactured with an independent frame which
resists front end deformation much more than a car with unibody
construction. Also, large LTVs usually strike smaller passenger vehicles
above the protective rigid sills and rocker panels so that resulting
intrusion into the passenger compartment is more severe.
Standard No. 214 was adopted in 1971 consisting primarily of a
quasi-static test in which a rigid cylinder was pressed against the sides
of cars to test how well they resist intrusion. NHTSA added a new,
separate dynamic compliance test for cars in 1990. This test used a 3,000
pound moveable deformable barrier to evaluate how well cars respond to an
actual lateral impact. Although NHTSA subsequently proposed extending the
standard to LTVs, and appropriately to increase the severity of the test
and the mass and height of the barrier, the agency received strong
opposition. As a result, NHTSA only extended the standard for testing cars
to LTVs, an action which it acknowledged to be an inadequate indication of
side impact safety especially for small vans, pickups, and SUVs.
Standard No. 214 in its current form is too weak to properly ensure
side impact safety. A passing score still permits a 50 percent chance of a
serious injury to the thorax and pelvis. In addition, manufacturers can
achieve compliance by simply adding extra padding to the interior sides of
small passenger vehicles. Although some manufacturers have begun using
thorax air bags in lieu of static padding as a compliance measure, these
bags are not available in most vehicles, are often available only as
options, and sometimes achieve compliance scores which are no better than
the vehicles with better scores from using padding alone.
BENEFITS: Standard No. 214 needs to be upgraded in a number of ways.
The current barrier used to test small passenger vehicles is too light,
too low to the ground, and the 33.5 miles-per-hour impact it provides is
substantially mitigated in severity by "crabbing" its wheels so
that the side impact is a glancing blow. Standard No. 214 also sets
passing scores for pelvic and thorax injuries that are too indulgent: a
vehicle can comply and still allow serious injuries to occupants in side
impacts. The type of tests for injury need to be updated and the passing
scores should be more demanding. Also, the standard needs to be
appropriately modified and extended to larger LTVs.
A rulemaking petition recently granted by NHTSA indicates how these
improvements could be accomplished and includes closer coordination with
the part of Standard No. 201 which regulates upper interior side impact.
Since Standard No. 201 has recently been strengthened by the addition of a
much more demanding, optional compliance test, Standard No. 214 could be
similarly upgraded. NHTSA's 1994 benefits analysis showed that scores of
deaths and hundreds of serious injuries could annually be prevented by
better side impact safety countermeasures at only moderate costs to
manufacturers.
ROOF CRUSH: FMVSS NO. 216
BACKGROUND: Light passenger vehicle resistance to roof crush during
rollover crashes is crucial to occupant safety. Both general and localized
roof failures reduce occupant compartment space and result in very high
fatality and severe injury rates. About half of all passenger vehicle
fatalities result from single-vehicle crashes and more than half of these
deaths are the direct result of light vehicle rollovers. Although a large
portion of these fatal injuries are caused by occupant ejections, the
majority are the consequence of occupants suffering massive trauma from
impacting unyielding objects and surfaces because of general and localized
roof failure.
The current roof crush standard has not undergone major revision since
its inception in 1971. The standard specifies a static compliance test
consisting of the application of force, by means of a rigid, rectangular
plate, of 1.5 times the unladen weight of the tested vehicle (or 5,000
pounds, whichever is less) to either of the two sides of the forward edge
of the roof. The test is acknowledged by NHTSA to be inadequate in
multiple ways: it does not model actual rollover forces, the amount of
force applied to the forward A-pillar area is too low, and the test fails
to evaluate other areas of the roof for resistance to failure, including
the roof's ability to withstand localized applications of force. Also, the
current standard does not have criteria governing the permissible levels
of injury in order to pass the compliance test.
Over 90 percent of rollover crashes occur off the traveled way.
Therefore, roof crush standards must be based directly on the type of
roadside topography encountered by light vehicles which includes tree
stumps, fire hydrants, rocks, guardrail posts, and other fixed object
hazards. Rollover crashes often involve roof contact with these roadside
features which apply localized, intrusive forces. In addition to these
localized failures, current roof designs often also suffer general failure
in rollover crashes because of roof pillar collapse. Although some measure
of protection against head and neck trauma is afforded by recent and
prospective improvements in the stringency of FMVSS No. 201, these
advantages of better protection for interior head impacts are largely
nullified if the occupant compartment cannot maintain its integrity in
full rollover crashes.
Recent NHTSA studies of roof crush have shown that a dynamic roof crush
test may not be feasible because of a lack of repeatability and the fact
that even a vehicle drop test does not realistically duplicate real-world
rollover forces. Also, current data cannot show what level of impact
severity should be chosen for rollover crashes in order to model a dynamic
test. However, recent evaluation of a new quasi-static test has shown a
close relationship to the actual forces involved in full rollover crashes.
This appears to provide the best basis for a realistic standard.
In 1994, the then Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation
promised to improve the crush resistance of light vehicle roofs. At the
time that NHTSA terminated rulemaking on a vehicle stability standard for
cars and LTVs, the Secretary announced that action would be taken to
improve roof crush protection. No action to upgrade the standard has yet
been issued.
BENEFITS: While potential benefits are difficult to quantify with
specificity, a revised standard based directly on the forces actually
applied to a passenger vehicle's roof in full rollover crashes would
dramatically reduce both deaths and severity of injury due to roof
failures. Benefits would range widely depending on the rigor of the
compliance test chosen by NHTSA.
FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY: FMVSS NO. 301
BACKGROUND: Standard No. 301 first became effective for cars in 1968
with the primary purpose of reducing deaths and injuries from fires that
result from fuel spillage during and after motor vehicle crashes. The
standard, as amended in 1977, applies to all passenger vehicles as well as
to school buses that exceed 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight rating. The
essential features of the standard have remained unchanged for the past 20
years.
According to NHTSA crash data, there are more than 20,000 passenger
vehicle fires each year that result from crash involvement. The agency
estimates that about three percent of the occupants receive second or
third degree burns. Of these, more than 700 occupants die who have been
moderately or seriously burned. However, many of these deaths are also due
in part to severe impact injuries which often occur in vehicle crashes
involving fires.
The central feature of Standard No. 301 is its limitation of the amount
of fuel spillage when vehicles are tested in front, rear, and side impacts
by flat, rigid barriers. There also is a "static" rollover test
following the barrier impacts. However, there are no offset front or rear
impact tests, no test conducted with a rigid, narrow fixed object such as
a pole or tree (such crashes cause the highest rate of burn injuries), and
the rollover test simply rotates the tested vehicle 90 degrees without the
rollover damage, including roof crush, that would occur in the real world.
NHTSA data shows that actual rollover crashes have the highest rate of
occupants receiving burn injuries in both cars and light trucks and vans.
NHTSA initiated rulemaking in June 1995 to begin a three-stage
improvement to Standard No. 301. The agency planned to upgrade the barrier
tests to make them more severe, ensure that the flow of fuel from the gas
tank is stopped in a crash, and set performance requirements for the long
term integrity of fuel systems which, in older passenger vehicles, have
been shown by NHTSA research to be more vulnerable to deterioration caused
by corrosion and vibration. The agency has preliminarily reviewed the
potential of adding the dynamic side impact test of Standard No. 214 as
well as offset frontal and rear crash tests using barriers more
representative of real-world crash conditions. However, no rulemaking
action has taken place since 1995.
BENEFITS: It is clear the extent to which protection from fires due to
spilled fuel interacts with both crash avoidance and crashworthiness
standards. Many fires could be avoided by increasing roll stability for
the entire passenger vehicle fleet to prevent rollover crashes. With
regard to crashworthiness, a rollover test of fuel systems must accurately
simulate the actual crash forces occurring in a rollover crash. Similarly,
the fuel system retention requirement in the current standard is much too
weak and permits a rate and amount of fuel to escape which dramatically
increases the chances of ignition and consequent vehicle fires. Standard
No. 301 currently allows up to 31 ounces by weight of gasoline to be
released following the completion of the front, side, and rear impact
tests. Also, the static rollover test is defective because fuel leakage is
permitted to occur until the tank is empty as long as the leak rate of one
ounce per minute is not exceeded.
Other countermeasures can have additional substantial lifesaving
results. NHTSA estimates that nearly one-third of all vehicle fires could
be prevented simply by placing tanks forward of rear axles. Additional
fires could be easily prevented if the compliance tests included a
hydraulic pressure test and a strong battery retention requirement for all
crash modes. Moreover, NHTSA should explore fuel flow shutoff measures and
performance requirements for preventing tank filler pipe rupture in
crashes.
CONSUMER INFORMATION: FEDERAL REGULATIONS PART 575
BACKGROUND: NHTSA is required by the 1966 National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (1966 Act) and the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act of 1972 (1972 Act) to provide vehicle information to
consumers. Under the 1966 Act, the agency may require manufacturers to
provide technical information on vehicle and equipment performance and
safety. Under the 1972 Act, information on vehicle damage susceptibility,
crashworthiness, and vehicle operating costs was to be provided in a
readily understandable form that would permit comparisons between
different makes and models. As long ago as 1981, NHTSA raised the
possibility of placing crashworthiness ratings on vehicle window stickers.
In 1994, the agency proposed providing comprehensive consumer information
on vehicle safety issues, including rollover, holding a series of town
meetings. Nothing ever came of these ideas. In 1996, the National Academy
of Sciences called on the agency to provide overall safety ratings in its
study on consumer safety information, Shopping for Safety, Transportation
Research Board Special report No. 248 (1996). The agency has provided only
a very limited amount of information, mostly in the form of warning
labels, and almost no information of a comparative nature that would
assist consumers in making vehicle purchases.
There is a significant need, and clear consumer demand, for information
that provides safety evaluations and which can be used to compare the
relative safety of different vehicles and items of equipment by make and
model. While private sources provide some information, only the agency can
require the type of technical data on issues such as vehicle stability
(rollover propensity), vehicle stopping distances, and brake performance.
Despite more than 30 years since Congress first mandated the issuance
of consumer information, NHTSA only provides a minimal amount of data to
consumers. Warning label requirements exist in the occupant protection and
child restraint standards, and utility vehicle warnings are required in
Part 575 (§575.105). The only other consumer information required by the
agency in Part 575 is information on Truck-camper loading (§575.103) and
the Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (§575.104). Aside from this,
the best example of a government information program and the only
substantive consumer information provided on comparative crashworthiness
is through NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP).
BENEFITS: Safety information about vehicle design and equipment is
essential to ensure that consumers can make intelligent decisions about
their personal safety. Since much of the safety equipment and safety
design issues are highly technical in nature, consumers need basic
information that explains safety performance issues in understandable
terms. Information that consumers can use to compare vehicle makes and
models would provide consumers with the opportunity to make informed
choices about the safety of the vehicles they purchase. Thus, consumer
information is essential to a rational marketplace. While the savings to
the public cannot be quantified, comprehensive safety information would in
all probability lead to reduced crashes as consumers use the information
to purchase safer, better designed vehicles.
BUMPER STRENGTH STANDARD: FEDERAL REGULATIONS PART 581
BACKGROUND: The existing Federal Bumper Standard, Part 581OF THE Code
of Federal Regulations, provides minimal protection for vehicle safety
systems while permitting low impact speed crashes to result in significant
damage to the vehicle. Vehicle bumper strength was originally established
to protect the safety systems of vehicles in low speed crashes of up to
2.5 miles-per-hour (mph) regardless of damage to the bumper itself or to
vehicle parts other than the safety systems. The standard was upgraded to
require protection in impacts of speeds up to 5.0 mph and the bumper
itself could sustain only minimal damage, but this requirement was
rescinded before it took effect in the early 1980s. As a result, in low
speed impacts of 2.5 mph or less, bumpers provide only minimal protection
to the vehicle safety systems and the body of the vehicle. The bumpers
themselves can be destroyed and frequently need extensive repairs or have
to be replaced. As the cost of vehicles has increased dramatically over
the years, so has the cost of vehicle repair and bumper repair and
replacement. Moreover, vehicle purchasers cannot discern bumper strength
merely by looking at a bumper, and little reliable information on actual
bumper strength, including whether the bumper and vehicle parts will be
damaged or destroyed at given impact speeds, is available to the consumer.
BENEFITS: Upgrading the bumper standard to require bumpers to withstand
impact speeds of 5.0 mph or higher would provide enhanced protection to
the vehicle safety systems and reduce overall consumer vehicle repair and
part replacement costs. Repair and replacement costs for damaged caused in
low speed crashes currently run into the hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.
APPENDIX C
LISTING OF STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS
State Highway Safety Laws
as of 9/8/99
| STATE |
GDL Systems* |
Partial GDL Systems** |
Standard (Primary) Safety Belt Enforcement |
.08 BAC |
Child Restraint No Gaps+ |
All-Rider Helmet Laws |
Red Light Running Photo Enforcement Laws++ |
| Alabama |
|
|
x |
x |
|
x |
|
| Alaska |
|
|
|
|
x |
|
|
| Arizona |
|
|
|
|
|
|
x |
| Arkansas |
|
x |
|
|
|
|
|
| California |
x † |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Colorado |
x † |
|
|
|
x |
|
x |
| Connecticut |
|
x |
x |
|
x |
|
|
| Delaware |
x † |
|
|
|
x |
|
x |
| DC |
|
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
| Florida |
x † |
|
|
x |
x |
x |
|
| Georgia |
x † |
|
x |
|
x |
x |
|
| Hawaii |
|
x
(eff. 1/1/01)
|
x |
x |
|
|
x |
| Idaho |
|
|
|
x |
|
|
|
| Illinois |
x |
|
|
x |
|
|
x |
| Indiana |
x |
|
x |
|
|
|
|
| Iowa |
x † |
|
x |
|
|
|
|
| Kansas |
|
|
|
x |
|
|
|
| Kentucky |
|
x |
|
|
x |
|
|
| Louisiana |
x |
|
x |
|
|
| |